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The German artist Thomas Struth has established himself in the 
art world with a cycle of large-format color photographs depict-
ing visitors in famous museums throughout the world. These so-
called ‘Museum Photographs’ show in a seemingly unmediated 
(albeit aesthetically extremely conscious) way people viewing art-
work in different rooms. On one level these pictures are hardly 
particularly remarkable; photos of people performing various 
routines or watching something exist in a plenitude of variations. 
Yet, something strange and alienating rests over Thomas Struth’s 
images.
The actual situation, considering a work of art at a museum, 
is of course a familiar act for a lot of people. One strolls through 
empty halls or jostles through crowded spaces, hastening past a 
number of works or stopping and reflecting for a long time before 
something of interest. But what are we actually doing? How do 
you stand, how do you move, how do you relate to the artworks, 
to the room and to other viewers? The subject-position, the gen-
eral other or the ‘one’ that the anonymous crowd in Struth’s 
photos pose, might as well be considered as an individual ‘I’; the 
border between the ideal and the real viewer stands out as indis-
tinct or liquid. Reception as a theoretical problem, and ‘the en-
counter with the work’ as a mystical conception, are placed into a 
physically tangible, yet impersonal social situation. And this situ-
ation as a depicted phenomenon is becoming the subject of a new 
work of art—ready to be exhibited and experienced in precisely 
the same place depicted. The aesthetics and the large scale of the 
photograph reinforces, in turn, a distance to the documentary 
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feature of the images, as well as the everydayness of the action 
of the beholder of art. But what the pictures also do is visualize 
a part of a discursive practice: the world where art exists as ‘art’.
One example is Museum of Modern Art, New York 1994, a 
study of observer of Jackson Pollock’s One: Number 31, 1950. By 
accident, I visited MoMA myself for the first time a few months 
after Thomas Struth took his photograph. I was absolutely mes-
merized by Jackson Pollock’s huge painting. And as I walked 
through the collections, where each room contained key works, I 
felt like I was moving through the history of art, as though my own 
physical movement through the halls corresponded with reading a 
handbook on 20th century art or taking art history lectures at the 
university. It was probably the immensely high level of the collec-
tion that made me, a visitor from one of the semi- peripheries of 
Northern Europe, estranged of an otherwise familiar situation—
and thus made me recognize the close relation between display 
and narrative.
What I’m trying to describe is the moment when a rift emerges 
between yourself and something familiar, when the real but un-
conscious conditions for something you do every day suddenly 
emerge. When one suddenly is able to observe an otherwise invis-
ible pattern.
The pattern in this case means the notion of modernism as the 
art of the modern era, which became fully institutionalized some-
time during the 1900s. Thus modernism emerges as the historical 
standard against which all other forms of art and visual codes 
are measured. This idea can be described as normalized in the 
sense that it has been a hidden condition rather than a thesis that 
requires arguments. Since that moment of realization at MoMA, 
I have observed the same basic pattern in numerous exhibitions, 
catalogues, handbooks, review papers and special studies. This led 
to an urge to study this phenomenon, the meta-narrative of the 
modernist art history. The problem of such a task was to find a 
way to recognize the duality of the word historiography—to write 
history and to write about history-writing—in a way similar to 
how Thomas Struth’s photographs make it possible both to con-
template art and study the contemplation of art.
****
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When, where and how did modernism become synonymous with 
modern art? The question may seem preposterous, but it high-
lights that something taken for granted may not be quite so ob-
vious. If one were to write a chronicle of the visual arts between 
1850 and 1950 from a purely historical perspective, without any 
aesthetic considerations, the picture would be radically different 
from those conveyed in the vast majority of the exhibitions, text-
books and special studies. Other contexts and other images would 
appear that, in their historical situation, were judged to be the 
most important and essential works of art but were disregarded 
or completely excluded in the modernist historiography. Thus, the 
triumph of modernism in the West after the Second World War 
was not just a case of institutional acceptance of radical art, it was 
a victory that established a historic narrative based on a certain 
aesthetic paradigm.
This survey stems from a desire both to understand modern 
art—and modernism—from a broader perspective than what the 
matrix of modernist historiography offers and to understand how 
and in what historical context this matrix was framed and on 
what implicit criteria it rests. Therefore, this objective is examined 
from a position that goes beyond a purely art historical story in 
order to analyze the historical and institutional situations in which 
the story was formulated and subsequently normalized. In this re-
spect, the title Modernism as Institution refers not only to a social 
historical or sociological analysis of the art world institutions, but 
also to an analysis that combines social, aesthetic, historical and 
historiographical perspectives. This perspective is close to Griselda 
Pollock’s definition in ‘Feminism and Modernism’ (1987):
Modernism can be understood as an institution, composed of and 
realised in a series of practices –painting, sculpting, writing art 
criticism, curating exhibitions, marketing pictures and careers, 
lecturing on art history courses, collecting and so forth. These 
practices circulate an ideology for the making, consuming and rat-
ification of art . . . It [modernism] also refers to a representation 
of twentieth-century art practices which select some as significant 
(advancing, avant-garde), while marginalising others as residual, 
reactionary or historically irrelevant. Modernist criticism and art 
history have become the shaping and ‘selective’ tradition of and 
for twentieth-century culture in the West.1
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Here, modernism is not only understood as a certain aesthetic 
approach or a contiguous cluster of artistic strategies, but also as 
an ideological matrix for interpretation, selection and evaluation. 
The very concept of modernism (and the theoretical perspectives 
that it historically has included) stands by itself as an interesting 
and problematic phenomenon, with its own history of establish-
ment, operations and transformations during the 1900s.
It is possible to emphasize a couple of disparate purposes for 
such an analysis. One aim is to make visible alternative historical 
empirics (works of art, groups of artists, events, ideas, networks, 
contexts) that were perceived as obsolete or excluded from the 
modernist historiography. Another is to establish theoretical po-
sitions and analytical instruments in order to visualize the histor-
ically specific criteria and strata that the modernist narrative was 
resting upon and, at the same time, made invisible (by making 
them universal, ahistorical and ‘normal’). These two objectives are 
not in any way mutually exclusive but can be seen as necessary 
and mutually supportive strategies; if the main purpose has been 
to investigate the very canonizing modernist narrative itself, its 
omissions and blind spots have made it possible to catch sight of 
the narrative as part of a discursive practice.
Thus the aim has been to articulate a distance towards the ob-
ject of study in order to obtain an understanding of modernism 
that differs from its own historiography. This reinterpretation is 
in no way uniform but consists of a huge amount of divergent 
issues and starting points, which all in one way or another can be 
described as critical. The keyword in my application of this criti-
cal perspective has been ambivalence: an active effort to visualize 
cracks in and to deconstruct the apparently stable and uniform 
structure established by modernist historiography. This theoreti-
cal framework is to a large extent informed by the work of Michel 
Foucault. L’archéologie du savoir (1969) and L’ordre du discours 
(1971) have been of particular importance, not as a direct me-
thodical influence, but rather as a motivation to ask certain kinds 
of questions, to call in a certain kind of context and to make 
visible certain kinds of patterns. The perspective presented here 
involves creating a distance from categories that have been taken 
for granted in previous historiography in order to find possible 
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contexts and patterns beyond established narratives and to recon-
cile a historical and metahistorical analysis.
But to clarify my theoretical stance, I would like to make a 
distinction between discourse theory and discourse analysis. In 
his own characterization of discourse analysis (what he called ‘ar-
cheology’), Foucault states that this is not a new method of inter-
pretation, but rather an analysis of a historical stage in the form 
of an episteme: the aim is not to ask what has motivated a singu-
lar statement or what kind of meaning it expresses, but rather to 
try to ‘define specific forms of articulation’2 My primary purpose, 
however, is to write history in terms of an interpretation of the 
contexts and content of statements and events. For this purpose, 
discourse theory has had the function of a theoretical reference 
point to provide a distinct rigor in how the questions are asked 
and how the contexts are described.
The concept of discourse is, in other words, used as an instru-
ment to distinguish certain kinds of contexts where meaning is 
produced: an institutional and/or socially conditioned regular 
structure that creates a certain order and maintains the limits for 
acceptable representations, choices, actions, identities and trans-
formations and, thereby, regulates both what can be said and how 
it can be said. The limit for a statement or an artistic represen-
tation is in this respect not only on an aesthetic or theoretical 
positioning within or opposed to other positions, but also part 
of a larger social, structural, intellectual and institutional context 
(‘the archive’).3
Based on this fundamentally structural determination, my 
purpose is to perform a closer examination of unique historical 
situations: of events; of social, political and aesthetical contexts; 
of institutional structures, as well as the production of historical, 
aesthetical and ideological identities. The concept of modernity 
has, in that regard, been used as an interface between the aesthetic 
and the social; it is a concept whose ambiguity reveals different 
connections, contexts and interpersonal relationships, which al-
low an analysis that does not stick to a specific schedule of causal 
relationships. In this purpose I do not differ from a tradition of 
social art history (Marxist or not); although, my combination of 
historical and metahistorical perspectives gives my study a rather 
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different structure than most other works in this tradition. This 
also suggests that despite my deep impression of poststructuralist 
theory, not least in terms of a skeptical stance towards essential, 
absolute and stable constants, I basically still write from a herme-
neutic perspective.
The reason for this is my interest in directing interpretation to-
wards the object, which I have elsewhere described as the possibil-
ity of holding an iconological paradigm—although significantly 
modified.4 As such, this perspective presents an antithesis against 
the tendency in some semiotic and poststructuralist theories to 
delegitimize the interpretation of a work of art as a central task 
in humanistic research, a tendency where the question of how a 
work means is set in opposition to the question what it means.5 
My point is that these issues do not need to be understood as 
mutually exclusive; to the contrary, it is precisely in the critical 
relationship between the how and the what that interpretation is 
activated and also where it is possible to establish a relationship 
between the then and the now. In this context, the interpretation 
is activated both as part of a meta-understanding of the formation 
meaning in a certain context and as an identification and interpre-
tation of possible meanings within that context.6 The purpose has 
been both to understand images as the primary sources of an in-
dividual (and historically specific) horizon of meaning and to use 
images as intersections in the overall analysis in order to concret-
ize a theoretical or historiographical argument. In the latter case, 
one can understand the concept of image in relation to Douglas 
Crimp’s use of it in his essay ‘Pictures’ (1979): as a critical tool for 
relating the production of aesthetic objects to mental and ideo-
logical conceptions.7 It is in this context that the formulation of 
modernism as the essential modern art can be understood as a 
constitution of a specific picture or trope (an ideologically satu-
rated representation).
****
Part one, the Regime of Authenticity, consists of a thematic inter-
pretation of some of the key tropes of modernism: modernity, au-
thenticity, presence, originality, truth, historical necessity. The aim 
here has been to differentiate and deconstruct certain fundamental 
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patterns of crucial importance in the interpretation of modern 
art in order to present a more complex and multilayered under-
standing of modernism and modern art. The key starting point in 
this regard has been to analyse the era of modern art on the basis 
of a larger context (modernity) than that offered by a purely art- 
historical study so as to uncover the contours and anchor points 
in a narrative that has served as an interpretive template underly-
ing modernist historiography. This theoretical and epistemological 
investigation of modernity has been augmented by an analysis of 
the changes to the institutional structure of the art world and the 
establishment of a particular sphere of value. Using this approach, 
I attempt to identify some key nodes in the vast and all but incom-
prehensible pattern constituting modernism as an institution.
Part two, the Normalisation of the Avant-Garde, is more an 
historical and chronological study. The key premise here is that 
the period following the Second World War brought with it a 
fundamental change in the way modern art was understood and 
described and that it was at this time that Modernism was nor-
malised and institutionalised in the prevailing normative systems 
of the West. As is made readily apparent in the application of 
concepts such as normalisation and institutionalisation, the post-
war period brought with it social, discursive, intellectual and his-
toriographic shifts in the conditions of modern art. What became 
institutionalised were not only a set of aesthetic criteria and sty-
listic idioms, but also a considerably more extensive and more 
authoritative interpretation of the art of the modern era—both in 
contemporary and historical terms. Moreover, what normalisa-
tion means in this context is that not only was a particular way of 
seeing entrenched in the system of norms of the dominant culture, 
but also a certain form of representation/narration was also grad-
ually adopted as a premise whose ideological criteria and histori-
cally specific circumstances were concealed behind a notion of its 
universal applicability. These intellectual and ideological aspects 
of the institution are just as important as its social, economic and 
material infrastructure.
Part three, Transformation/Transmedia/Transfusion, consid-
ers the changes that have affected the normalised historiography 
and narrative of modernism from the end of the 1950s onwards. 
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It was then that the conflict over the right to formulate the na-
ture of the problem became acute once more in the art worlds of 
Western Europe and the United States. A struggle in which the es-
tablished view, which emphasised to a great extent the boundary 
between art and the surrounding world, was opposed by various 
open strategies aimed at bridging this very cleavage. This anal-
ysis leads to a concluding argument concerning the paradoxical 
position of the avant-garde as an institutionalised counterculture 
and the extent to which the alternative aesthetic and epistemolog-
ical viewpoints labelled postmodernism have managed to call into 
question and to delegitimise both this position and the institu-
tionalised narrative of modernism. This challenge did not involve 
a simple dismissal but should be understood instead from two 
diametrically opposed viewpoints: one attempted to demonstrate 
how the new forms of pluralism within the art world meant that 
the phenomenon of the avant-garde had become impossible, while 
the other sought to reestablish the oppositional and antagonistic 
position of the avant-garde in contemporary society. Both sides 
of this discussion may, however, be considered as the logical out-
comes of the dilemma that is the hallmark of the historical process 
in this study: what happens when a counterculture becomes inte-
grated into the dominant one?
PART I 
THE REGIME OF AUTHENTICITY
The threshold between Classicism and modernity . . . had been defi-
nitely crossed when words ceased to intersect with representations 
and to provide a spontaneous grid for the knowledge of things. At 
the beginning of nineteenth century, they rediscovered their an-
cient, enigmatic density; though not in order to restore the curve 
of the world which had harboured them during the Renaissance, 
nor in order to mingle with things in a circular system of signs.1
Michel Foucault, Les mots et les choses (1966)
Modernity is a polemical tradition which displaces the tradition of 
the moment, whatever it happens to be, but an instant later yields 
its place to still another tradition which in turn is a momentary 
manifestation of modernity. Modernity is never itself; it is always 
the other. The modern is characterized not only by novelty but 
by otherness. A bizarre tradition and the tradition of the bizarre, 
modernity is condemned to pluralism. . .2
Octavio Paz, Los hijos del limo (1974)
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The Modernity of Modernism
The Tradition of the New
Understood as a question, the subtitle to Kirk Varnedoe’s book A 
Fine Disregard (1990) poses a problem that may appear puzzling: 
What Makes Modern Art Modern.3 Remarkably, what Varnedoe 
has made it his task to explain has not just been taken for granted 
but appears to be a contradiction in purely semantic terms—for 
if modern art is not modern, what is it? Put briefly, the answer as 
developed in Varnedoe’s study is based on the idea that the very 
modernity of modern art (and implicitly of modernism) lies in 
a decision by certain artists to rethink the traditional goals and 
methods of visual art in a manner that was only made possible by 
the changes to social and cultural systems that took place in the 
late nineteenth century.4 In a nutshell, the modernity of modern-
ism is to be found in the striving of the individual to remodel the 
rules of tradition and produce something radically new within the 
framework of that same tradition. This explanation may seem en-
tirely plausible, but it remains far less perplexing than the formu-
lation of the problem itself: the very modernism of modernity as a 
matter taken for granted, a premise rather than an open question.
Kirk Varnedoe’s account has recourse to a theme that has been 
central both to the avant-garde discourse of the twentieth century 
and the historiography of that period: the relationship of visual art 
to the modern and the new. In Aesthetic Theory (1970), Theodore 
Adorno describes how this relationship has become burdened by 
an element of compulsion or of an almost a priori necessity:
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Yet since the mid nineteenth century and the rise of high capital-
ism, the category of the new has been central, though admittedly in 
conjunction with the question whether anything new had ever ex-
isted. Since that moment no artwork has succeeded that rebuffed 
the ever fluctuating concept of the modern.5 
The concept of modernism itself involves a radicalisation of this 
theme: a movement that not only stands in a specific relation to 
the modern, but which by its very nature affirms the new without 
reserve, attempting at any cost to go beyond the utmost bound-
aries of modernity in this process of affirmation. In this context, 
Ezra Pound’s celebrated battle-cry ‘Make it new!’ may be under-
stood as both a condensation and a radicalisation of the demand 
for contemporaneity that the realist avant-garde of the late nine-
teenth century sought to impose on art (‘il faut être de son temps’). 
Obviously, this insistence on newness and contemporaneity had 
not only a descriptive, but also a powerfully normative aspect. 
Sooner or later, however, this cross-boundary pursuit of perpetual 
newness was bound to find itself in an uncomfortable position, 
as the change was interpreted in relation to history. This appar-
ently paradoxical situation has been aptly described by Harold 
Rosenberg when referring to ‘the tradition of the new’.
If Pound’s and Rosenberg’s formulations are placed side by 
side, an interesting dislocation is revealed in which the aesthetics 
and identity of the avant-garde have become a norm for histor-
ical classification. Furthermore, when the dates of these phrases 
are compared, 1934 and 1959, respectively, a period of time is 
marked out that would in many ways come to redefine modern 
art.6 Certain definitive changes can also be detected during this 
period in the use of a concept such as modernism when applied to 
the way in which modern art is defined.
According to Matei Calinescu, the concept of modernism was 
first used relatively recently, during the 1920s, as a collective term 
for various radical, at first literary and subsequently artistic, move-
ments.7 The term modernism is conspicuous by its absence from 
the period before the Second World War, irrespective of whether 
art criticism, manifestos or historicist writings about modern art 
are being studied. It would prove much more useful at a later 
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stage: towards the end of the 1930s, when an epochal concept 
was required as part of the intensifying efforts to chart, distin-
guish, evaluate and classify historically the hodgepodge of various 
avant-garde movements that had arisen from the late nineteenth 
century onwards. Modernism would provide the term required to 
circumscribe these heterogeneous movements, managing to inject 
an element of uniformity into their radical disunity, while also 
putting it in relation to modern life. Attempts to chart the terrain 
in this way had also been made as part of the art history and ex-
hibition activity of the early nineteenth century, but then it was 
more a matter of establishing and legitimising new movements 
(‘-isms’) in relation to one another, to history and to contemporary 
society. The need to produce an overall map did not, in fact, be-
come topical until later: once avant-garde art had become increas-
ingly institutionalised as part of the cultural life of Europe and the 
United States. A further change both in meaning and usage can be 
identified a few decades later, from the end of the 1970s onwards, 
when the concept of modernism was used as a collective term for 
the art and aesthetics that had just been declared anathema and 
which postmodernists wanted both to transcend and negate.
The decisive change in this regard is not to be found in the 
historicisation of the avante-garde during this period, but in the 
shifting of the position of the avant-garde from the margins to 
the centre of discourse: with the normalisation of the logic of per-
petual change that would now define contemporary cultural life. 
The historical interpretation of modern art—and the interpreta-
tion of modernism as modern art—thus constitutes both a histor-
ically transient category and an understanding from which our 
own self-image has developed in one way or another, positively 
or negatively. The image of the dominant position of modernism 
in the art and visual culture of modernity still provides a matrix 
for what is considered historically normal in the art history of the 
twentieth century.8
****
The relationship between modernism and modernity has been 
characterised in general terms by many authors. One example is 
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the historian Louis Dupeux, who thinks that modernism amounts 
to ‘the systematic valuation’ (la valorisation systématique) of 
modernity.9 A similar formulation can be found in the work of 
Charles Harrison and Paul Wood, who write that modernism 
involves ‘the deliberate reflection’ on modernity.10 These formu-
lations may appear entirely plausible, but they are nevertheless 
too vague to provide any kind of answer as to the nature of the 
relationship. Nor do they succeed in identifying anything typi-
cal about modernist art in comparison with other aesthetic ap-
proaches; instead, they presuppose a connection that is at once 
too general and too specific to be characterised: general in the 
sense of self-evident and specific in that it can only be described 
on the basis of each individual example (in the form of particular 
statements or works of art.)
Marshall Berman, on the other hand, manages to be consider-
ably more detailed when describing the connection between mo-
dernity and modernism in All That Is Solid Melts into Air:
To be modern, I said, is to experience personal and social life as 
a maelstrom, to find one’s world and oneself in perpetual disin-
tegration and renewal, trouble and anguish, ambiguity and con-
tradiction: to be part of a universe in which all that is solid melts 
into air. To be a modernist is to make oneself somehow at home in 
the maelstrom, to make its rhythms one’s own, to move within its 
currents in search of the forms of reality, of beauty, of freedom, of 
justice, that its fervid and perilous flow allows.11
Throughout this work, Berman succeeds in highlighting the signif-
icance of contradiction in the modern and within modernism, as, 
in particular, in his quoting of Marx’s celebrated phrase in the ti-
tle. He describes the link between base and superstructure from a 
historically materialist viewpoint as a multifaceted and occasion-
ally contradictory dialectical process. It is the paradoxical unity, 
the risk, the transformation, and the pain and the dangers, too, 
that are focused on, while ‘the maelstrom of continual dissolution’ 
evokes bold, energetic, almost futuristically charged images and 
metaphors. Rather than present us with the humdrum greyness of 
the everyday in modern society, its routinisation of social life and 
increasing alienation, Berman’s account paints a picture of heroic 
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struggle and confusion in which the individual launches himself 
unflinchingly into the maelstrom of dissolution of futurity.
Although this perspective is somewhat modified in the rest of 
his presentation, (particularly when describing Robert Mose’s 
planning/devastation of the Bronx as an image of the more brutal 
and technocratic aspects of modernism), the idea of modernism 
itself retains its heroic nimbus. It still conveys, in his eyes, a cre-
ative, radical and even revolutionary potential that needs to be 
affirmed—despite all the evils that can be attributed to the process 
of modernisation. This condensed account succeeds in situating 
the various forms of the word modern in a self-evident and trans-
parent relation to one another: modernity, modernisation, mod-
ernism. A value judgement is also being made here, in which the 
capacity for relating to the modern in a particular way—of ‘being 
modern’— is a positive characteristic on the part of a group or an 
individual living in the modern world. For Berman, modernism 
as a collective term encompasses rather more than a particular 
aesthetic canon; although, particular linguistic qualities and artis-
tic devices are considered in terms of an essential value and thus 
given a privileged relation to the contemporary: modernism is not 
primarily presented as a style but as a zeitgeist in the old and ide-
alistic sense of the word.
This judgement can no doubt be traced back to Charles 
Baudelaire’s description of the specific aesthetic value of contem-
porary art in ‘Le peintre de la vie moderne’ (1863), where the 
ephemeral aspects of the contemporary world are seen as a spe-
cific quality of the art of the modern period:
By ‘modernity’ I mean the ephemeral, the fugitive, the contingent, 
the half of art whose other half is the eternal and the immutable. 
Every old master has had his own modernity; the great majority 
of fine portraits that have come down to us from former gener-
ations are clothed in the costume of their own period. They are 
perfectly harmonious, because everything – from costume and 
coiffure down to gesture, glance and smile (for each age has a de-
portment, a glance and a smile of its own) – everything, I say, com-
bines to form a completely viable whole. This transitory, fugitive 
element, whose metamorphoses are so rapid, must on no account 
be despised or dispensed with. . . . . Woe to him who studies the 
8 Modernism as Institution
antique for anything else but pure art, logic and general method! 
By steeping himself too thoroughly in it, he will lose all memory of 
the present; he will renounce the rights and privileges offered by 
circumstance – for almost all our originality comes from the seal 
which Time imprints on our sensations.12
It is a total immersion in the present, which is described by 
Baudelaire as the essential task of contemporary art (whose fate 
is inevitably to become part of history and thus lose its most cru-
cial quality). Part of Baudelaire’s argument may, of course, derive 
from the very ancient and long-established notion of the superi-
ority of one’s own time over the past: that because we stand on 
the shoulders of giants, we can see further than they could. But he 
emphasises the specific beauty of the contemporary (of the pres-
ent) without necessarily rejecting the efforts of previous ages to 
find general (eternal) beauty. What he is actually formulating is 
a paradoxical relationship between the transient and the eternal, 
which does not involve a simple polemic against tradition, but 
rather an analysis of the contemporary that serves as an exhorta-
tion to establish a dynamic connection with history.
Baudelaire’s definition entails a revaluation of the dynamic 
variability of modern society, which also introduced a new sense 
of time and a different way of reflecting on the particular iden-
tity of contemporary society in relation to the past. But where 
Baudelaire highlights a diffuse phenomenon in his own society 
as reflecting a comprehensive change, Berman affirms instead the 
entrenchment of that phenomenon in a particular aesthetic canon. 
These authors also speak to us from two diametrically opposed 
historical positions. Between these texts lie not only just over a 
century of changes in aesthetic pronouncements and historical se-
lections, but more importantly a normalisation of a certain kind 
of pronouncement and selection. For it is, of course, not as simple 
a matter as Charles Harrison, for example, would have us believe: 
that modernist art theory has proved better able at capturing the 
concepts and views that have turned out to be definitive of mod-
ern artistic practice.13 Once modernist art theory is afforded this 
privileged position, what it actually does is establish the precon-
ditions for what may be understood and defined as modern art.
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The concept of modernity that emerges here is not only multi-
valent, but also applied in a wealth of diverse and, occasionally, 
contradictory areas of usage in which it fulfils different functions. 
In order to illustrate the complexity of these interconnections, 
Fredric Jameson has distinguished two distinct uses and meanings 
of the concept of modernity: one linguistic and one epochal.14 In 
the former sense, the concept has an ostensive function, identify-
ing a phenomenon as modern. Here the concept remains constant 
in terms of form but completely empty in terms of content, like a 
personal pronoun alternating between different tenses and indi-
viduals, like the ‘I’ that is used by different people in a conversa-
tion and identifies the particular person using it. The phenomena 
of his contemporary world Baudelaire would so enthusiastically 
describe as modern belong nowadays to history; the characteris-
tics I attribute to the modernity of my own time are contradicted 
by other interpretations and selections. In an academic context, 
this process of exclusion and inclusion involves both the choice 
of an interpretative horizon and an affiliation to a subject area: 
an art historian will presumably emphasise different matters than 
a sociologist or an economist. In the second sense, which could 
be said to be a function of the first, the concept of modernity is 
used to characterise a particular age or epoch.15 The concept of 
modernity is usually considered to encompass a historical period 
that had its beginnings in post-feudal Europe and is therefore as-
sociated with industrialisation and technological change, with the 
advent of a capitalist commodity market and a systematic division 
of labour, with continually increasing economic growth and the 
trans-national flow of money and information, with the rise of the 
bourgeoisie as the dominant social class and the establishment of 
the nation state, with the philosophy of the Enlightenment and 
the scientific revolutions that introduced a greater degree of ra-
tionalisation and a demystification of existence, with a greater 
differentiation of the functions of society as reflected in new forms 
of administration, jurisprudence and the exercise of power, with 
urbanisation and the establishment of new patterns of social life.
Together all these shifting uses and attributes may be condensed 
into a single historical perspective in which a particular histori-
cal change (modernisation) is combined with a new intellectual 
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orientation (the Enlightenment) and in which the formulation of 
a post-traditional world view is interwoven with an emancipatory 
idea of human liberation. A number of key tropes can thus be 
discerned connecting the various, divergent theories about mo-
dernity that were produced in the twentieth century; all of these 
tropes may be traced back to the idea that modernity is not just 
a concept or a representation, but is also, or perhaps above all, a 
narrative category. What this tells us is that knowledge about the 
modern has also been produced in the modern, an apparently ba-
nal statement that succeeds nevertheless in highlighting the close 
connection between descriptive and normative criteria—between 
the production of knowledge and of ideology—because the for-
mulation of the contemporary is crucial to the formation of the 
political.16 Fredric Jameson has described this relationship in par-
ticularly apt fashion:
‘Modernity’ then, as a trope, is itself a sign of modernity as such. 
The very concept of modernity, then, is itself modern, and drama-
tizes its own claims. Or to put it the other way around, we may 
say that what passes for a theory of modernity in all the writers we 
have mentioned is itself little more than the projection of its own 
rhetorical structure onto the themes and content in question; the 
theory of modernity is little more than a projection of the trope 
itself. 17
The essential aspect of this argument is that the descriptive iden-
tification also encompasses a meta-level, which is not only based 
on a particular judgement, but also follows a set dramaturgy. 
This means, first, that a hyper-complex and boundless context 
is reduced to a limited set of themes, and second, this thematic 
arrangement is based on a narrative structure, on various rhetor-
ical figures and on images and metaphors that are more or less 
integrated. Put simply, it involves discursive representations that 
condense a vast and contradictory context into a comprehensible 
(and ideologically effective) form, into images that have been pro-
duced, translated, projected and reproduced in every conceivable 
context. This is a process that has no space for deviations and 
doubt but which seeks to shape history with regard both to the 
needs of the current age and to the aims of the future.
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This could be said to be the standard version of the modern 
narrative of modernity; it is a version of the story that produces 
a relatively coherent image of modernity. What Berman is at-
tempting to bring to light is its critical and even revolutionary 
potential—a way of thinking and being that blows apart the stan-
dardised image. Contradiction is a crucial factor in this enterprise 
and one that must be continually affirmed and renewed in order 
to wrest the modern project away from the technocrats of mod-
ernisation. The problem with his account is not so much its heroic 
ambitions for contemporary society but the way it establishes a 
horizon for historical analysis from within modernity as an over-
arching system. Contradiction becomes an ideological weapon, 
rather than a tool, for illuminating and analysing the premises of 
his own historiography: the words modernity and modernism are 
used as a means of defending particular ideological and existen-
tial values rather than as the starting point for an analysis of the 
premises of established historiography. But to describe or analyse 
this context from without—so as to demonstrate both its rhetoric 
and which tropes it takes for granted—is no easy task. Even if 
we accept the idea that we could be said today to stand outside 
 modernity and are thus capable of observing its beginning and 
end, its factual preconditions and ideological tropes, every aspect 
of this modernity has served to create the very foundations on 
which our own age, our own ideological narratives and historical 
blind spots have been constructed.
A good place for such an investigation to begin might be to take 
Octavio Paz at his word when he asserts that modernity is always 
another, all the values, functions and forms of experience, that is, 
which arise between and beyond all its apparently obvious and 
clearly defined attributes. We might formulate a strategy in this re-
gard that has certain similarities with a Derridean deconstruction: 
where Jameson distinguishes modernity as a trope formulated in 
and by the modern, Paz points out the necessity of discovering 
and investigating the cracks in this undifferentiated image. Instead 
of simply adding together a series of attributes in order to produce 
an apparently objective and factual equation of the modern, we 
could choose, like Zygmunt Bauman, to describe modernity as 
something more than a general pluralism, as something that is 
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fundamentally ambivalent. According to Bauman, ambivalence is 
a normal phenomenon of linguistic practice and has its origins 
in one of the key functions of language: naming or classifying. 
Classification is an act of inclusion and exclusion that divides the 
world in two, thus creating a stable structure of binary polarities. 
Ambivalence may be understood as a by-product of this process, 
a bugbear that directs attention to phenomena and values outside 
the range and norms of the system and, in so doing, demonstrates 
its arbitrary and unstable nature:
Ambivalence, the possibility of assigning an object or an event to 
more than one category, is a language-specific disorder: a failure 
of the naming (segregating) function that language is meant to 
perform. The main symptom of disorder is the acute discomfort 
we feel when we are unable to read the situation properly and to 
choose between alternative actions.18
Because the goal of rational modernity is to create a stable and 
symmetrical order within all its practices and areas of operation, 
every form of ambivalence presents a threat that has to be elim-
inated. But as no language provides an unambiguous and stable 
structure, ambivalence cannot, in Bauman’s view, be eliminated—
on the contrary, it appears to be a fundamental attribute of all 
linguistic construction and communication. If modernity is con-
sidered as a discursively produced phenomenon, ambivalence 
would constitute a basic component of its defining characteris-
tics and classification: a persistent ontological fault line running 
through the forms of experience and representation that the mod-
ern has given rise to.
Elsewhere, Bauman has described this ambivalence of moder-
nity as a split between ability (what I may do) and wanting (what 
I wish to be done), which has brought about a state of permanent 
disharmony.19 This rift may also be considered to be a function 
of the intersection of these two heterogeneous patterns of move-
ment, the dynamic of continual change and novelty as opposed 
to the equilibrium of rational order and the system. Attempts to 
eliminate ambivalence of this kind—by reproducing, for exam-
ple, the idea of a uniform and consistently rational modernity—
would involve not only a normalisation of particular selections 
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and evaluations, but also a potential threat to modernity’s fun-
damental, cross-boundary dynamic. This idea of uniformity may 
be countered by a motley and contradictory combination of 
scepticism and deferral of a more philosophical and epistemo-
logical kind, a combination that has frequently been dismissed 
as the product of nostalgia or of lingering premodern forms of 
experience.
One of the most resolute and simultaneously heart- wrenching 
examples of a stance that is critical of both modernity and prog-
ress is found in Walter Benjamin’s posthumously published 
Geschichtphilosophische Thesen (1940), where he inscribes his 
doubts about the present and the future in a painting by Paul Klee:
A Klee painting named ‘Angelus Novus’ shows an angel looking 
as though he is about to move away from something he is fixedly 
contemplating. His eyes are staring, his mouth is open, his wings 
are spread. This is how one pictures the angel of history. His face 
is turned towards the past. Where we perceive a chain of events, 
he sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon 
wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet. The angel would like to 
stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has been smashed. 
But a storm is blowing from Paradise; it has got caught in his 
wings with such violence that the angel can no longer close them. 
This storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which his 
back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows skyward. 
This storm is what we call progress.20
This short text contains an array of suggestive metaphors: from 
the eyes of the angel (the gaze of the historian) and the storm 
out of Paradise (the development of history) to ruins that form a 
veritable Tower of Babel (the ultimate consequences of this devel-
opment). What Benjamin is formulating here is an attitude critical 
of civilisation that is particularly reminiscent of the Primitivist 
trope, which characterised so many of the various avante-garde 
movements of the early twentieth century. In opposition to the 
maelstrom of change, the storm of progress emerges as an alter-
native image of how historical change has driven human beings 
further and further away from their original condition while also 
driving the Enlightenment ever further away from the original 
14 Modernism as Institution
idea of the liberating and life-affirming force of rational thinking. 
The melancholy and despair evoked by the Biblical metaphors 
are, of course, connected with the real-life circumstances in which 
Benjamin found himself: fleeing from the German Nazi-regime, 
whose war machine at that time seemed impossible to stop, while 
deeply disillusioned at Stalin’s betrayal of world communism in 
the signing of the nonaggression pact with Hitler. This pessimism 
was not restricted to the acute situation that obtained at the be-
ginning of the 1940s but encompassed the developmental process 
of history as a whole in that it considered change and progress to 
be a story of continually repeated catastrophes. It is in this con-
text that he would impose a fundamental moral requirement on 
historiography: not to pass on blindly the history of the victor, but 
to allow the depiction of the past to become a commemoration 
and rehabilitation of the victims of the triumphal march of the 
generals and of ‘development’.
This lack of trust in progress might well have been shared by 
anyone who managed to live through the years immediately fol-
lowing the war in the bombed-out metropolises of Europe. The 
political, social and economic problems confronting the countries 
affected were enormous, and this would be particularly true fol-
lowing the Second World War. The image of growing piles of ru-
ined buildings was no metaphor but an extremely tangible form of 
reality for millions of people. They were also faced with the moral 
and existential reevaluation forced on them by the Holocaust and 
the mass destruction created by modern warfare. How could the 
image of the modern project as a process of perpetual progress 
and liberation be sustained when it seemed that it was this very 
progress that had forced human beings into the most extreme 
forms of barbarism? And what was the role of the individual in 
this process of development; what moral responsibility could be 
laid on him or her? Modernisation and the idea of progress con-
tained within themselves consequences that were as unavoidable 
as they were appalling, or so it might seem.
Voices critical of progress and development are therefore to be 
found within the modern; there is, in fact, a long tradition of such 
critical voices, which includes several of the greatest thinkers and 
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interpreters of modernity (Marx, Weber, Nietschze, Sprengler). It 
should nevertheless be pointed out that the fundamental value 
inscribed in the image of modern society, particularly after the 
Second World War, was created not through doubt and criticism 
of various kinds but primarily by trust in the emancipatory po-
tential of technology, social planning and science. This would be 
particularly evident when the chaos and crises of the late 1940s 
transformed into the powerful economic recovery of the 1950s, 
the period when the welfare state would increasingly become a 
reality in Western Europe and the US. In the ideological context of 
the Cold War, the real threat was not provided by a vague internal 
enemy (the negative consequences of modernism), but by a very 
specific external one (the expansion of the Soviet empire). This 
was also a period in which private consumption was continually 
growing, while various innovations in technology and the media 
made it possible to travel and to acquire information, culture and 
entertainment on a far greater scale than ever before. Although 
the notion of progress might be subject to criticism in a particular 
context, the growing rise in living standards appeared to demon-
strate its incontrovertible validity in another. In antithesis to the 
criticism of civilisation, a growing sense of trust in the rational-
ity and inherent reasonableness of science and democratic soci-
ety became established now that political reforms and a socially 
adapted market economy appeared to create better conditions for 
the freedom and existence of the individual than ever before in 
history. In consequence, criticism was not aimed at the idea of 
enlightenment in itself, but against what was seen as the utopian 
and metaphysical delusions of totalitarian ideologies.
It would appear, therefore, that a new need was felt in the post-
war period to employ a genuinely or supposedly rational form of 
scientific analysis as a foundation not only for the understand-
ing of society, but also for its planning, which inevitably involved 
other sciences, such as economics, political science, urban studies, 
psychology, mathematics. And this would also have applied, of 
course, to other disciplines and discourses that treated or analysed 
modernity in various ways. What was problematic here, however, 
was both the choice of perspective and the selection of the level of 
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abstraction. Even though different sciences could provide a diver-
sity of viewpoints in the analysis of modernity, in many cases this 
involved the taking for granted of certain categories and premises 
in the transfer between different disciplines.
In order to focus on the ambivalences of modernity and mod-
ernism in this context, fault lines have to be made visible that, 
in many ways, run entirely counter to the values and identities 
that are reproduced within the modern. It is, therefore, of crucial 
importance that any such interpretation should encompass a de-
scription of not only what modernity means, but also of how and 
in which contexts its normative values have been produced.
True and False Modernity
The analogy drawn by Marshall Berman between modernity and 
modernism may appear both more specific and more normative 
than an unconsidered view of the relationship as being obvious 
or unproblematic (modernism as a conscious form of reflection 
or a systematic evaluation of modernity). And yet both these 
viewpoints are actually embedded within each other to the extent 
that the explicitly formulated notion is simply a codification of 
something that would otherwise be taken for granted. However, 
when manifestos, specialist studies, monographs, essays, surveys 
and other texts are read anew with this relationship in mind, a 
particular pattern emerges that makes the analogy manifest, albeit 
in various ways and with dissimilar aims. And if it is the origins 
of the analogy that are being sought, they can also be discovered 
in some of the manifestos, programmatic writings and statements 
of the avant-garde.
The most celebrated are, of course, the Futurist paeans to the 
speed, harshness and mutability of the modern age. Or as the 
‘Manifesto dei pittori futuristi’ of 1910, devised by Umberto 
Boccioni and signed by Carlo Carrà, Luigi Russolo, Giacomo 
Balla and Giovanni Severini, has it,
Comrades! We declare that the triumphant progress of science has 
brought about changes in humanity so profound as to dig an abyss 
between the docile slaves of the past and us who are confident in 
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the shining splendor of the future. . . . The only living art is that 
which finds its distinctive features within the environment that 
surrounds it. Just as our forbears took the subject of art from the 
religious atmosphere that enveloped them, so we must draw inspi-
ration from the tangible miracles of contemporary life, from the 
iron network of speed which winds around the earth. . . . Waiting 
to contribute to the necessary renovation of all artistic expression, 
we resolutely declare war on all those artists and institutions that, 
even when disguised with a false costume of modernity, remain 
trapped in tradition, academicism, and above all a repugnant men-
tal laziness.21
Even though all these ideas may be familiar from the modernist 
canon—the notion that there is an absolute gulf separating the 
present and the past—the phrase referring to a false modernity 
is noteworthy. This can only be taken to mean that these Futurist 
painters were claiming to be creating in their art a true modernity, 
a language and a value that have their origins in the changes oc-
curring in the contemporary world and are, therefore, authenti-
cally in relation to the essence of modernity.
The bombast and self-glorifying rhetoric of the Futurists might 
appear to be a rather facile example, an unintended parody al-
most of the attempts by the avant-garde to legitimize their art to 
their contemporaries. But if one disregards the rhetorical façade, 
an intellectual construct becomes apparent that recurs in a range 
of similar contexts and in which the modernity of a particular art-
ist’s work is presented as the ultimate criterion of its legitimacy: 
why something appears as it does and why it has to look that way 
as a matter of necessity. While it would of course be possible to 
stick to the old ways, art that is striving for authenticity and to 
be in harmony with its own age must embody the changes of the 
modern age.
And yet it is striking how seldom explicit analogies were for-
mulated in the discourse of the historical avant-garde between 
the work of a particular artist and the modernity of his or her 
contemporary world. The main reason presumably being that the 
analogy runs counter to one of the key tropes of the avant-garde: 
the individuality and autonomy of art and the artist. Instead, the 
key argument in the avant-garde manifestos was the formulation 
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and legitimation of the modernity of new art by means of nega-
tions. This was reflected in a continually recurring antagonism 
toward the art of previous ages, the dominant culture of the 
contemporary world and tradition as such. It also involved, as 
Theodor Adorno put it, establishing more or less specific registers 
of taboos that could not be transgressed. As a result, the definition 
of the art a particular artist practised was, equally, a definition of 
what was no longer possible:
Art is modern when, by its mode of experience and as the expres-
sion of the crisis of experience, it absorbs what industrialization 
has developed under the given relations of production. This in-
volves a negative canon, a set of prohibitions against what the 
modern has disavowed in terms of experience and technique; and 
such determinate negation is virtually the canon of what is to be 
done. That this modernity is more than a vague Zeitgeist or be-
ing cleverly up to date depends on the liberation of the forces of 
production.22
The cultural identity of the avant-garde is expressed here through 
a demarcation of the limits of aesthetic and social autonomy in 
relation to the bourgeois normality of the modern age. Adorno, 
indeed, asserts that modernism, unlike previous artistic practice, 
not only negates preceding aesthetic forms, but also the very tra-
dition per se, which serves to integrate, in a manner of speaking, 
the pursuit of change by bourgeois modernity within artistic prac-
tice.23 Modernism could be seen in this context as a mainly neg-
ative trend, which—like Walter Benjamin’s angel—observes and 
illuminates the misery of modernity and whose form of represen-
tation could even be described as a kind of anti-modernity.24 But 
this negative dialectic should be interpreted, rather, as a form of 
antagonism towards the aspects of bourgeois culture, which failed 
to keep pace with the dynamic changes of the modern age. It is in 
this sense that Boccioni’s remark about false modernity becomes 
so important: it marks the point at which a descriptive statement 
is transformed into a normative identification.
Instead, it is in the historical interpretation and legitimation 
of avant-garde art that the analogy between modernity and 
modernism has come to play a crucial role. Its practitioners, in 
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contrast, were more preoccupied with the detail of describing and 
explaining their aesthetic starting points and artistic devices and, 
above all, with their contempt for the conventions of bourgeois 
modernity. Both the use of the term modernity and the need it 
fulfilled may be seen as a symptom of the shift in the status of the 
avant-garde: from marginalisation, autonomy and antagonism 
to acceptance, historicisation and institutionalisation. Two gen-
eral phenomena can be distinguished in relation to the changing 
circumstances in the Western democracies during the twentieth 
century. On the one hand, the 1920s and the 1930s witnessed the 
gradual acceptance and institutionalisation of various avant-garde 
movements (when the notion of the avant-garde began to be for-
mulated in terms of modernism); on the other, modernism became 
a more or less standard way of describing modern art per se in the 
decade following the end of the Second World War. A particular 
paradigmatic image of the nature of modernism and modern art 
is thus being constituted during this period. Although this image 
obviously encompassed a number of divergent interpretations, it 
would nevertheless define a distinct horizon for what was both 
possible and legitimate. And it is as part of this process that the 
analogy becomes necessary.
What this also demonstrates is the necessity of making a dis-
tinction between the concepts of the avant-garde and modern-
ism. Although not (as some have done) in order to distinguish a 
different essential content, but because the use and meaning of 
both terms have different histories. While the concepts may not be 
considered synonymous, there is a tangible proximity, historically 
speaking, between the phenomena both terms are usually associ-
ated with.25 When this closeness is borne in mind, the history of 
modernism and the avant-garde emerges as a perpetual conflict 
or crisis within the modern. The most esoteric movements within 
the avant-garde and those most critical of civilisation may also be 
understood in this light—as a utopian pursuit of a different form 
of modernity: a new order and a new human being which could 
transcend the established culture of the West.26
Here were have the contours of a specific historical process: a 
concept is introduced at a certain point because it meets a par-
ticular need; the concept is then widely disseminated through 
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various institutions; certain interpretations are privileged and a 
somewhat simplified image of a complex historical situation be-
comes established (essential developmental perspectives and anal-
ogies, canonical selections and collections of examples, a process 
of exclusion and inclusions). The temporal (historical) change in 
function and value must also, of course, be taken into account, 
because it marks a number of different historical positions that 
determine the relevance and significance of both the aesthetic cri-
teria and the theoretical legitimacy of a particular interpretation. 
Seen from an art historical perspective, the establishment of a dis-
cursive and epistemological boundary between the modern and 
the postmodern is of particular relevance here as it allows for a 
degree of distance from the object of research (in this case, mod-
ernism). Instead of understanding this boundary line as separating 
the criteria deemed legitimate and illegitimate aesthetic in one’s 
own contemporary period, it may be used to differentiate a num-
ber of historical situations in which descriptions of the contem-
poraneity of particular periods have taken place. This is an issue 
that calls for both a historical and a historiographic perspective.
Metaphoric Displacements
When modernism is understood to be a direct and simple re-
flection of modernity, the image in the mirror appears distorted. 
However, like Renato Poggiolo, we could also view modernism as 
an exceptionally polysemous reflection of and on the distortions 
of modernity:
[T]he nature of modernism in general is anything but timid, mod-
erate, or discreet; it naturally leads to exaggeration and disequi-
librium and must even be defined as an unconscious parody of 
modernity, an involuntary caricature. Modernism leads up to, and 
beyond the extreme limits, in the modern spirit which is most vain, 
frivolous, fleeting, and ephemeral.27
At issue here is an experience of distortion—as both reflection and 
judgement—which is expressed, in particular, in the negative rheto-
ric of contempt for tradition and the criticism of civilisation. Matei 
Calinescu, for his part, has attempted to explain this phenomenon 
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by maintaining the existence of two modernities: one connotes a 
stage in the history of Western culture and is associated with scien-
tific and technological progress; the other is an aesthetic concept 
(the avant-garde).28 These two modernities appear to be locked 
in a dialectical struggle, continually repelling and attracting one 
another, the former rationalist and competitive, the latter critical 
and focused on demystifying the established values of the former.
Literary modernism, to take one quick example, is thus both mod-
ern and antimodern: modern in its commitment to innovation, in 
its rejection of the authority of tradition, in its experimentalism; 
antimodern in its dismissal of the dogma of progress, in its critique 
of rationality, in its sense that modern civilization has brought 
about the loss of something precious, the dissolution of a great in-
tegrative paradigm, the fragmentation of what once was a mighty 
unity. To go beyond the all-too-obvious conceptual difficulties 
raised by the vocabulary of modernity, I have spoken metaphori-
cally of the “faces” of a constitutively double – dual, ambiguous, 
and duplicitous – modernity.29
The problem of the essentialist connotations of the analogy re-
mains, however, in these negative or contradictory explanations. 
And yet the possibility emerges, in Calinescu’s argument, of an 
entirely different interpretation of the relation between modernity 
and modernism in that he succeeds in demonstrating a multiplic-
ity of aesthetic forms of representation not only of but within 
the modern, which is explicitly alluded to in his title: Five Faces 
of Modernity. Included among the faces of modernity here are 
areas that clearly lie outside the self-image of modernism, such 
as kitsch (the antithesis of modernism) and postmodernism (the 
transcendence of modernism). This makes it possible to describe 
the various artistic manifestations of modernism as a continuous, 
critical, parodic, antithetical, serious and contradictory process 
of evaluating a particular contemporary period—without having 
to understand the problem on the basis of a direct analogy, a spe-
cific consciousness, an inherent meaning, a particular view of the 
world or an essential spirit of the times.
In order to make this argument more specific, we might con-
sider an individual work with the following question in mind: 
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Figure 1. Pablo Picasso, Guitar and Wine Glass, 1912, collage and 
charcoal on board, 47,9 x 36,5 cm, Collection of the McNay Art 
Museum, San Antonio, Bequest of Marion Koogler McNay, 1950.11. 
Copyright: Succession Picasso, License CC BY-NC-ND.
what would such a proposition about the ambivalence of moder-
nity mean in practice? Pablo Picasso’s Guitar and Wine Glass of 
1912 may serve our purpose in this regard.
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This collage may be said to be one of the standard examples of 
modernist art. While there is no doubt that it is a modernist work 
(in terms of current linguistic usage), the interesting question con-
cerns the different ways in which it is modern.
The picture is apparently simple. Various visual elements have 
been assembled on a surface covered by fairly ordinary patterned 
wallpaper: cut-out pieces of paper, a fragment from a newspaper, 
part of a music score and the drawing of a glass. The pieces of 
paper have been shaped and composed into what might be per-
ceived as an iconic sign for a guitar (its throat, frame, sound-hole, 
and the indication of overall volume provided by the shading). 
This was one of Picasso’s first papier collés and may be inscribed, 
in historical terms, in a multiplicity of different contexts: in a tra-
dition of still-life painting, in relation to Cezanne’s aesthetics, as 
part of Cubism’s transitional phase, as belonging to the period 
in which modernism became definitively established, at the be-
ginning of the collage tradition and so on. The selection of this 
particular image as representative of the change in stylistic and 
linguistic conventions brought about by modernism is, of course, 
not a matter of chance. On the contrary, it could be said to repro-
duce a very widely held view of Cubism as the principle hub and 
engine of modern art, whose idiom has come to be seen as iden-
tical with the idiom of modernism and whose centrifugal power 
would influence, in one way or another, almost the entirety of the 
remaining art of the twentieth century (or rather: the modernist 
art of that century).30
When describing Picasso’s Cubist phase, John Berger locates 
its aesthetic in a larger context of alterations to the circumstances 
of production and living conditions, of technological innovations 
and a new form of scientific thinking, and in a period (prior to the 
First World War) when these enormous changes—modernity— 
were still capable of instilling people with hope: they were paint-
ing ‘the good omens of the modern world’.31 Berger’s thesis is that 
during his Cubist phase Picasso was working in harmony with 
the revolutionising (or revolutionary) potential of modernity, 
while in his later career he lost this essential connection and be-
came the victim of his own myth. What the Cubists were painting 
was, therefore, not simply the good omens of the modern world, 
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but above all the original, progressive and emancipatory core of 
modernity.
But in order to avoid the evolutionist (and/or) nostalgic notion 
that underpins both the assertion that Cubism was a crucial phase 
in the history of modernism and that its function was to reflect the 
lost progressiveness of modernity, the idiom of Cubism could be 
said instead to concentrate and condense a new form of linguistic 
analysis and examination that would prove to be one of the major 
themes of modernism. While Picasso’s collage may seem unprob-
lematic to us because it forms part of such a familiar art historical 
context, his contemporaries would have perceived it as extremely 
strange. To describe the picture simply as a modern representative 
of the tradition of the still-life genre would, of course, be to miss 
its most obvious attribute: the way it plays with the iconicity of 
its subject matter. Guillaume Apollinaire would describe Cubist 
painting as follows:
If painters still observe nature, they no longer imitate it, and they 
carefully avoid the representation of natural scenes observed di-
rectly and reconstituted through study. Modern art rejects all the 
means of pleasing that were employed by the greatest artists of the 
past: the perfect representation of the human figure, voluptuous 
nudes, carefully finished details, etc. . . . The young painters of the 
avant-garde schools, then, wish to do pure painting. Theirs is an 
entirely new plastic art. It is only at its beginnings, and it is not yet 
as abstract as it would like to be. The new painters are in a sense 
mathematicians without knowing it, but they have not yet aban-
doned nature, and they examine it painterly. A Picasso studies an 
object the way a surgeon dissects a corpse.32
All forms of idealism, naturalism and good taste were being aban-
doned here as part of an assertion that the painter’s sole task was 
to create an entirely new plastic art—an art whose purity was to 
be found in its formulation of an immanent linguistic logic, tran-
scending any reference to the surrounding world or to tradition. 
And to the extent that a relation to the surrounding world might 
still exist (‘art is not yet as abstract as it would like to be’), this 
should involve an almost scientific examination of objects on the 
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basis of the laws of geometry. The apparent verisimilitude gener-
ated by the meticulous rendering of detail in realist art was to be 
replaced by a higher degree of truth. The simile between Picasso 
and a surgeon evokes the radical nature of an art in which the 
artist has cut away all unnecessary props and is fully engaged 
on forcing his way into the objects that remain. The simile also 
signals a logic of change, because it involves a metaphor and not 
a factual description—Picasso analyses his motifs the way a sur-
geon does (objectively, impartially, unsentimentally, accurately), 
and this leads him to find an entirely new truth that is no longer 
based on a tradition of interpreting the knowledge and language 
of past ages.
The question that remains, however, is what the collage’s spe-
cific form of representation actually means. A whole array of 
answers have been provided in response: that it is a technique 
for further accentuating the surface of the painting (Clement 
Greenberg); that it is the logical consequence of the Cubist view 
of the work as an autonomous, self-reflexive and constructed 
object (John Golding); that it is a way of problematising the re-
lationship between the internal logic of the pictorial surface and 
the depiction of objects from the surrounding world (William 
Seitz).33 All these interpretations inscribe collage as a passage in 
the development of the medium-specific aesthetic of avant-garde 
art, in which the subject matter appears to serve primarily as 
a temporary and, in itself, not particularly significant starting 
point for the formal study. These interpretations were, moreover, 
formulated in a period (between 1959 and 1961) when the ab-
stract and self-referential criteria of visual art appeared to be 
definitive both of the understanding of contemporary art and of 
the history of modern art as such. Seen in this light, Picasso’s col-
lage would serve as an example of modern art’s very deliberate 
transformation of both subject matter and tradition, in which 
the primacy of form and pictorial surface would increasingly 
come to inhabit the centre ground—in which the quality of the 
image as surface is, to use Greenberg’s words, a more or less di-
rect function of that altered view of history, which can be called 
modernity.
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To inscribe this transformation directly into an analogy be-
tween modernism and modernity without further delimitation 
would, however, miss an important point, namely, that the issue 
of the modernity of contemporary art has itself been subject to a 
number of historical changes that occurred between Baudelaire’s 
writing and the questions raised by Cubism. By 1912, reference to 
the modernity of visual art was distinctly old hat, an echo for the 
most part of the attempts made in the previous century by realist 
and impressionist art to break free from the conventions of the 
academy. It was at this time, however, that the issue of modernity 
and the representation of the modern in pictorial art were to as-
sume an entirely new relevance. Two definitive turns took place 
that pushed in diametrically opposed directions: on the one hand, 
the inheritance of the symbolism of the 1880s and its intensified 
interest in the linguistic function of visual art and, on the other, 
a new interpretation (not to say distortion) of Baudelaire’s old 
notion of ‘modernité’ as embodied in the Futurists’ heralding of 
the modern age.
The linguistic turn meant that the focus was directed at visual 
art as an examination of the relationship between inner and outer 
worlds, where the key issue was the nature of the visual sign and 
its reference to the object.34 Large parts of the renewed interest in 
‘the primeval’ and ‘the primitive’ and the associated move away 
from the social iconography of modern life at the dawn of the 
twentieth century can be traced to this turn.35 One consequence 
would be that more traditional motifs became essential in the 
most advanced avant-garde art of the period: recurring depictions 
of mountain landscapes (Cezanne), views of the German country-
side (Kirchner), silent Algerian landscapes (Matisse) or monoto-
nous series of still lifes (Picasso). The Futurist turn did not involve 
stylistic influences from the Futurists, but rather the desire to in-
ject something of the dynamism of modern life into fine art. The 
first Futurist exhibition in Paris at the Galerie Bernheim-Jeune 
in 1912 met with considerable suspicion; what was seen as the 
Futurists’ preoccupation with the content of art—and as a result 
their incomplete emancipation from the academic tradition—
would be the crucial factor in explaining its negative reception 
The Modernity of Modernism 27
by the avant-garde.36 This was a sin against the pictorial logic 
described earlier: within the context of Cubism, the picture was 
not intended to be a reconstruction of an anecdotal fact but a 
construction of a new, pictorial fact.37 However, there was also 
some ambivalence towards the radical stance of the Futurists, as 
many perceived it to be, which meant that while their art could be 
dismissed, their ideas could not. A key example is provided by the 
change in Apollinaire’s attitude to Futurism when he proved quick 
to realise how their ideas could be transformed to form part of 
that general pursuit of lyrical and abstract dynamism he referred 
to as ‘Orphism’.38 Although this movement, which encompassed 
several of the leading artists of the French avant-garde, derived 
its energy from the dynamics of the surrounding world, it trans-
formed these impressions into a purely visual (non- figurative, 
non-allegorical) representation.
The modernity of Guitar and Wine Glass may be understood 
in terms of the work being situated at the intersection of these 
two turns. Even though Picasso, too, was strongly antipathetic to 
Futurism, there was an ambivalent streak to his distaste.39 The issue 
of the pictorial subject was not quite such a taboo matter for him, 
because he never accepted Apollinaire’s evolutionist thesis that ad-
vanced art should pursue abstraction. The subject of the work, he 
maintained, is always a ‘source of interest’ for the individual with 
the eyes to see it and a mind open to his or her surroundings.40 The 
Italian Futurists had presumably touched on a sensitive point for 
the French avant-garde of the time: its self-referential involvement 
with the formal or expressive problems of pictorial art as transcend-
ing the dynamic and transient impressions of the urban environ-
ment. The problem was how to reestablish the relationship between 
art and society, to combine in a sense the internal and external crite-
ria of the work without renouncing one side or the other. Theodor 
Adorno has described this as a source of tension in modern art: ‘The 
unsolved antagonisms of reality return in artworks as immanent 
problems of form. This, not the insertion of objective elements, de-
fines the relation of art to society.’41 The issue would also appear to 
have been an acute problem for Picasso at this time, a dilemma to 
which the collage technique provided a particular solution.
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If we choose to look beyond the generic constraints imposed 
by the term still-life, it becomes clear that the pictorial elements 
in Guitar and Wine Glass do not represent only objects and envi-
ronments; neither do they constitute simply an examination of the 
representative nature of visual art. The work appears, instead, to 
dramatise representation itself: the relationship of the score to the 
music; the relationship of written language both to events and to 
the medium itself (the Crimean war, the daily newspapers); the re-
lationship of the pieces of paper to the iconicity of the objects and 
the relationship of the drawing to the glass itself and to the me-
dium-specific type of representation (a Cubist picture of a glass). 
This interplay of signs is made possible by a linguistic peculiarity 
of the collage technique: that the sign is both a representation 
and identical with the referent. In his study Painting as Model 
(1990), Yve-Alain Bois draws parallels between this linguistic and 
sign-oriented change in Cubism and the state of linguistic research 
at the time. The point of his interpretation is not to demonstrate 
any direct influences between art and linguistics, but to attempt 
to shed light on how the interpretation of certain African masks 
(primarily from Gabon, Liberia and the Ivory Coast) would lead 
to a similar realisation of the arbitrary nature of the visual sign:
The syntax is “arbitrary” in that it no longer relies on anatomical 
knowledge, and therefore on the pictorial illusionism that always 
springs from this knowledge (the face and hair can be separated 
in two equal volumes, disposed on one side and the other of a cy-
lindrical neck – an example to which we can add the protuberant 
quality of the Grebo mask’s eyes). The vocabulary is arbitrary and, 
in consequence, extends to infinity because the sculptural elements 
no longer have need of any direct resemblance to their referent. A 
cowry can represent an eye, but a nail can fill the same function. 
From this second type of arbitrariness unfolds the third (that of 
materials), as well as a complete range of methods that we might 
now call metaphoric displacements.42
The mutations and metaphoric displacements of the signs are 
not simply a form of playing with the rules, but rather a kind of 
perception (albeit an intuitive one) in which the function of the 
sign and its variation within a particular context appear more 
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important than its morphology. What is crucial is not that Picasso 
allowed himself to be inspired by the formal vocabulary of African 
or Iberian masks as a kind of naive gesture that was both critical 
of civilisation and in praise of the ‘primitive’, but that he was able 
to interpret this art as a means of redefining the sign function of 
the picture.
The question might be asked at this point what Guitar and 
Wine Glass actually represents? It might seem redundant as the 
subject matter is indicated in the title: a guitar, a sheet of music 
and a glass. But the key issue here is not simply what the subject 
is, but what it does. Observe the accumulation of objects against 
the background in the upper half of the work, and, after a while, 
the pattern no longer appears to be a form of superficial decora-
tion (a wallpaper), but a faceted roof. A similar illusion emerges 
in the lower half of the image. Here, the image of flat paper frag-
ments against a level surface is contrasted with the image of ob-
jects in space. In The Picasso Papers (1998), Rosalind Krauss has 
described what she calls the ‘polyphonic spaces’ of collage and 
its ‘circulation of signs’ when referring to Bakhtin’s interpreta-
tion of the dialogic function in Dostoevsky’s poetics.43 Applied 
to Guitar and Wine Glass, this is an evocative characterisation of 
how each pictorial fragment and each voice are doubled and then 
split up in a game played with the interpretation of the sign and 
its referentiality. The perception of the work oscillates between 
surface and depth, between facticity and transparency, while the 
function of particular pictorial elements shifts in similar fashion 
between what is immediately observable and what is hermetically 
abstract.
The pictorial elements do not, however, refer simply to a num-
ber of objects that just happened to be at hand in Picasso’s studio; 
they also provide clear connotations to a specific context. They 
appear to be poetic and transient reflections of the world and life 
outside the frame, while also serving as a more specific index of 
the kind of environment (a café or a bar), which still served, for 
the most part, as the social arena of the avant-garde at the time. 
Apollinaire was among the first to interpret Braque and Picasso’s 
use of letters and textual fragments directly in relation to the sym-
bols, signs and advertisements of the urban visual environment, 
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which he saw as having such an important role to play in 
modern art.44
Jeffrey Weiss has described this relationship in terms of an in-
tricate game between sign and referent, which he locates more 
specifically in the rise of the music hall. This was an extraordinary, 
ostentatious, ironic and ultramodern form of entertainment, a 
mix of seriousness and superficiality, which many of the represen-
tatives of the avant-garde were very interested in both attending 
and observing. In analysing the role played by daily newspapers, 
Weiss takes as his starting point one of the central elements of 
music hall: allusion. Le Jou represents both a specific newspaper 
and the medium of the press as such; the fragmented word is at 
the same time a pun on the French word for play (both game 
and theatre) and an allusion to the actor’s change of costume and 
character in accordance with the dictates of the role.45 Here the 
circulation of signs serves not just as a game with the phonetic 
qualities of words, as in Mallarmé, but as a means of referring to 
modern life as it is lived in the world.
The point, however, is not the illustrative effect of the visual 
references or that this mundane and apparently banal form of 
entertainment is inscribed in the hermetic language of Cubism; it 
is, instead, that music hall’s particular mixture of different motifs, 
genres and languages—in which various events and tableaux are 
jumbled together in a succession of fragments rather than in a 
coherent linear narrative—provided a model for the syntax of the 
collage. And, crucially, it is through this encounter that the in-
ward motion of symbolism (towards the fundamental qualities of 
language) is turned outwards (towards the dynamism of modern 
life). The collage did not simply provide a new set of rules to play 
by; it was by its very nature a form of playing with the rules.
Interpreted in this way, the subject matter of Picasso’s collage 
would refer both to the world around it and to its own language 
system: a fateful leakage, so to speak, is occurring both between 
different sign systems and between the picture and the surround-
ing world. The work oscillates between several levels of meaning 
as a result, in which the various voices are duplicated and where 
fleeting but profound encounters take place between art (between 
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genres, composition, the formal logic of Cubism) and the wider 
world (allusions, the collage fragments) and where none of the 
levels can be understood without reference to any of the others. 
This interplay of unstable references and directions is, however, 
made to cohere within the strict uniformity of the composition. 
The work should not, therefore, be described as dissonant, but 
as contrapuntal, with each reference, each voice and each point 
of view being disciplined by the harmony of the whole. Its unity 
might best be compared to a force field in which the movement of 
the individual particles is kept in equilibrium while nevertheless 
remaining visible as motion in its stillness, to borrow Adorno’s 
phrase.46 
This is also a key point for understanding the metaphorical dis-
placements of the collage: as an interplay between the affirmation 
and the denial of every outward and inward movement. Although 
the discipline of the composition and its generic connotations 
serve to anchor it in an ancient tradition that is far removed from 
the noisy, urban and futuristic modernity of the music hall, the 
metaphorical displacements and the manner in which the collage 
plays with arbitrary signs radically violate the rules of the same 
tradition at the same time. This allows the play—the game—with 
signs, motifs and allusion to operate within the framework of the 
serious (of Art), while the logic on which that framework is struc-
tured is simultaneously being redefined.
****
Picasso’s Guitar and Wine Glass provides an example of how 
modernism’s centrifugal and centripetal forces are able, paradox-
ically, to collaborate in one and the same work: the collage refers 
both inwards and outwards, forwards and backwards in time. 
This is also a crucial aspect of its modernity. The work appears 
to radicalise the particular ambivalence of Baudelaire’s definition 
of the modernity of modern art as ‘the ephemeral, the fugitive, 
the contingent, the half of art whose other half is the eternal and 
the immutable.’ It is modernity itself that constitutes the particu-
lar polyvalent coding of the transient and the eternal in this col-
lage, in which the artist’s reflection on this paradoxical situation 
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necessitates a continual reexamination of its pictorial language. 
The circulation of signs in the subject matter may be seen in this 
light not only as a possible solution to the problem of relating the 
internal linguistic game of art to an external reality, but also as a 
metaphor for the alteration in the conditions and displaced func-
tion of the artistic process.
Figure 2. Johann Heinrich Füssli, The Artist’s Despair Before the Grandeur of 
Ancient Ruin, 1778/80, red chalk and brown wash on paper, 42 x 35,2 cm,  
Kunsthaus Zürich, Wikimedia Commons, License CC-0 (Public Domain)  
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Johann_Heinrich_F%C3%BCssli_013.jpg.
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This is not, however, an exclusive or unique attribute of the art 
of modernism, but a much larger phenomenon and one that Linda 
Nochlin has aptly described in terms of the sense of distance, nos-
talgia and fragmentation expressed in Johann Heinrich Fuseli’s 
Der Künstler verzweifelnd vor der Grösse der antiken Trümmer: 
the artist is not simply portraying himself as being overwhelmed 
by the dignity of antiquity, but also as being crushed by the ruins 
as a symbol of the contemporary world’s loss of wholeness and 
coherence.47
The discrepancy in size between the hand and foot of the 
Emperor Constantine and the artist is interpreted as a metaphor 
for modernity’s relation to antiquity and to the increasing frag-
mentation of the artist’s own age. This relation is, however, not 
simply one of longing and nostalgic tragedy: ‘Out of this loss is 
constructed the Modern itself. In a certain sense, Fuseli has con-
structed a distinctively modern view of antiquity-as-loss – a view, a 
“crop”, that will constitute the essence of representational modern-
ism’.48 My point here is not to compare fragmentisation as such as 
a device in Fuseli and in Picasso (even though this is an interesting 
subject), but to understand the issue of the modernity of visual art 
as a conscious process of reflection at finding oneself irretrievably 
lost on the other side of the boundary to the past (the premodern). 
At issue is a position capable of encompassing both nostalgia and 
futurism and of shedding new light on the question of the linguistic 
nature of the visual. Precisely because it presented a change in the 
function of the sign, Picasso’s collage may also be understood in 
this context: providing one possible answer to the question that 
had been posed as early as the end of the eighteenth century as to 
the possibility or impossibility of the truth and authenticity of the 
sign—it is an answer, however, based on entirely different aesthetic, 
social and intellectual premises. Picasso sheds no tears over his 
fragments, setting them in motion instead as a springboard from 
which to raise new questions about the possibilities of visual art.
Lastly, Picasso’s posture in this regard might also be consid-
ered in terms of Charles Baudelaire’s designation of the particular 
point at which the contemporary and the past intersect, where 
the work transcends both history and the present—which would 
subsequently be identified as the paradoxical condition of modern 
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art. In the 1910s, however, this would not by any means have 
been an obvious posture for an avant-garde artist to adopt, whose 
identity would, in many cases, be characterised by a desire to cast 
off all that belonged to the past and to arrive at a point of depar-
ture, which signalled a new direction forward. With reference to 
Nietzsche, Paul de Man has described how this form of progres-
sive striving has, as a matter of necessity, consciously or uncon-
sciously, entered into a pact with history:
Modernity and history relate to each other in a curiously contra-
dictory way that goes beyond antithesis or opposition. If history is 
not to become sheer regression or paralysis, it depends on moder-
nity for its duration and renewal; but modernity cannot assert it-
self without being swallowed up and reintegrated into a regressive 
historical process.49
One aspect of this remarkable pact is, as we have seen, that the 
pursuit of modernity has a very long history. Another is that the 
changeable logic of modernity also brings with it an accumulation 
of yesterday’s news: an archive, if you like, of artifacts, which may 
be ordered—and always will be ordered—according to a histor-
ical chronology. What de Man means, rather, is that the creative 
process contains both original and reflective elements and, as part 
of this process, the writer (or the artist) inevitably functions in his 
text as both actor and observer. In order to cross the boundaries 
separating us from the past, one would presumably have to pos-
sess a memory in which every text emerges in relief against the 
historical context of previous texts. The polysemous relationship 
between history and modernity is thus already inscribed in the 
production of every single work of art, even though it may not 
necessarily constitute a conscious part of the self-image and inten-
tions of the modern artist.
What this interpretation of artistic modernity offers is the un-
derstanding that modernism constitutes a vital part of the visual 
culture of modernity, although in a rather different sense than 
the one-sided insistence of the analogy on a progressive forward/
outward movement. It also runs counter to the analogy’s implicit 
definition of modernism as the modern art. It would be useful at 
this point to return to Matei Calinescu’s argument concerning the 
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various faces of modernity, as this provides a form of differentia-
tion that points not only to the multiplicity of forms of aesthetic 
expression and values existing within the modern, but also to a 
means of overcoming the orientation imposed by the analogy to-
wards realistic definitions and the consequent normative identifi-
cation of what constitutes the essential form of representation of 
the modern age and of modern art.
The issue here is the need to pay serious attention to what is 
fragmentary in the representation of the contemporary and the 
historical and to understand the differences between representa-
tions as symptoms both of an increased differentiation within the 
world of art and of a profound crisis in the perception of the 
authenticity of the sign. The fragment sets up a structure that is 
capable of taking ambivalence seriously; it leads to a provisional 
selection of detail and, possibly, to an open question mark, rather 
than to an all-embracing system whose answers are followed by 
an authoritative full stop.50 This is, in my view, perhaps the most 
important consequence of Octavio Paz’s notion that modernity is 
condemned to pluralism.
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Conflicting Truths
The Antithesis of Modernism
There is a remarkable illustration by Henri Meyer in the September 
1883 issue of Le Journal Illustré that depicts an interior from the 
Triennale exhibition held in Paris in the same year, in which hang 
portraits of the most famous of the participating artists.51
At that time, the Triennale was the only official art exhibition 
held in France, the government having previously awarded con-
trol of the Salon to artistic organizations that were independent 
of the Académie des Beaux-Arts. This was a change of no little 
consequence. Since the eighteenth century, the Salon had been 
both the real and symbolic site for the public demonstration of 
the operations of the Academy—and for the more or less critical 
reception of its work.52 This shift would mark a new era of public 
competition within the art world: the Salon was the first recur-
ring, publicly accessible exhibition of contemporary art in Europe 
and proved, as such, to be one of the most popular public events 
in Paris.53
The Salon provided a spectacle without any real peer in the 
visual culture of the period, filling a number of the halls of the 
Louvre (and later the Palais de l’Industrie) with thousands of 
paintings and sculptures, colorful depictions of mythological 
and historical subjects, portraits, genre paintings and still lifes.54 
The context in which the Salon functioned would appear to have 
been a complex one in which the financial and social interests 
of the artists were dependent on the willingness of the Academy 
and the authorities to show aesthetic representations they deemed 
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acceptable. Its public nature made the Salon into a kind of index 
of the various possible and acceptable positions within the art 
world: controlling the Salon during the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries was tantamount, therefore, to controlling a major part 
of the official art world. And this control had slowly but surely 
been passing into the hands of individuals who either had no en-
trenched position in the official institutions or were directly op-
posed to them. The introduction of the Triennale can therefore 
be described as a last (though ultimately stillborn) attempt on 
the part of the conservative forces within the Academy to retain 
power and influence in a changing art world.
But Henri Meyer’s illustration also bears witness to the art-
ists who formed the establishment at this time: William-Adolphe 
Bouguereau, Jean-Louis-Ernest Meissonier, Jean-Léon Gérôme, 
Jean-Jacques Henner, Alexandre Cabanel, Jules Lefebvre, Léon 
Bonnat, Paul Baudry, Henry Lévy. These are the names of power-
ful and influential individuals who are today all but forgotten 
and whose works have either become invisible to art history as 
Figure 3. Henri Meyer, Le Triennal. Le Grand Salon Carré avec les portraits 
des peintres et des sculpteurs principaux, illustration in Le Journal Illustré, 
sept. 30, Paris 1883, Photo and copyright: Uppsala University Library, 
License CC-0 CC BY-NC-ND.
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a whole or may, conceivably, still be studied with a kind of ap-
palled delight as part of that cabinet of curiosities usually and 
disparagingly termed ‘Salon art’. Of interest here, however, is that 
this art forms a key part of the visual culture of modernity, which 
not only existed in parallel with the early history of modernism, 
but also dominated the art world of that time. What separates 
‘us’ from ‘them’ is not just modernism’s history of radical exper-
imentation, its insistence on the need for reconsideration and re-
vision and on making a fresh start, but also an extensive process 
of normalization, which has rendered invisible large parts of the 
historical context within which modernism became established.
In ‘The Allegorical Impulse: Towards a Theory of 
Postmodernism’ (1980), Craig Owens describes how modernism 
may be understood in a historical context as a parenthesis be-
tween the different conceptions of the allegorical image in classi-
cism and in postmodernism; this theory also helps to explain the 
taboo placed on allegorical aesthetics by modernism.55 Although 
Owen’s aim was polemical (and by now, perhaps, somewhat 
dated) the distinction itself is interesting because it appears to iso-
late an age or epoch with a distinct beginning and end, in which 
the contours of an idea that has otherwise appeared diffuse can 
be more clearly distinguished by means of thematic interpreta-
tions clearly situated outside the period in question. The outlines 
can be discerned here of a fundamental shift that started with 
Romanticism and encompassed a change in the way the forma-
tion of meaning, interpretation and historiography functioned: a 
reinterpretation of the very nature of the artistic image (the work 
of art as expression/essence), its forms of representation (how and 
to what the sign refers) and also its interpretation (the develop-
ment of a formalist tradition). This is a change, moreover, that 
extends far beyond the context of the avant-garde and which, in 
the twentieth century, has come to affect large parts of the modern 
discourse on visual art.
Baudelaire’s definition of modernity, to take one example, can 
be understood within this framework. His formulation of moder-
nity as ‘the ephemeral, the fugitive, the contingent, the half of art 
whose other half is the eternal and the immutable’ may be consid-
ered a symptom of a fundamental change in the way the nature 
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and function of art were seen during the nineteenth century, a 
change which found its own catchy formulation in Realism’s 
demand that art should be of its own time (‘il faut être de son 
temps’), instead of reproducing (and possibly revitalising) the ide-
als of previous ages.56 A fundamental idea was emerging here that 
would transcend the ideals and definitions of the academic code. 
‘To be of one’s own time’ also meant a change in the way the 
work of art was seen: a shift, in metaphorical terms, from serving 
as a reflection of a metaphysical ideal (truth/beauty) that could be 
appraised using an external yardstick to becoming a creation that 
embodied the truth and could only be judged on the basis of its 
own premises. As a result, an alternative discursive order became 
established in the art world of the West during the nineteenth cen-
tury, which was characterised by notions of creativity, uniqueness, 
originality, authenticity and integrity. As we have seen, this order 
arose in antithesis to bourgeois modernity in general and to aca-
demic discourse in particular; its hallmarks were variation, indi-
viduality and pluralism, as opposed to the continuity, generality 
and traditionalism of the academic code.
But is it at all possible in such a disparate and pluralist context 
to refer to an order? This cannot, of course, be done in the same 
way as would apply within academic discourse—as a more or less 
established matrix of possible interpretations and actions—but 
rather as a network in which the ideals serve as its nodes, all of 
which seem to be connected, all of which presuppose one another 
and so constitute the boundaries for what is possible within the 
discourse. These ideals may be gathered together under the overall 
concept of the regime of authenticity. Authenticity is understood 
here, in the words of Jürgen Habermas, as a fundamental form of 
legitimation: a basic idea that, ultimately, legitimates each dispa-
rate (although approved) activity within a discourse.57 This form 
of legitimation might be said to constitute the internal code that 
creates a factual or fictitious continuity—a distinct narrative—by 
means of the unstable and mutable context that developed along-
side academic discourse: as an antithesis to its notion of ideal 
beauty.
Although this antithetical relationship would characterise the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to a considerable 
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extent, the former of its two poles—the academic—has largely 
vanished from history. It is remarkable that the academic dis-
course that was so dominant in its time has ceded the field and 
been erased, more or less, from art historical awareness, like a 
sunken continent or an unconscious layer whose fragments and 
splinters occasionally rise to the surface as the remnants of the 
nightmare of modernity’s unhappy and meticulously repressed 
childhood. What this demonstrates is how one discursive practice 
(the avant-garde) becomes defined in opposition to another and 
then, once an interpretive privilege under the heading of modern-
ism has been established, excludes it.
****
The increasing significance accorded to modernism and its sub-
sequent acceptance and eventual dominance of the art world of 
the West should not, of course, be described simply in terms of a 
conflict between two opposed viewpoints, as a battlefield from 
which one of the parties emerged triumphant. Instead, this was 
a wide-ranging historical process whose contours are much less 
clearly defined, but which nevertheless involved the establishment 
of one particular way of seeing as opposed to another and which 
at a certain point acquired the right to privilege its interpretation 
and could thus make its own position the self-evident one. For 
the most part, this is not a process that can be read about in the 
survey literature or even in specialist studies, but one that requires 
some effort even to discern.
One way of shedding light on a process of this kind is to trace 
its roots back to a time when that interpretive privilege had not 
yet been acquired, when a particular statement could not be pre-
sented as self-evident but had to be formulated in opposition to 
the other: when the thesis could still be seen in relief against its 
explicit antithesis. The relevant question as far as this work is 
concerned is, therefore, when and how modernism acquired its 
interpretive privilege within the discourse of the visual arts. When 
did its aesthetic and historical position emerge as the natural and 
self-evident precondition for any statement about modern art? 
In order to answer this question, the primary antithesis of the 
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self-image of the avant-garde needs to be isolated and its various 
historical strata have to be examined in a manner that might be 
likened to an archaeological process of excavation.
A useful starting-point is provided by Richard Wrigley’s The 
Origins of French Art Criticism (1993) in which he identifies the 
reaction against the academic tradition as a crucial aspect of the 
way art history has come to define the tradition of modern art:
Art-Historical accounts of eighteenth and nineteenth-century 
European art have been overwhelmingly predisposed to seek out 
and celebrate innovation. In such progressive narratives, lon-
ger-term continuities of art practice and their associated habits of 
thought are included only as a necessary but retardataire evil.58
Here, Wrigley has put his finger on a key point not only for the 
twentieth-century understanding of its own contemporary art, 
but also for its interpretation of previous epochs. A whole range 
of celebrated examples can be found for what this reappraisal 
meant in terms of bringing historical figures to light who had pre-
viously been overlooked or marginalised (as in the transformation 
of Francesco Goya into ‘Goya’), but what is important here is that 
the process of reevaluation also risks obscuring significant histor-
ical relations and connections. In consequence, the image of the 
art of the modern age has, in many instances, been so refined and 
simplified as to diminish the significance of the academic tradition 
entirely. This tradition has become a diabolic antithesis that is 
invoked whenever someone has to be scared off by the appalling 
alternative to the hermetic and abstruse experiments of contem-
porary art.
This view has, in fact, continually reappeared as a fundamental 
tenet throughout the entire history of modernism, while also be-
ing handed down as a constitutive element of the identity of both 
modernism and the avant-garde. At the beginning of the 1960s, 
the American art critic Thomas B. Hess described the extraordi-
narily negative connotations of the academic tradition in the art 
criticism and art history of the twentieth century as follows:
Academy, Academic, Academism (or Academicism) – these words 
mean “bad” in the conversations of the art community, much 
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worse than “pretty” or “decorative” or even “sentimental” – they 
are about as dirty as polysyllables can get. They do not refer to a 
category, like “Neo-Classic” or “Cubist”, which are tags on rather 
specific, more or less homogeneous, bodies of material, but rather 
indicate areas where something unsettling has gone on, in any 
time, in any place.59
Not just bad, therefore, but about as bad as it is possible to be! 
Hess’ comment may seem exaggerated but is, to all intents and 
purposes, an accurate description of the value modernism as-
signed to art of this kind. The same view is reflected, for example, 
in Clement Greenberg’s characterisation of the official painting of 
the nineteenth century in his influential essay ‘Towards a Newer 
Laocoon’ (1940):
There have been academies before, but for the first time we have 
academism. Painting enjoyed a revival of activity in 19th century 
France such as had not been seen since the 16th century, and aca-
demism could produce such good painters as Corot and Theodore 
Rousseau, and even Daumier – yet in spite of this the academicians 
sank painting to the level that was in some respect an all-time low. 
The name of this low is Vernet, Gérôme, Leighton, Watts, Moreau, 
Böcklin, the Pre-Raphaelites, etc., etc.60
Greenberg’s analysis produces an interesting (and, for him, rhe-
torically necessary) conflation of academy and academism so that 
what had been the neutral name for a certain type of institution 
was transformed into a highly charged term of abuse. The distinc-
tion involves not only a change in taste, but also a radical redefini-
tion of what art is and should be. This preoccupation with criteria 
pertaining to the innovative, creative and original aspects of art 
developed out of an opposition and would reproduce, in turn, the 
image of a cleavage running through the art world of the most 
recent centuries. This is explicitly described in Lionello Venturi’s 
History of Art Criticism (1936), where the author describes how 
an abyss had opened up between the accommodating, eclectic and 
reactionary art of the academy and that of the avant-garde, the au-
thentic expression of the progressive and creative spirit of the age.61
A similar separation can be found a decade or two earlier in 
Clive Bell’s essay collection Art (1914). In what is an extremely 
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summary historical presentation of Western art, Bell shows how 
the gradual decline of art during the eighteenth century would, in 
the course of the subsequent one, generate a complete collapse of 
all aesthetic values to the extent that the visual arts could be all 
but declared dead—during the heyday of the academic doctrine 
that is. According to Bell, the artefacts produced under the name 
of official art during this period fall entirely outside any conceiv-
able definition of art:
But the mass of painting and sculpture had sunk to something that 
no intelligent and cultivated person would dream of calling art. . . . 
It is not until what is still official painting and sculpture and archi-
tecture gets itself accepted as a substitute for art, that we can say 
for certain that the long slope that began with the Byzantine prim-
itives is ended. But when we have reached this point we know that 
we can sink no lower. . . . Except stray artists and odd amateurs, 
you may say that in the middle of the nineteenth century art had 
ceased to exist. That is the importance of the official and academic 
art of that age: it shows us that we have touched the bottom.62
Bell’s work was, it should be said, produced in a context in which 
the avant-garde scene had still to be legitimated theoretically and 
historically in opposition to an official artistic tradition, which 
may go some way to explain the pitilessness of his judgements. 
Both Bell and Greenberg describe the academic tradition as con-
stituting the aesthetic ruins from which the authentic art of the 
avant-garde arises. In both instances, history is used to distinguish 
an authentic artistic trend from a tradition of pictorial creation 
under the aegis of the official academies and salons, which was 
as perfunctory as it was superficial. The wheat can, therefore, be 
sifted from the chaff and the artists who proved essential to the 
development of (modernist) history distinguished from those who 
constituted both a degenerate species and a blind alley—despite 
that fact that they were all operating largely within the same his-
torical and institutional context.
This kind of historiography emerges in its turn from the pro-
grammatic writings and manifestos of the avant-garde itself, where 
the front against the established art world was defined above all 
by a savage criticism of everything the art academies represented. 
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This may be seen, almost without exception, as the other side of 
the manifestos’ rhetoric: the indispensability of their own form 
of modernity is asserted in terms of the equally unconditional 
necessity of the destruction of the academic ideal. One example 
among the many available is found in Wassily Kandinsky’s Über 
das Geistige in der Kunst (1911), where, in the opening para-
graph, he presents his assessment of the retrospective tendency 
that characterised the canonisation of Ancient Greece by the aca-
demic tradition:
Efforts to revive the art-principles of the past will at best produce 
an art that is still-born. It is impossible for us to live and feel, as 
did the ancient Greeks. In the same way those who strive to follow 
the Greek methods in sculpture achieve only a similarity of form, 
the work remaining soulless for all time. Such imitation is mere 
aping. Externally the monkey completely resembles a human be-
ing: he will sit holding a book in front of his nose, and turn over 
the pages with a thoughtful aspect, but his actions have for him no 
real meaning.63
According to Kandinsky, the error of academic doctrine lies in that 
it made the repetition of the past—of a dead language—into its 
very core, with the effect that the empty gesture became the rule at 
the cost of losing touch with the contemporary world and the ruin 
of artistic authenticity. The apparently paradoxical consequence 
is that academic art in its search to recapture eternal verities 
through the past simply recreated an external appearance with-
out any engagement with the trans-historical necessity/truth that 
characterises all authentic art in every age and culture. Kandinsky 
is enrolling himself here in an established tradition critical of aca-
demic art, which can be traced at least as far back as the romantic 
movements of the early nineteenth century.64 Kandinsky’s descrip-
tion of the simultaneous and paradoxical relationship of artistic 
modernity to the transience of the present and the eternity of the 
historical mediates an insight that had, in principle, already been 
expressed by Charles Baudelaire in ‘Le peintre de la vie moderne’, 
even if there is a vast gulf between Baudelaire and Kandinsky’s 
interpretations of how this relationship might best be manifested 
in artistic practice. The necessity of a connection between modern 
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art and the contemporary world, and thus to the immanent work-
ings of history, appears to have been a key issue in the entire tradi-
tion of implacable criticism of academic discourse. It is, moreover, 
on this point that the crucial distinction between academism and 
modernity is drawn.
This journey back in time helps to reveal not only a critical 
context, but also a change in the position from which criticism 
was formulated, as the antagonistic attitude of the avant-garde 
was gradually codified by radical art criticism and the judgements 
and selections made by such art critics were incorporated over 
time, surprisingly fast, within the historiography of the visual 
arts. Another index of this change may be found, for example, 
by studying how art-historical survey literature treated the visual 
arts of the late nineteenth century. From around the turn of that 
century and into the 1930s, although academic discourse is men-
tioned in the image mediated, it increasingly appears as a dec-
adent phenomenon, the last outgrowth of an already withering 
branch of the development of art.65 After the Second World War, 
academic discourse more or less disappears from the historical 
picture and an evolutionist trend emerges instead in which each 
work, each artist and each grouping is legitimated in terms of the 
significance of their influence on future generations.66
The logic of change Harold Rosenberg so aptly characterized 
as ‘the tradition of the new’ would thus become an authoritative 
description of modern art in general. The process of rendering the 
academic art of the late nineteenth century invisible had  finally 
been normalised by this point, while what once constituted a 
marginal area for critical attention had been transformed into the 
mainstream of history.
This does not, of course, mean that art history underwent a 
process of radicalisation during the twentieth century, increas-
ingly embracing the aesthetic ideals of the avant-garde. Rather it 
is a function of what Hans Belting described as the late  nineteenth 
century separation of art history (as a university discipline) from 
art criticism, which meant that the former no longer constituted 
an authoritative or autonomous voice in the interpretation and 
conceptualisation of modern art and was obliged to place its 
trust in the gradual reevaluation of the avant-garde by the art 
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world.67 What were once radical and antagonist positions would 
in this instance become entirely internalized and institutionalized 
over time. The reason for this was that the normative study of 
the art historical disciplines was so extensively directed at ancient 
art. For the interpretation, evaluation and historiography of the 
 contemporary—when this became necessary in teaching, for ex-
ample, or in the production of survey literature—art history was 
more or less obliged to call on expertise in the field, on modern-
ism’s own historiography in effect.
If a narrower definition of the historical framework for this 
process is desired, the decades immediately prior to and following 
the Second World War can be considered to be a first breakpoint. 
It was then that modernist art was incorporated and institution-
alized within the established system of cultural norms in Western 
Europe and the United States—as an aspect of the unified ratio-
nal and progressive modernity, which at that time became a cor-
nerstone of the ideological structure of the modern welfare state. 
There is a chronological agreement at this point between the es-
tablishment of a particular unified image of modernity and a sim-
ilarly unified image of modernism as the essential artistic form of 
modernity. It is also at this time that the separation between mod-
ern art and academic art became so self-evident that it no longer 
needed to be made explicit and salon art would finally be hidden 
away in the cellars and storerooms of the major museums. The 
other breakpoint can be traced back to the end of the 1960s when 
theoretical and ideological perspectives were formulated within a 
range of different fields that sought to go beyond the established 
understanding of modernism and modernity.
The dialectic between both these breakpoints can be observed in 
a multiplicity of areas, the art world in particular, in which the for-
mulation of postmodernism was based largely on the negating of 
the values that had been accentuated by post-war modernism. Let 
me provide a single example here that may also serve as a coda to 
this archaeological excavation. This is the American art critic Hilton 
Kramer’s violent reaction to the altered display of late nineteenth 
century European art at the Metropolitan Museum of Modern Art 
in New York in 1980 (as a result of a donation by André Meyer), 
in which a more unorthodox selection was exhibited:
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It is the destiny of corpses, after all, to remain buried, and salon 
painting was found to be very dead indeed. But nowadays there is 
no art so dead that an art historian cannot be found to detect some 
simulacrum of life in its mouldering remains. In the last decade, 
there has, in fact, arisen in the scholarly world a powerful sub- 
profession that specializes in these lugubrious disinterments. . . . 
So long as the modernist movement was understood to be thriving, 
there could be no question about a revival of painters like Gérôme 
or Bouguereau. Modernism exerted a moral as well as an aesthetic 
authority that precluded such a development. But the demise of 
modernism has left us with few, if any, defences against the in-
cursions of debased taste. . . . What we are given in the beautiful 
André Meyer Galleries is the first comprehensive account of the 
19th century from a post-modernist point of view in one of our 
major museums.68
The intentions of the Metropolitan Museum of Art (an institu-
tion which might very well have been accused of being culturally 
conservative rather than postmodern in any more radical sense) 
in showing this selection are not the object of discussion here, but 
rather the impertinence of the museum at even entertaining the 
idea of showing ‘the dead’ alongside ‘the living’—under one and 
the same roof. The crime committed by the curators would appear 
to have been a kind of cultural necrophilia, the bare fact of the 
presence of these dug-up and mouldering corpses being enough to 
sully the truth of deathless Art.
It would, of course, be easy to incorporate Kramer’s verdict 
within the tradition discussed above. However, my point is not 
to extend further the unbroken chain of academic criticism, but 
rather to identify a historical threshold: the fact that by this time 
the need was felt once more to mount a rhetorical defence both 
of modernism and of good taste. The true crime committed by the 
curators involved was that they had acted as historians, and their 
selection, deliberate or not, had made visible the standard (i.e., the 
invisible) presuppositions of established historiography. What so 
upsets Kramer is, fundamentally, that the discourse he has been 
operating so unselfconsciously within is being questioned from 
without and that a theoretical and temporary boundary for the 
scope of modernist discourse is being established. If Clive Bell’s 
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censure was motivated by the attempts (on his part and by others) 
to establish an interpretive privilege, Kramer’s statement corre-
sponds to that point in the story when this privilege has been 
lost. Modernism’s paradigmatic criteria for judgement and selec-
tion were being transformed from a tacit presupposition into the 
object of debate, a debate, moreover, in which all parties were 
obliged to present openly their arguments and their underlying 
reasons.
Hilton Kramer’s real position (and that of modernism) in 1980 
therefore corresponds more closely with that of the academic es-
tablishment at the time of the Triennale a hundred years earlier. 
What these interconnections also demonstrate is that the various 
historical positions of the pictorial arts within the visual culture 
of modernism involve a conflict, not simply between different aes-
thetic ideals, but also between different kinds of truth, and that 
each acceptable formulation of truth actually takes place in a par-
ticular and delimited space.
A Space of Transformations
Paul Oskar Kristeller has described how a modern system that 
encompassed the various artistic genres developed in the mid- 
eighteenth century. Although the function and definition of art in 
this system were still linked to a much older tradition, they nev-
ertheless displayed a number of specifically new features.69 In this 
study, he reinterprets the implications of the old paragone debate 
and shows how the continual process of comparison between the 
various art genres during the first half of the eighteenth century 
led to a gradual change in the content of the traditional concept 
of the liberal arts. This shift was codified in Abbé Batteaux’s for-
mulation of the term the fine arts (les beaux arts) in 1749 and in 
Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten’s Aesthetica of 1750. Not only 
were the fine arts seen as sharing an essential definition and a 
set of values, which meant they could be considered in relation 
to one another, they were also understood as a category sepa-
rate from other realms of human experience and knowledge. 
According to Kristeller, Kant’s Kritik der Urteilskraft (1790) was 
a key text in this context. Partly because it was the first study in 
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which aesthetics and art theory were treated as an integral part of 
an advanced philosophical system, and partly because the differ-
ent genres of art were presented as separate forms of experience 
while aesthetic judgement was also considered to be a specifically 
subjective perception beyond any practical function.70
However, unless grounded in institutional practice, these dis-
tinctions would in themselves be of limited importance. It is, nev-
ertheless, possible to see how they are linked together in time with 
an extensive change in the social and institutional structure of aes-
thetics and the visual arts, which would result in their codification 
both through the establishment of particular aesthetic disciplines 
at many of the universities of Europe and through the publication 
of encyclopaedias and specialist tracts that served to reproduce 
the system.71 The considerable significance the new system of the 
arts would actually acquire reflected the fact that it bore such an 
obvious relationship to social, political and artistic contexts and 
practices: it became definitive of the constitution of the identity 
of artists in the modern era and for the specific function of art in 
modern society. It is, however, necessary to distinguish between 
the subjective perception of aesthetic judgement and the specific 
social and ideological functions that the visual arts also estab-
lished. What these two aspects of the modern system of the visual 
arts actually make clear is that, on the one hand, the work of art 
was increasingly seen as an autonomous value (that an autono-
mous category of Art was being established) and, on the other, 
that an ever-more-specialised institutional apparatus for the ad-
ministration and circulation of this value was being organised.
A number of structural shifts took place at the end of the 
 nineteenth century whose effect as a whole was to constitute the art 
world as a somewhat different type of discursive space than before. 
One such shift can be observed in the power and significance of 
the official institutions: it was at this time that the art museum 
took on ever-greater importance as a setter of norms in the art 
world, while the university increasingly took over the role of the art 
academy as the producer of art theory (of rules for the definition 
and interpretation of art).72 Another major shift saw the art world 
gradually become secularised, despite the continuing significance 
of the church as both actor and commissioning body throughout 
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the nineteenth century. As part of a further change, the role of the 
state became defined much more clearly in relation to an evolving 
bourgeois public sphere, in which both the official institutions and 
a private sector simultaneously acquired greater significance for the 
financial and social situation of the artist, primarily in the major 
European metropolises and capitals.73 The historian Daniel M. Fox 
has characterised this state of affairs as follows:
At the end of the eighteenth century patronage came from the mid-
dle class as well as the aristocracy. Painting had a social function: 
as decoration, an index of sophistication and prestige, a luxury 
to be enjoyed aesthetically or materially and as an investment of 
potential financial value. Perhaps for the first time in the history of 
art men were painting more often in anticipation of a market than 
on commissions. By the end of the nineteenth century, government 
buildings, town halls, and public squares were full of paintings and 
statues. The artists who received these commissions were the men 
who had captured the market by best anticipating the taste of the 
members of official committees.74
What makes this description so interesting is that it reveals the 
ambiguous situation of the art world within the bourgeois public 
realm: on the one hand, a process of individualisation through 
private initiatives was occurring in which the position of the artist 
as subject was increasingly transformed from an employee with 
craft skills (and with varying degrees of classical education) into 
an individual market-orientated Artiste; on the other, the organs 
of the state were taking on an ever-greater role in the institution-
alisation of the art world. The dynamic within this system had a 
major effect on the aesthetic foundations of the visual arts and on 
the institutional structure of the art world. The modern art world 
could be said to have evolved in the tension between both these 
areas, in which changes in art, ideals and identities were matched 
by various movements between the public and the private spheres.
This meant that the ties connecting the arts to the church, the 
aristocracy and the court that had existed previously were grad-
ually transformed into a form of representation and commodity 
within a general public sphere. This is, of course, not the same as 
saying that visual art had previously lacked public functions; what 
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it indicates, rather, is a shift occurring on several levels, where the 
previous functional values of art are increasingly differentiated 
and specialised such that the functional value comes largely to be 
overshadowed by purely aesthetic ones. Kant’s distinction of aes-
thetic experience from other forms of experience and knowledge 
may be understood as part of this comprehensive institutional 
and social dislocation. While artistic practice was not obviously 
transformed overnight, discussion of art was increasingly deter-
mined by partially different theoretical and discursive premises. 
It also meant that a similar institutional infrastructure would be 
established in a majority of European states during the nineteenth 
century. This would make it possible to produce and maintain a 
more or less coherent system of codes, norms and ideals—a hier-
archical and normative order that laid down the boundaries for 
the possible and legitimate production of meaning and value in 
the art world. The art world was establishing a particular and 
distinctive logic that would set the norms for the definition of art 
and the boundaries for its interpretation. Reference may be made 
here to “a specific discursive practice”, to borrow a phrase from 
Foucault, a set of written or unwritten rules, which, in a given 
period and in a given social, economic, geographical and linguistic 
circle, determine the conditions for various kinds of statements, 
representations and actions.75 This practice takes place at specific 
institutionalised sites that constitute the nodal points, so to speak, 
of the discourse and where the order stipulated by the archive is 
codified, put into practice and demonstrated.
In order to describe this relationship in greater detail, let us 
return to the fundamental issue of the differentiation in modern 
society of different spheres of value. In terms of the scale and 
speed of change, the modern epoch would seem exceptional in 
this regard as well: with changes occurring to many aspects of 
human existence within the course of a single generation. In many 
instances, this involves a gradual process of change within already 
existing institutions, which are assigned either partially or entirely 
new meanings and functions. This process of differentiation can be 
seen both as the result of the new requirements of industrialised ur-
ban society and as a function of a rational view of knowledge and 
social life. In his Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns (1981), 
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Jürgen Habermas has described how Max Weber understood the 
process of differentiation in terms of a lost wholeness, such that 
what were formerly coherent spheres were split into more or less 
distinct sectors and areas of operation with specific functions and 
forms of legitimation.76 Weber contrasts science and art here with 
the value sphere of ethics and shows how they mediate their spe-
cific claims to universal validity through the fundamental order 
of their own spheres. This would mean that the modern subject 
is capable of adopting different fundamental attitudes to various 
parts of the same world, all of which may be described as rational 
in relation to their specific organising principles.
Working with Weber’s distinction, Habermas has portrayed 
cultural modernity as consisting of three autonomous fields with 
varying kinds of legitimacy: science (truth), morality (normative 
law) and art (authenticity and beauty).77 The separation of the 
spheres does not mean that visual art can be understood and inter-
preted in a context that transcends society, economy and politics. 
On the contrary, it serves to indicate how a sphere that manifests 
its own autonomous logic may nevertheless be inscribed within a 
social and political space.78 Habermas’ distinction identifies two 
determining factors for how visual art functions in the modern 
world: differentiation leads, on the one hand, to the development 
of a heterogeneous context of dissimilar spheres or discursive 
structures while, on the other, the production of knowledge and 
value within each and every one of these spheres does not con-
stitute a cumulative, universal and uniform process, but rather a 
paradigmatic one.79 At issue here is the development of different 
systems of norms, rather than the existence of fully autonomous 
spheres. The establishment of particular epistemological, theoret-
ical and social regulatory systems thus creates a particular order 
or horizon of understanding, which influences and, in many in-
stances, determines the production of knowledge and values in 
each of the various spheres, and it is the power of the discursive 
framework itself that sets the limits for which statements and rep-
resentations are possible within a specific sphere.
Even if this admittedly general (not to say generalising) prop-
osition needs to be interpreted in terms of specific historical, cul-
tural and national situations, it serves to indicate the development 
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of relatively autonomous spheres within various social sectors 
that demonstrate more or less distinct patterns and regularities. It 
would be possible, for example, to describe how the value sphere 
of the visual arts in Europe and elsewhere during the second half 
of the nineteenth century established not only a particular insti-
tutional order, but also a particular kind of space for the trans-
formations that took place. At a fundamental level, this involves 
what Arthur Danto portrayed in ‘The Artworld’ (1964) as the 
manner in which the art world defines and regulates each object 
produced or incorporated in this context by means specifically 
identifying something as a work of art, which he refers to as ‘the 
is of artistic identification’.80 Here we have a space that opens on 
one side to a wealth of interpretations that would otherwise not 
have been possible (everything that a particular sign may signify 
in the art world), while the horizon of meaning, in contrast, closes 
off this space by defining the category that both makes possible 
and sets limits to every interpretation (art/the art world). This 
idea, when transferred to the sphere of the visual arts, appears 
to furnish a key insight into both the art world and how various 
kinds of interpretation and transformation function within this 
world: what was recently a bottle rack has now become a work of 
art, the mirror in an allegorical representation of veritas is also a 
symbol for the reflection of light/the truth, et cetera.
The archive, however, not only regulates what is possible within 
this space—what may exist at all, on what conditions and within 
which horizons of meaning—but also how values and meanings 
may be related to the surrounding social world. In contrast to 
what certain theoreticians have sought to make valid, the auton-
omy of art must be perceived as relative. This open/closed space 
might best be described in terms of an economy of signs: a system 
for regulating symbolic transactions that possess a relative au-
tonomy in relation to the society around them. Autonomy is rel-
ative because the transactions of information, meaning and value 
that take place in this economy of signs are always reversible and 
compatible with the world around them: they can move in oppos-
ing directions from, and are (in certain respects) consistent with, 
one another. What happens within the confines of the art world 
is, therefore, not a game that is completely without any kind of 
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obligations whatever, but an activity that—together with other 
kinds of sign economies—interacts with the surrounding world 
and constructs a particular image of reality. Ultimately, an appro-
priately sanctioned aesthetic value may not only affect the wider 
society but may always be exchanged for hard cash. The fact that 
the notion of an artistic avant-garde should have shown itself to 
be so productive was the primary test that determined it was pos-
sible for the modern system of the arts to be applied in full in an 
always-changing capitalist (and to varying degrees democratic) 
world order. The parenthesis between classicism and postmodern-
ism described by Craig Owens is actually only a part of a far more 
complicated and profound social and institutional change.
****
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the word authentic 
is derived from the Greek authentikos and embraces a range of 
different meanings:
Of authority, authoritative . . . Legally valid, having legal force . . . 
Entitled to acceptance or belief, as being in accordance with fact, 
or as stating fact; reliable, trustworthy, of established credit . . . 
Original, first-hand, prototypical; as opposed to copied . . . Real, 
actual, genuine . . . Really proceeding from its reputed source or 
author; of undisputed origin’. . . 81
These various levels of meaning all relate to how truth and cer-
tainty can be attained and demonstrated in a context where this is 
not obvious, in order to constitute an authoritative interpretation 
of something in a particular situation. The concept establishes 
both a distinction and a certain direction between two or more 
phenomena, one of which can only be considered authentic in 
relation to something else. An authentic document can (in con-
trast to a dubious one) be traced back with certainty to a partic-
ular event or individual and serves, by virtue of its authenticity, 
as proof or evidence of something: the wording of a peace treaty, 
for example, whether a painting was really executed by the indi-
vidual whose signature it bears, or the extent to which it is a mat-
ter beyond any reasonable doubt that a particular person carried 
out a murder. The manner of determining the authenticity of a 
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document varies but is always directed at testing and eliminat-
ing any conceivable doubt. It is in this sense that the concept of 
authenticity has acquired key importance in a range of fields—in 
the historical sciences in particular—as an interface to the true (in 
the sense of the term within the natural sciences, mathematics or 
metaphysics).
But when Jürgen Habermas calls attention to authenticity as 
a fundamental criterion for the legitimation of art in the modern 
world, he is, of course, referring to a phenomenon that extends 
far beyond the determination of the genuineness and historical 
reliability of a document. Ultimately, it provides a principle with 
which to underpin the nominalism that characterises those aspects 
of the modern art world to do with constant change and the way 
in which the individual artist serves as the yardstick of his or her 
own work. This should not, however, be taken to mean that the 
word authenticity was used or played any significant role in the 
historical discourses under discussion. Instead, the concept can be 
used today as an instrument with which to identify ideas and ide-
als that have emerged in the course of historical interpretation as 
being of key importance in a particular historical and discursive 
context. The cluster of different meanings to which the concept 
of authenticity relates can be derived from its two-fold root: truth 
and origin. This duality points to specific differences in relation 
and direction: what something is authentic in relation to. Different 
levels of meaning in the concept of authenticity may be identified 
here: the authenticity of the work in relation to time/change (true 
modernity), in relation to the autonomous, self-reflexive subject 
(the originator), in relation to form and language (the work as an 
organic whole), and in relation to history (the work’s developmen-
tal logic and/or place in a canon of authentic works).
Primarily as a function of modernity’s altered view of history, 
reflexivity and subjectivity, the crucial relationship has become 
the one that establishes an authoritative connection between 
truth and origin, between the work and the originator. Within 
this horizon, an authentic work of art can mean a genuine and 
a unique expression both of the artist’s subject and, as a direct 
consequence, of the contemporary world as interpreted by this 
subject. Or, in the terms used by Rosalind Krauss, the self as origin 
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makes possible the idea of an experience of the contemporary as 
absolutely pure and uncontaminated by a past weighed down by 
tradition, which forms the basis for the claim made by the avant-
garde of the need for change and originality.82 In this context, 
authenticity has to do with how a certain understanding is estab-
lished within a social and intellectual community that regulates 
the relation of the work both to a specific origin and to the wider 
world. The notion of origin is transformed here from a purely 
descriptive statement (X executed this work) to a normative in-
terpretation (this work is an essential expression of X and his/her 
contemporary world). Alternatively, the descriptive horizon might 
be said instead to merge with the normative as two inseparable 
parts of a fundamental value: the idea of the inherent truth of the 
work of art. When referring to an origin, this would, therefore, 
mean keeping these two levels apart in order to analyse wherein 
the subjective dimension of this authenticity lies. And even though 
this transformation may be interpreted from an array of different 
perspectives—ranging from the work of art as an individual or ex-
istential expression to the work of art as a product on the  market—
it signals a change both in the perception of what art means and 
how the function of art is defined in the modern world. Here, art, 
irrespective of the medium, has become an almost symbolic repre-
sentation of the idea of the reflexivity of the modern subject.
This understanding comes close to what Jacques Derrida has 
described in another context as a metaphysics of presence: the an-
cient idea that the linguistic or visual sign always possesses a given 
centre of meaning, which, ultimately, can be traced back to the 
presence of an absolute origin, which has served as the foundation 
for what he calls the tradition of Western metaphysics:
Its matrix . . . is the determination of Being as presence in all senses 
of this word. It could be shown that all the names related to funda-
mentals, to principles, or to the center have always designated an 
invariable presence – eidos, archè, telos, energeia, ousia (essence, 
existence, substance, subject) aletheia, transcendentality, concious-
ness, God, man, and so forth.83
Derrida derives this view from the logocentric hierarchy between 
speech and writing, which served as one of the cornerstones of 
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this tradition from Plato to Saussure and onwards, in which the 
former is always privileged at the cost of the latter owing to its 
greater proximity to the origin (the referent). A written text is al-
ways marked by a greater degree of distance to its origin because 
it can be read and reproduced independently of (in the absence 
of) the referent. Whereas articulated speech involves a primary 
sign whose absolute origin is its referent, writing serves instead 
as a supplement or a secondary sign—a sign of the sign.84 In this 
tradition of ideas, the subject constitutes not only the origin of 
the sign and the immanent centre to which all parts of the sys-
tem (language, utterance, image) can be traced back, but also that 
which transgresses the boundaries of the system—the subject who 
speaks exists prior to and, in principle, independently of language.
Now it may, of course, be objected that what Derrida is de-
scribing is an ancient tradition of ideas primarily derived from 
a philosophical context that has nothing specifically to do with 
the changes in the way art was seen during the latter part of the 
 nineteenth century to which we are referring here. Another fun-
damental difference between the linguistic distinction (speech/
writing) and the praxis of the visual arts is that the latter appears 
to lack any counterpart to speech—that the whole content of the 
visual arts is writing and, therefore, consists of secondary signs. 
Derrida’s distinction nevertheless helps to pinpoint an important 
aspect of the change of the form of legitimation under discussion 
here, and at least two dimensions of this change can be distin-
guished that involve a metaphysics of presence. First, there is the 
change in the perception of the nature of art, which took place 
at the end of the eighteenth century when the ontology of the 
work was interpreted by analogy to botany as an organic whole.85 
Second, there is the change in the evaluation of the linguistic func-
tion of the visual arts, which led, during the nineteenth century, to 
an increasing emphasis on the autonomy and intrinsic value of the 
graphic sign as both form and content.
The central importance accorded discussion of the creative act 
in the theoretical formulations of both romanticism and modern-
ism can be traced back to a perception that the genesis of the 
work appears to be a creative process that originates in the uncon-
scious of the individual, rather than a rational consummation of a 
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complete idea. A revaluation of the function of the sketch and in-
dividual brushwork as factors of significance in the finished work 
would become increasingly evident as a result. In some instances 
this process would lead in the twentieth century to a view that 
the interpretation of handwriting, graffiti and the brushstroke 
could serve as the royal road to an understanding of the aesthetic 
essence and source (the subject) of the work. From such a per-
spective, the image would only emerge as writing at the moment 
it becomes a signifier, which means that at least one level of the 
artistic sign (below its referential and iconic layer) would share 
with speech the claim to originality.
There was, however, considerable interest in the artist as indi-
vidual within academic discourse as well, an interest that verged 
at times on a cult of original genius to which the view of the origi-
nator as the absolute source of the work was, naturally, a far from 
alien idea. The relevant difference had more to do with an alter-
ation in the centre of gravity: a dislocation rather than a change in 
meaning, which brought with it a considerably greater emphasis 
on the significance of presence/authenticity for the existence of the 
work as a work of art. And it was the accentuation of this particu-
lar aspect of the concept of authenticity that is of interest here: the 
extent to which the development of a field of competition within 
this discourse also entailed a change in the form of legitimation 
such that the artist and the individual qualities of art were em-
phasised in an entirely different way—in theory, in practice and 
on the market.
One example of this initially gradual but eventually distinct 
change is provided by the growing importance of the sketch. While 
the sketch also played a very significant part in understanding the 
creation of art in academic discourse, it was not, in itself, an ac-
ceptable final aim for the finished work.86 Winckelmann’s cele-
brated advice to the artist to ‘sketch with fire, and execute with 
phlegm’ bears witness to this, but it also highlights the division 
between these two elements, which reflects, in turn, the distinc-
tion discussed earlier between craft and theory in the academic 
code. The function of the sketch within the academic system was 
utilitarian rather than aesthetic: the sketch was considered to be a 
preliminary stage in the artistic process, or an embryo from which 
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the trained eye could determine the potential of the finished work 
at competitions.87 The specific qualities (warmth, individuality, 
spontaneity, originality) of the sketch in the introductory stages of 
the creative process may have been clearly perceived, but, as Albert 
Boime pointed out, these qualities were not seen as definitive, or 
even acceptable, aesthetic criteria for the finished work of art:
The Artist’s verve had to be governed by his judgement, and ulti-
mately his spontaneity had to be modified by ethical thought. To 
achieve this content, a work demanded reflection and finish; the 
casual brush technique of the sketch required an austere drawing 
in the translation, appropriate to the norm of classical themes. . . . 
Throughout the history of the Academy, the generative phase was 
identified with idiosyncratic genius and originality, while the ex-
ecutive phase was identified with skill and scientific ability. Critics 
rightly observed the polarization of the two stages, the one often 
operating to the detriment of the other. But in the mind of the 
Academician the two stages balanced each other; impulse and free 
hand were checked by careful control and reflection.88
The gradual revaluation of the intrinsic value of the sketch and 
of the significance of free brushwork that took place during the 
beginning of the nineteenth century thus involved a shift in the 
underlying aesthetic criteria. It also led to an ongoing art-critical 
discussion of the relationship between the sketch and the finished 
work (a discussion which, in France at least, would also signal the 
establishment of more less officially sanctioned artistic positions 
outside the influence of the Academy).
To consider, as Boime does, the particular importance assigned 
to the sketch as the point at which an academic tradition would 
continue within the discourse of modernism is, therefore, partially 
correct, although a statement of this kind neglects the evident 
shifts this interest would undergo. While it is possible to maintain 
that the accentuation of artistic genius, indeed its mythogenesis, 
can be traced at least as far back as Ancient Greece, the mythol-
ogisation of the artist that occurred during the Renaissance and 
afterwards introduced a different emphasis, as a kind of emanci-
pation of the divine act of creation. This satisfied a variety of aims, 
one of which has survived into the modern age: the promotion 
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of the social status of the artist and of art.89 The emphasis in ro-
manticism, and subsequently modernism, on the value of individ-
ual expression and originality as being of crucial importance did 
not, therefore, constitute a break with this tradition, but rather 
it served to lend greater weight to a mystical and quasi-religious 
narrative of emancipation surrounding the identity of the artist. 
Instead, the key change that took place was the way the originator 
was identified as/through the work, which led to a new and fun-
damentally different interest in the specific qualities of the sketch 
and, by extension, of the spontaneous brushstroke.
One of the most extreme and influential formulations of this 
value can be found in Harold Rosenberg’s article ‘The American 
Action Painters’ (1952), in which he describes how the new art 
cannot be understood as an image in the traditional sense, but as 
an event:
The painter no longer approached his easel with an image in his 
mind; he went up to it with material in his hand to do something 
to that other piece of material in front of him. The image would 
be the result of this encounter. . . . The act-painting is of the same 
metaphysical substance as the artist’s existence.90
According to Rosenberg, the painting as act cannot be distin-
guished from the biographical facts of the artist’s life. The brush-
strokes thus become traces: indexical signs not just of the vitality 
and transience of the creative act but, above all, of the presence 
and the transcendence of an artist and a sensibility in the painting. 
This formulation can be inscribed in a historical process in which 
the very spontaneity of the sketch as expressed in its brushwork 
would be transformed into a fundamental transcendent and aes-
thetic criterion for the appraisal of the finished work. But this 
revaluation would also introduce a new form of representation. 
Rosalind Krauss describes, for example, how Claude Monet’s 
work was praised by certain critics for the qualities of immediacy 
and spontaneity his brushstrokes conveyed while, in fact, the pic-
torial staging of this spontaneity might require several weeks to 
achieve.91 What this demonstrates is how the brushstroke served 
not only as an indexical sign of the action of the artist, but also as 
an iconic representation of a particular quality—the spontaneity 
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of the creative process—irrespective of whether the work took 
two weeks or two seconds to execute.
Even though this quality may be considered an ancient tradi-
tion in the art of the West, Harold Rosenberg’s formulation and 
the works of Willem de Kooning or Jackson Pollock were, of 
course, concerned with a radically different practice than would 
have been possible or desirable for painters such as Eugène 
Delacroix or Claude Monet. The brushstroke itself would become 
charged in the context of Abstract Expressionism (as a result of 
Rosenberg’s extraordinary significance as an art critic) with an 
aesthetic and existential import that extended far beyond the no-
tions of contemporaneity, spontaneity and originality cherished 
by the Romantic and Impressionist traditions.92 We can see the 
principle of the pivot at work here, where a difference in degree (a 
gradual change in the interpretation and evaluation of the graphic 
sign) over time becomes a difference in kind, one that, on certain 
key points, represents a diametrically opposed view of the ontol-
ogy and aesthetic value of the work.
The Mirror and the Lamp
The development of a value sphere specific to the visual arts 
during the nineteenth century should not be seen simply in terms 
of an empty discursive practice. On the contrary, this sphere 
would be characterised by continual conflict and revolt, as any 
art-historical survey can testify. But the accepted narrative in 
which the academic ideal was excluded from the 1850s onwards 
and replaced by an unbroken line of (proto-) modernist pioneers 
starting with Courbet may appear somewhat insubstantial and 
one-dimensional. The academic ideal would be replaced by the 
narrative of modern art. And yet what happens if we fail to take 
the exclusion of academic art seriously and put together, instead, 
an interpretation that considers the academic and avant-garde 
discourses as two historical aspects of modernity’s possible forms 
of representation? In order to provide at least one possible answer 
to this extraordinarily wide-ranging question, let us start with a 
single example from outside the modernist canon: Jules Lefebvre’s 
painting La Vérité (Truth) dated 1870.
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Figure 4. Jules Lefebvre, La vérité, 1870, oil on canvas, 110 x 226 cm, 
Musée d’Orsay, Paris, Photo and copyright: Reunion des musées nationaux/




This painting has been chosen because of its considerable odd-
ness. I first saw it in a book by the Swedish historian of ideas 
Sven-Eric Liedman and was dumbfounded when he described 
the painting as a representation of Truth holding a light bulb.93 
I showed the picture to various colleagues who reacted in  different 
ways, from aversion, pure and simple, to gales of laughter. I felt, 
nevertheless, that Lefebvre’s picture was saying something essen-
tial, something that might be able to deepen a historical under-
standing of the art and visual culture of modernity.
What are we actually looking at here? The representation is in 
keeping with an established convention that can be found exem-
plified in Cesare Ripa’s Iconologia (1593), where Truth is person-
ified by a (partially) naked woman holding the sun in her right 
hand, a book and a quill in her left, with her right foot placed on 
a globe of the world.94 She is naked because simplicity is natural 
to her, and the sun lends her the joy of clarity; she is the strongest 
of all the things of this world and, therefore, has the globe (i.e., the 
world) beneath her foot. This pictorial formula both recurs and 
is transformed in many subsequent representations of Veritas in 
which the source of light, for example, may change from a burning 
torch to a mirror that reflects the light, although not all the other 
attributes need be present.95 Lefebvre’s work complies with this 
basic scheme, and his image satisfied all the technical and aesthetic 
requirements established by the discourse of academic painting,
The mixture of heightened idealism and eroticised nakedness 
may seem comical to us; this was the very combination that 
would give Salon art such a poor reputation as being pompous, 
vulgar, pornographic and bad theatre, rather than authentic art. 
If Lefebvre’s painting seems comical to us today, its comedy may 
perhaps be found primarily in the date of its genesis: the viewer 
of today would in all likelihood expect quite a different por-
trayal of truth in a picture produced in 1870. It was created when 
Courbet’s thematic claims to truth were yesterday’s news, five 
years after Manet caused a scandal at the Salon with Olympia, at 
a time when books, periodicals and newspapers were increasingly 
furnished with documented illustrations, when the Impressionists 
were first formulating the necessity for optical truth in their paint-
ings and when photography was being established as the pencil of 
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nature, particularly in the genre of portraiture and in various sci-
entific and documentary contexts. As far as the official academic 
art world of Paris was concerned, however, the truth claims of 
the Realists and the Impressionists (not to mention those of the 
photographers) were delusions that had nothing to do with Fine 
Art. But this difference in interpretation has more to do with a 
difference in the historical perspective of our own time: the ex-
tent to which we understand Lefebvre’s image in the light of its 
modernity or its traditionalism, the extent to which we can see 
beyond the stylistic categories of historicism in order to under-
stand the difference that actually exists between this image and 
previous classical representations. The painting was, in fact, much 
praised by the artist’s contemporaries when exhibited at the Salon 
of 1870, where it received the Jury’s prize, and it was bought the 
following year by the Musée du Luxembourg, the most presti-
gious museum of contemporary art at the time.96
If we leave all aesthetic considerations aside and take this painting 
seriously, as was apparently done when it was first shown, we might 
begin by asking ourselves what kind of truth the title of the work 
refers to. The image has been interpreted as an allegory for the new 
conceptual universe of the Enlightenment, with the mirror reflecting 
the naked light of Truth that would ‘drive lies and shadows out of 
the world’.97 Such an interpretation of the allegory would, however, 
seem rather odd because the Enlightenment and science are being 
portrayed through a mythologizing motive, while the primary claim 
to legitimacy of modern science is its criticism of myth. Neither, 
apparently, can Lefebvre’s painting be said to be making a claim 
for truth in the sense of being a naturalistic depiction, complying as 
it does with a convention that the visual arts should portray ideal 
beauty. The female figure is, to use Kenneth Clarke’s distinction, 
not naked but nude, dressed in art.98 If the mirror of the goddess of 
truth is reflecting the light of truth, the composition and the repre-
sentation of the female body reflect a particular notion of the abso-
lute truth content of ideal beauty. This does not mean that Veritas is 
a stylised form: she appears to be an individual, although endowed 
with classical or classicist features, both in the design of the body 
and the face. This would also apply to the composition as a whole, 
whose chiaroscuro testifies to a kinship with a painterly tradition, 
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rather than the linear approach of the rigid neo-Classicism of the 
early nineteenth century. The interplay of light and shadow creates 
the illusion of a three- dimensional space in which it is the body of 
the goddess and her reflection of the Light (in her person and in the 
mirror) that are accentuated.
Irrespective of what stylistic connections one chooses to make, 
this is a painting that could justly be accused of being  traditional—
and one that, in its traditionalism, points to a different kind of 
concept of truth than the one embraced by the natural sciences of 
the late nineteenth century. Interpreted in this way, the painting 
would appear to be an allegory almost of the classical tradition’s 
definition of both truth and beauty, in which light had a crucial 
symbolic significance. One example of the way in which this ideal 
could be expressed is found in the work of the librarian and theo-
logian Antonio Ludovico Muratori, who wrote these words at the 
beginning of the eighteenth century:
Beauty, which delights and moves us with its sweetness, is nothing 
other than the radiant light of truth. This light is revealed in brev-
ity, or clarity, or evidence, or force, or novelty, or honesty, or utility, 
or magnificence, or proportion, or arrangement, or verisimilitude, 
or in the virtues which may accompany truth.99
Aesthetic beauty is intimately linked to truth in this definition be-
cause it corresponds to and reflects a divine world of ideas beyond 
the imperfect and transient appearance of the material world.100 The 
mirror may be said to have served as a general metaphor in classical 
doctrine, both for an ineluctable distance from the ideal (the light 
or the source of the light) and for the materialisation of the ideal 
through the reflecting process of art. A similar connection between 
light, beauty and truth was made at the end of the eighteenth century 
in the work of Friedrich Schiller, for whom art, while not serving as a 
surrogate for science or philosophy, nevertheless signified a particu-
lar form of knowledge in the service of human enlightenment:
Even before Truth’s triumphant light can penetrate the recesses of 
the human heart, the poet’s imagination will intercept its rays, and 
the peaks of humanity will be radiant while the dews of night still 
linger in the valley.101
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In Lefebvre’s painting, this classical (and possibly pre- Romantic) 
conception of Truth and Beauty is directly represented in the sub-
ject and should not be confused with a scientific, positivist concept 
of truth. Here, the mirror has become a metaphor for the capacity 
of the work of art to reflect the light of Beauty/Truth like a mirror.
The idealism that characterised academic aesthetics also en-
tailed the canonisation of a particular historical ideal: classical 
Greek art. The art of the ancient world was considered so im-
portant in that it was believed to provide the best guide as to how 
such an idealised portrayal of reality should appear and how the 
artist, on the basis of a meticulous study of this art, might find a 
path to the understanding of the beautiful form behind nature’s 
endless supply of accidental variations and defects. It would be a 
mistake, however, to see academic doctrine simply as the expres-
sion of a particular artistic style. It was rather an institutionali-
sation of an ancient art tradition in the theory of art of using an 
image to make visible an idea: the ideal truth behind the objects 
of the sensory world.102 In artistic practice, what the interpreta-
tion of this idea involved was a clarification or refinement of the 
theory of selection, in which the nature study was combined with 
a particular conception of ideal forms. Studying at an academy 
of art involved a systematic initiation into the discursive order 
of academic doctrine, in which the rationality of the modern age 
was interwoven with (a particular interpretation of) a very an-
cient ideal.103 The process of legitimation through science and 
philosophy allowed both aspects to emerge as the two sides of an 
underlying truth.
The art academies would thus appear to have been intellectual 
rather than practical institutions (in ideal terms at least), whose 
aim was to teach art as a form of knowledge through the disciplin-
ing of drawing and the sign, but not through the practical skills 
of painting or sculpture.104 This form of knowledge also made 
possible the classification and evaluation of the type of subject 
matter on the basis of the established hierarchy of genres, which, 
at a superficial level, provided a system for the assessment of dif-
ferent types of subject matter while also serving at a fundamental 
level as a matrix for interpretation and debate.105 The hierarchy 
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of genres also defined relative criteria for the appraisal of every 
type of genre, which also entailed a division into different types 
of art.106 Despite the existence of this strictly rational order, there 
was an obvious discrepancy between the representation of the 
ideal, as prescribed by the regulations of academic discourse, and 
the pragmatism that frequently characterised its application. For 
even if practical skills were variously described as secondary in re-
lation to theory (idea), it was a key tenet that both aspects had to 
be woven together in order to perfect the work.107 The production 
of the mature artist was, and was supposed to be, an interpreta-
tion whose hallmarks were his (or more rarely, her) temperament 
and genius.108 And becuase the value sphere in which this interpre-
tation was produced must be considered partially autonomous, 
neither the academic ideal, nor its aesthetic practice may be un-
derstood as absolute, ahistorical norms, but rather as an approach 
that was gradually adapted to a changing social situation.
It may be observed in this regard that although the changes un-
dergone by the hierarchy of genres, despite its continued consider-
able significance during the nineteenth century, had some extent to 
do with alterations to the political landscape, they were primarily 
the outcome of the development of a bourgeois public sphere and 
its transformation of the social structure of society. This meant, 
furthermore, that the dividing line between the genres (and for 
what was acceptable) was constantly shifting during this period. 
History painting increasingly became the province of erotic fan-
tasies or bloody dramas inscribed in historical or mythological 
tableaux. This particular shift can perhaps be more readily inter-
preted on the basis of the increased importance of the bourgeois 
public sphere and its need for sensory realism, greater historical 
detail and subjects that fired the imagination, rather than for an 
abstract scheme of ideal beauty.
The significance of the ambivalence manifested in Lefebvre’s 
mythological motif applies not only to single artwork or a partic-
ular individual, but also it also reflects a crisis phenomenon, what 
might be described as a linguistic and ontological insecurity in the 
art world of the late nineteenth century. The unintended comic 
effect of the image may be more revealing of our own one-sided 
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relation to this culture than any failure on the part of the aca-
demic tradition.
****
Although Jules Lefebvre’s La Vérité can be interpreted both in 
terms of its traditionalism and its modernity, it is not my aim 
to assert or cultivate either one or the other. The issue, rather, 
is to understand how these two perspectives point to an unre-
solved ambivalence in the art world of the late nineteenth century 
Europe, where neither the rational concept of truth cherished by 
science or the metaphysical notion cherished by idealism could be 
taken for granted.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, Max Weber char-
acterised modernity in terms of rationalisation and disenchant-
ment: the definitions provided by the enlightenment/modernity of 
knowledge, the human being and society had not only proven 
superior to those provided by the traditional connections to the 
church and an older social structure, those very connections were 
also being called into question on a more systematic basis for the 
first time.109 As a result of this shift, social actions and theories 
about the world could increasingly acquire legitimacy through the 
application of a rational and secularised form of knowledge, in 
which the world could no longer be understood as a unity whose 
ultimate ontological foundation was constituted by religion or by 
mystical forces. At the same time, however, modernity should not 
be seen as a uniform movement away from the forms of experi-
ence of the past, even though the traditional significance for so-
ciety of religion and the church had been undermined, they were 
not necessarily in a state of opposition to the modern. Neither did 
rationalisation mean the same thing in every value sphere, but it 
should be seen as an overarching process that led to a range of 
different contexts being incorporated and institutionalised within 
the framework of the modern now that religion had come to con-
stitute a separate value sphere and the church was seen as merely 
one institution among others.110
So how should we understand the effects of this multivalent 
process of disenchantment on the art world? Even though the re-
ception of antiquity constituted a key part of academic doctrine, a 
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fundamental precept of that doctrine was the distinction between 
the ancient world and the contemporary one. The abilities of the 
artists of ancient Greece were likened to those of someone speak-
ing their native tongue; whereas, modern artists had to acquire 
this extinct foreign language by artificial means.111 The metaphor 
of a dead language also tells us something interesting about the 
emancipation of idealist art during the nineteenth century: the du-
alistic representation of the relation between the world and the 
world of ideas was extinct. Applied to Jules Lefebvre’s La Vérité, 
this idea might be understood in terms of the painting represent-
ing the uncertainty of the contemporary world when confronted 
with the tradition of classical art and of the idealist nude, rather 
than as expressing Truth or reflecting it in itself. Although the 
greatness of that tradition remained undimmed at this point and 
it was still seen as providing a guiding light for the contemporary 
world, the cleavage between the idealism of the classical tradi-
tion and the materialism of the modern age inevitably entailed an 
awareness of loss.112
Historical reflection on greater awareness of change in the 
ahistorical notion of beauty had been a feature of the aesthetic 
discourse of the recent past. Friedrich von Schiller, for example, de-
scribed the phenomenon in Briefe über die ästhetische Erziehung 
des Menschen (1795) as a consequence of the process of civilisa-
tion, in which progress had fractured the organic unity between 
feeling and reason that had still existed in Ancient Greece.113 This 
fundamentally nostalgic view was to characterise the work of 
many theorists during the second half of the eighteenth century 
and reached it most significant formulation in Johann Joachim 
Winckelmann’s Geschichte der Kunst des Altertums (1764). For 
Winckelmann, the authority of the ancient Greeks was founded 
on favourable external factors, such as climate, nature and consti-
tution, all of which had created the circumstances that endowed 
the character of the ancient Greeks with a superior notion of truth 
in life and in art.114 The concept of truth involved was, however, 
not relative or culturally determined, but absolute and universal; 
it was the inner essence of things and in tune with a God-given 
harmony, which could be recreated by the artist as ‘ein aus der 
Material durchs Feuer gezogener Geist’.115 Although the artist of 
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the modern age had to strive to comprehend this harmony and 
portray it in his art, he could hardly be expected to succeed as well 
as the ancient Greeks.
There was, however, considerable variation in the kind and de-
gree of authority accorded the art of antiquity. The entire problem 
complex may be inscribed in the debate between the ancient and 
the modern, which had been going on since the seventeenth century. 
Matei Calinescu has described how the modern camp assigned a 
normative role to the ancients in terms of the ideal of beauty, while 
assuming that the contemporary world was superior to all past 
epochs in terms of rational argument and religion.116 What this dis-
cussion reveals, however, is a growing insight into the peculiarity of 
the modern age during the nineteenth century, when an increasing 
degree of historical awareness could lead both to nostalgia and a 
belief in progress. A particular aesthetic trend could, after all, not 
be legitimated solely on the basis of utilitarian rational argument, 
but had to be weighed in the balance with notions of morality and 
beauty. A chasm was opening in this regard, as well between the 
aesthetic and epistemological functions of art, to the extent that 
fewer and fewer people viewed the world of ideas as a divine and 
transcendental order, even though idealist doctrine still clung on to 
legitimacy by dint of convention and tradition.
For Schiller, art offered a unique opportunity to bridge this 
chasm by conveying a sense of harmonious equilibrium between 
reason and feeling, which the viewer was able to perceive intui-
tively through aesthetic contemplation.117 Schiller’s approach may 
be considered a version of the modern belief that art— precisely 
because it now comprised a semiautonomous sphere within mod-
ern society—transcended the general trend towards fragmentation 
and alienation. This was a view that became largely institu-
tionalised through the academic system of the early  nineteenth 
century, a view in which the dualism of classical art would be 
overshadowed by confidence in the quintessential nature of art, 
which was an emancipated belief in the capacity of aesthetics to 
mediate an understanding of a unity of existence that was both 
hidden and lost.
One indication of this comprehensive social, epistemologi-
cal and linguistic turn is the change in the reception of Ancient 
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Greece and Rome during the second half of the eighteenth century 
when the notion of antiquity as a natural order was replaced by 
the image (or myth) of antiquity as both a rhetorical trope and 
a code that clearly marked the historical difference between us 
(the moderns) and them (the ancients).118 A similar change in the 
reception of the antique world during the Enlightenment has been 
characterised by Maiken Umbach in terms of an ambivalent pro-
cess of mediation and deliberate detachment:
It is true that archaeological excavations in this period opened up 
new perspectives on classical culture. Yet paradoxically, the more 
enthusiastic eighteenth-century writers became about the physi-
cal contact with the classical world, the more remote this world 
also became. What has so often and somewhat confusingly been 
dubbed ‘neo’-classicism was rarely an exercise in recreating the 
classical world in a literal sense. Ancient Rome and Greece became 
an ‘other’; they were remembered in quotation marks. Classical 
notions of order and reason quoted them, retold them – and turned 
them into fiction. These fictions were ambiguous and multiple – 
and in this multiplicity lies the ‘modernity’ (or post modernity) of 
the Enlightenment.119
As Umbach indicates, this altered awareness was not only a defin-
ing characteristic of the neo-classical and academic reception of 
antiquity, it also provided a foundation for ideas that would, in 
the long term, lead beyond academic doctrine and the dualism of 
allegorical aesthetics towards a Romantic view of the authenticity 
of the work of art, its organic unity and mythical origins. And, 
later even, towards a series of Utopian models (the avant-garde) 
that would overtrump, overthrow and replace one another at an 
ever increasing pace. Though the language may have become ex-
tinct, it still retains its relevance, albeit in a new form, because art 
is capable of re-presenting that lost unity, of conveying the idea 
of ideal beauty as part of the mutable, fragmented and materialist 
way of life of the modern age. It is here, too, that the foundations 
were laid for the way in which modern art would be formulated 
within academic discourse.
The element of the modern in the neo-Classicist view of con-
temporary art did not, of course, entail a potential revolution; it 
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was more a matter of a gradual shift that occurred as a response 
to the institutionalisation of a change in the way time and history 
were seen. Although the debate/dialectic between the moderns 
and the ancients is longstanding, at issue here was a new type of 
awareness, a historic shift, which became the impetus for notions 
of the demystification of the contemporary world that understood 
it in terms of a fundamental social and linguistic loss (of unity and 
natural connection). I would maintain that the idea of this shift 
has had far greater significance than simply providing the spur 
for various forms of early nineteenth century nostalgia. Rather, 
it has served ever since as a fundamental premise for the various 
aesthetic, functional and ontological formulations of the visual 
arts and for their position in modern society.
Meyer Howard Abrams has described how the shift from clas-
sicism to what is called romanticism can also be deciphered from 
changes in the metaphors used to describe the ontology of the 
work of art at the beginning of the nineteenth century: increas-
ingly, it was the expressive value of the work (the work as lamp) 
that was accentuated, rather than, as before, its imitative function 
(the work as mirror). The light was seen, therefore, as emanating, 
so to speak, directly from the work of art, while the truth of the 
work was increasingly considered to be a reflection of its original-
ity and authenticity, rather than its capacity to reflect the objects 
of the surrounding world or an abstract ideal.120 A gradual change 
in emphasis, selection and focus may thus be perceived that would, 
by extension, herald a decisive difference in the way art was seen:
Even though the characteristic patterns of romantic theory were 
new, many of its constituent parts are to be found, variously de-
veloped, in earlier writers. By shifting the focus and selecting the 
examples, we can readily show that romantic aesthetics was no 
less an instance of continuity than of revolution in intellectual his-
tory. In the course of the eighteenth century, some elements of the 
traditional poetics were attenuated or dropped, while others were 
expanded and variously augmented; ideas which had been central 
became marginal, and marginal ideas became central; new terms 
and distinctions were introduced; until, by gradual stages, a rever-
sal was brought about in the prevailing orientation of aesthetic 
thinking.121
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Not only did this change in metaphors involve the use of new im-
ages to describe a particular phenomenon (a work of art), it was 
also a symptom of a more profound change in the way the nature 
of art and its manner of representation were understood.
The combination of a gradual and radical change might be de-
scribed in metaphorical terms as a historical pivot: that point at 
which the conditions for the production and interpretation of art 
undergo a shift by a number of degrees. Initially, this shift would 
only involve small-scale deviations from a prevailing ideal, but, 
over time, it would lead to an entirely different perception of art 
and of the foundation for its legitimacy.122 The kind of change 
referred to here could also be described as a dispersed historical 
process that would produce a deep-seated and substantial change 
in the course of several decades: the establishment of an alterna-
tive paradigm for the understanding of what art is and how art 
should be perceived.
It is within the extensive context of effects created as part of this 
shift that a broad range of phenomena may be understood, rang-
ing from the traditionalism of academic art and the condemnation 
of traditionalism as such by the Futurists, from Romantic notions 
of the authentic expression of the subject to the Postmodernist 
dramatisation of the thesis on the death of the subject. In all cases, 
this involves ideas about a radical position on the other side of 
the boundary to something that had either existed before or been 
taken for granted, about the way in which the loss of something 
that had previously seemed self-evident would provide the im-
petus for new ways of formulating a particular artistic practice. 
What is at issue here is not a linear tradition, but the existence of 
a specifically modern premise—a shared intellectual construct—
which would give rise in various theoretical and social contexts to 
a range of different interpretations and patterns of reaction that, 
taken as a whole, serves to characterise what might be called the 
episteme of modern art.
****
The question nevertheless remains, what is Veritas actually hold-
ing in her hand? Although convention tells us that it has to be 
a mirror, it has also been suggested that she is grasping a light 
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bulb.123 The fact that the painting was produced in 1870—nine 
years before Edison’s patent of the incandescent bulb—would 
make this truly remarkable. In itself, however, this would not re-
fute the attribution, because there had been ideas about electric 
light and indeed demonstrations of it throughout the nineteenth 
century.124 But no contemporary or subsequent description of 
the picture mentions anything about a light bulb.125 Moreover, it 
would have been unthinkable, in principle, for a painting that was 
not only accepted by the Salon jury but also awarded a medal to 
have so punctured the academic ideal as to incorporate a modern 
and worldly detail such as a light bulb in a mythological sub-
ject. The absence of naturalistic, individualistic and material signs 
was the very foundation of the increased importance accorded the 
nude at the end of the 1860s, in which the academic tradition’s 
synthesis of idealism and abstraction was considered to demon-
strate a value that transcended the triviality of modern life (and 
the potentially pornographic connotations of the subject mat-
ter).126 The crossover between the general and the specific would 
seem, in fact, to have been at once a risky, subversive and pleasur-
able zone in the academic art of the late nineteenth century.
But even if the proposed attribution is not correct, this does not 
make it irrelevant. For there can be no doubt that a connection ex-
ists between the pictorial formula and iconography of Lefebvre’s 
work and various attempts to establish visual codes to do with 
electricity and electric light a decade or so later. In her fascinating 
book When Old Technologies Were New (1988), Carolyn Marvin 
describes the visual culture that developed in tandem with the 
electrification of modern society during the 1880s and 1890s, 
when the problem was not just a matter of making visual a new 
(and rather abstract) technology to the general public, but also 
(for a particular social group of experts) of displaying knowledge 
and authority in the form of dramatic demonstrations:
In the perceived novelty of its high-drama public role, the electric 
light also expressed the sense of unlimited potential that was a sta-
ple of nineteenth-century discourse about the future of electricity. 
For if electricity was the star of the nineteenth-century show, its 
most publicly visible and exciting agent was certainly the electric 
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light. It was present in exhibitions, fairs, city streets, department 
stores, and recreation areas. It was physically and symbolically as-
sociated with whatever was already monumental and spectacular. 
It appeared in grand displays, processions, buildings and perfor-
mances. It borrowed from every established or dramatic cultural 
self-promotion.127
Although electric light proved a spectacular event in itself, its mer-
its were not only demonstrated in practical demonstrations, but 
also as extravagant displays in the form of stellar constellations, 
illuminated bunting, fountains lit up with coloured light, signal 
lamps, illuminated department store fronts, projections on clouds, 
light in the shape of emblematic figures, and so on. The use of light 
in public demonstrations of this kind formed a significant part 
of the visual culture into which this technology was inscribed. 
It may be observed here how the visualisations and metaphors 
employed in both the specialist and popular press to describe the 
new technology were extremely varied and oscillated between di-
ametrically opposed connotative poles: from apocalypse, utopia 
or magic to rational science and the utilitarian pragmatism of the 
everyday.
However, this culture and, indeed, the use of the new technol-
ogy as a whole involved a form of translation between new signs 
and codes, on the one hand, and older conventions, on the other, 
which meant that the discourse that developed around electricity 
as a technology and as a mass medium only became possible within 
certain accepted cultural and social systems of norms.128 The same 
pictorial formula on which Lefebvre’s painting was based also re-
curred in images that alluded more directly to electricity and elec-
tric light and were produced for popular, commercial and private 
contexts. One example is provided by a photograph from 1883 of 
Mrs. Cornelius Vanderbilt as ‘The Electric Light’.
Wearing an evening gown, the woman in the picture is hold-
ing aloft an electric bulb. The motif would appear to be a direct 
translation of Lefebvre’s formula, albeit rather more clumsily ex-
ecuted. Any direct application of the classicist nude would have 
been impossible in terms of the conventions of this particular 
medium (photography): such a photograph would definitely have 
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Figure 5. José Maria Mora, Vanderbilt Ball, Mrs. Cornelius Vanderbilt as the 
electric light, March 26 1883, fotografi, The New York Historical Society, 
New York (Department of Prints, Photographs, and Architecture Collections: 
Costume Ball Photographs Collection, PR-223, Series V, Box 3, Folder 34), 




crossed the boundary to the pornographic. It is difficult to de-
termine the particular aims of this photograph, but considering 
that the model belonged to the very summit of New York’s social 
and financial elite, it may reasonably be supposed that the image 
was intended as a fashionable and/or humorous tableau for pri-
vate consumption. The really interesting aspect from our point of 
view, however, involves paying attention to what the translation 
and transformation of the motif are actually doing: combining the 
classical ideal of truth with one that is scientific and technological; 
light-as-truth is being transformed into electricity-as-truth.
This combination of convention and innovation would pre-
sumably have been a key incentive for the commercial companies 
that had invested in the new technology and were keen to con-
vert it into cash by selling it to the general public. As described 
by David E. Nye, the crucial issue for electric companies was to 
be able to dramatise the superior benefits of their own products 
while simultaneously downplaying the utopian/apocalyptic con-
notations. By placing an electric bulb in a traditional, premodern 
environment, the technology was presented as harmless and in 
keeping with tradition.129
A variation on this theme can be found in the trademark of the 
German electrical company AEG from 1884, in which the attri-
butes of Truth are combined with those of Fortune, and the resul-
tant goddess is seen holding an incandescent bulb.130
A company such as AEG would appear to have felt the need to 
transpose a widespread but diffuse perception of this extraordi-
nary novelty into a traditional and, therefore, more comprehen-
sible figure. The combination of visual codes gave rise, however, 
to a particular communication problem in that the emblem had 
to mediate a specific iconography while remaining comprehen-
sible to anyone not versed in iconographic and allegorical mat-
ters. The same kind of competence is, in principle, at issue here 
as was essential, in Arthur Danto’s view, for creating an aesthetic 
identification in the art world of the 1960s. But the problem is 
both a more ancient and more wide-ranging one in that it applies 
not only to the confused visitors confronted with Andy Warhol’s 
Brillo boxes at the Stable Gallery in New York in 1964, but also, 
and in a more general sense, to the art world that was constituted 
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Figure 6. Anonymous, Trademark of Allgemeine Elekrizitäts-Gesellschaft 
(AEG), Germany, 1894, Photo and copyright: The Archives of the National 
Museum of Science and Technology, Stockholm, License: CC BY-NC-ND.
as an autonomous value sphere during the nineteenth century and 
to the broader visual culture that was oriented towards the gen-
eral public. A new need was emerging to mediate the codes of the 
visual arts to the public as a whole, while greater competence was 
being required of that same audience at deciphering various forms 
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of visual communication (from official art to different kinds of 
advertisements, trademarks, labels, items of political propaganda, 
etc). To a target group that was either entirely or partially unfa-
miliar with allegorical matters, the trademark delivered a more 
general connotation of the union of the old and the new, in which 
a mythological figure of some kind is seated on a wheel (modern 
communications), which rests on a globe of the world (world do-
minion, universality), while holding a light bulb (modern technol-
ogy). To be on the safe side, the goddess of light is also strategically 
draped in cloth to prevent uninformed observers from confusing 
the different and distinct connotations of nudity. The way of read-
ing inscribed here is allusive rather than descriptive, with the text 
serving both as an anchorage (leading potential interpretations in 
a particular direction) and as a relay (shifting the category of the 
motif from the field of art to that of the trademark).131
Unlike this commercial and popular cultural use of the con-
vention, Lefebvre’s picture served an entirely different function, 
in which two aspects that were both typical and definitive of the 
artistic practice of academic discourse could be said to converge: 
the interplay between doctrinaire and rational classification and 
the necessity of individual interpretation and pragmatism. What 
becomes apparent here is that the hierarchy of genres operated 
within a field whose boundaries were explicitly defined against 
other fields, a field in which the Fine Art that Lefebvre’s paint-
ing exemplified was regulated and assessed on the basis of quite 
different norms than those governing the applied art represented 
in this instance by AEG’s trademark. AEG, for its part, was able 
to profit from what was conventional in academic visual culture 
as a source of a particular value. But it also tells something else, 
namely that neither of these images—or categories of image—can 
be considered in isolation from a much more extensive process of 
social change.
Certain mythical and religious views were, as we have seen, 
included in the differentiated repertoire of both compatible and 
contradictory contexts found within the modern. Demystification 
in this regard should, therefore, be understood as a more compli-
cated process than the differentiation of particular activities and 
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values to specific domains. Various generally disseminated ideas 
of the consequences of the scientific revolution could even be 
considered to constitute a new and secularised form of mythol-
ogy.132 Within the bourgeois public sphere, modernisation was 
the economic and financial prerequisite for the new social life of 
the middle class. That life would, however, be characterised by 
an ambivalence between the upholding of traditional social hier-
archies and moral values and an almost blind, spellbound even, 
trust in the future potential of science and the process of moderni-
sation. However, as Carolyn Marvin has shown, the boundary 
between science and myth was much less clearly defined in the late 
 nineteenth century than it is today:
Although an express mission of science was to kill magic and 
myth, electrical experts were deeply implicated in the production 
of both. . . . The occasional appearance of sensational stories about 
the occult at the fringes of scientific and professional literature 
was usually legitimized by the suggestion that science was absorb-
ing and taking over disreputable magical modes and replacing 
them with benign scientific ones. Stories of this kind dramatized 
the heroic encounter with the unknown, and the contest of power 
against power. As in any thrilling story, the plot of scientific proof 
and verification revealed what was authentic and legitimate in the 
eternal drama between good and evil.133
Here we see emerging the outlines of a position that would en-
compass an almost mystical faith in the material rationality of sci-
ence, on the one hand, and a merger of occult and rational criteria 
and narratives in the public understanding of scientific innovation 
on the other. This extraordinarily ambivalent situation (which 
was in no way unique to the turn of the century) was, to some 
extent, a reflection of the sheer pace of change. Although political 
power structures can be swiftly altered and new technology may 
rapidly change the conditions of everyday life, changes within 
social structures and thought patterns usually occur much more 
slowly.134 Various forms of mysticism, tradition and convention 
seem to have been entirely necessary criteria for the social context 
in which the public understanding of scientific innovations took 
place in the decades either side of the turn of the century. This 
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would also serve to explain, in part, the shifting function of the 
visual arts in this period.
As Jonathan Crary has so convincingly demonstrated, the 
nineteenth century can be described in terms of a comprehensive 
change both in the organisation of visual forms and in the posi-
tion of the observing subject; this change would, in turn, entail 
the development of new technologies, instances of social control, 
fields of knowledge and forms of linguistic representation:
Rather than stressing the separation between art and science in 
the nineteenth century, it is important to see how they were both 
part of the single interlocking field of knowledge and practice. The 
same knowledge that allowed the increasing rationalization and 
control of the human subject in terms of new institutional and 
economic requirements was also a condition for new experiments 
in visual representation. Thus I want to delineate an observing 
subject who was both a product of and at the same time constitu-
tive of modernity in the nineteenth century. Very generally, what 
happens to the observer in the nineteenth century is a process of 
modernization; he or she is made adequate to a constellation of 
new events, forces, and institutions that together are loosely and 
perhaps tautologically definable as ‘modernity’.135
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the fixed and stable 
visual regime on which both classical art and visual technologies, 
such as the camera obscura, depended was broken up. The vary-
ing foundations of visual truth on which it was based (idealist 
and scientific, respectively) were not only called into question by 
alternative ideas, but also were challenged and outmanoeuvred 
over time by a spectrum of various interchangeable and mutable 
visual values and forms of experience. The reception of the photo-
graphic image as a visual medium at the time of its breakthrough 
provides a striking example: the photograph was understood and 
promoted both as a spectacular technical innovation and, through 
the references it made, as a more highly evolved form of older 
visual media (graphic art, drawing).
From this perspective, a comparison of Jules Lefebvre’s paint-
ing, the photograph of Mrs Cornelius Vanderbilt and AEG’s trade-
mark would have to involve not only the identification of various 
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metaphors for truth or various media and image genres, but also 
the understanding of an intellectual and experiential context that 
meant these diverse forms of representation would all become 
possible within the framework of the modern. This shift also had 
an influence on the change in the visual language and types of 
representation of the academic visual arts. As Linda Nochlin has 
pointed out, the superficiality of academic art and the dissolution 
of the hierarchy of genres reflected not only the poor taste of the 
middle class and its passion for the spectacular and the sentimen-
tal, but also the more detailed knowledge and altered view of his-
tory introduced by the science of the modern era:
As the treatment of historical subjects became more factual and 
mundane towards the mid-century, so the chronological range 
available to artists was expanded. The limits of time itself were 
being gradually pushed back from Archibald Ussher’s judicious 
starting-point in 4004 B.C. The fluid relativism of a perpetually 
revised scientific hypothesis replaced the story of Creation and 
the metaphysical absolute it implied. History and value, history 
and faith, which had been inseparable since the earliest creation 
myths and integrated in the doctrine of the Christian Church, were 
irremediably torn asunder by the Higher Criticism and the New 
Geology. What was left was history as the facts, in a vast landscape 
extending from the mists of prehistoric times to the Comtean pre-
cincts of present-day experience.136
In light of this change, it is possible to see Lefebvre’s painting as 
located at the crossroads between different conventions for the 
artistic representation of objects and abstract ideas, where a sci-
entific ideal of truth comes up against an aesthetic one and where 
various forms of legitimation are simultaneously at work within 
the modern. In which case, the painting would not be a peculiar 
exception, but extremely representative of large parts of the vi-
sual world of the nineteenth century. However, this overall change 
in the organisation of visual forms should not, in my view, be 
considered solely as a coherent continuity, but must also be read 
and understood within the framework of every type of discur-
sive practice. The ambivalent quality of the work of an artist such 
as Lefebvre actually involved a state of tension within the value 
sphere specific to the visual arts, a tension that was the hallmark 
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of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century: while incapable 
of being considered in isolation from the wider social world, it 
nevertheless developed a particular pattern of inflection based on 
the order that regulated the definition and discussion of art within 
established discourse.
We only have to move a few decades forward to study how this 
intricate interplay between tradition and modernity is expressed 
in quite different ways in a form of visual art that made the same 
claims to ultimate value that the academic had done, but which 
embraced a diametrically opposed concept of truth. One such ex-
ample is Sonia Delaunay’s painting Prismes électriques of 1914. 
By this time, even though the technological innovation of electric 
lighting had already reached the living rooms of town-dwellers, 
it was considered sufficiently new to appear both evocative and 
dynamic. Consequently, this form of light also served as an ap-
propriate starting-point for an avant-garde that was attempting 
to capture and transpose the dynamism of the modern age in its 
pictures.
Stanley Baron describes an episode when the Delaunay cou-
ple, while walking along the Boulevard Saint-Michel in Paris that 
same year, found themselves amazed at the newly installed electric 
lights.137 It was that impression that impelled Sonia Delaunay to 
start work on a set of sketches in which she attempted to capture 
the dynamism of that light by gradually reducing all the inciden-
tal, figurative elements in the street scene in order to distil from it 
an abstract composition of circles in shining colours. It was not 
only the mythologisation of the academic tradition that was being 
excluded as part of this compositional process, but also the social 
iconography of realism and impressionism: visual art was no lon-
ger intended simply to depict modern life; it had to be true, in itself, 
to the modern. Delaunay’s painting is an attempt to portray the 
perception of electric light directly in the language of images: two 
circular coloured prisms, both separate and interconnected while 
expanding across the surface of the image like an optical distilla-
tion of the transformations of energy and matter. The composition 
of the colour field is based on Michel Eugène Chevreul’s theories 
about the interaction of simultaneously contrasting colours, with 
the aim of evoking the perception of the visual effect of light.
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While the picture obviously exists in relation to the realist tra-
dition and to Claude Monet’s attempts, for example, to depict a 
particular light at a particular time and place, Delaunay’s painting 
is making more general claims: light is not being depicted solely 
as an effect, but is being employed equally as a metaphor for the 
energy-saturated and kaleidoscopic dynamism of modern life. In 
its pursuit of a radical present, the painting is deliberately turning 
its back on the tradition and the attitude to life that had given rise 
to both Lefebvre’s painting and AEG’s trademark.
What this comparison demonstrates first and foremost are two 
diametrically dissimilar forms of representation. John Berger uses, 
at one point, a couple of metaphorical models to highlight lin-
guistic or rhetorical differences on the part of various historical 
epochs: Lefebvre’s painting would correspond most closely in this 
scheme to the model of ‘the theatre stage’; whereas, Delaunay’s 
corresponds to that of ‘the diagram’.138 In terms of the former 
model, the subject matter is presented as a tableau, while art is 
seen as an artificial language; in the latter model, the image con-
stitutes a directly observable, symbolic rendering of invisible pro-
cesses. It is noteworthy in this context that Delaunay’s depiction 
avoids any suggestion of a staged tableau; all the props and all the 
actors have been erased in order to accentuate the portrayal of the 
dynamism of electric light.
Michael Fried’s characterisation of the element of theatricality 
in academic painting may be understood as a function of the hi-
erarchy of genres, which served not only as a simple taxonomy 
of types of subject, but also as a manifestation of a specifically 
new way of perceiving the image.139 He describes this altered per-
ception in terms of a change in the appreciation of the dramatic 
effect of the image, an accentuation of its essential unity and a 
new relationship between the image and the viewer. The theatre 
stage served, therefore, not only as a metaphorical model (for the 
composition as a static tableau), but also as a paradigm, both for 
the perception of the genre of visual art (as genre) and its com-
municative function. And it is in its obvious transgression of this 
tradition that Delaunay’s painting inscribes itself so strikingly in 
a radically different definition of the ontology and truth criteria 
of visual art.
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This changed definition also points to a changed way of read-
ing. As we saw earlier, Lefebvre’s painting served as a codified 
form of representation, in which the presumption of a varying 
degree of familiarity on the part of the public with the code would 
determine its significance in a particular context. Delaunay’s 
painting is also, of course, a coded representation, but here, the 
interpretation—in its original context—appeared more indirect 
and intuitive: the specific iconography of the former work has 
been transformed in the latter into more general allusions. This 
meant that the need for conventional linguistic skills in the case of 
the former work was replaced by a more general requirement for 
an imaginative sensibility in the latter. At issue here is a changed 
relationship between image and narrative that is indicative of the 
increased focus on the purely visual and the formal in the mod-
ern discourse of the visual arts. The idea of the exclusively visual 
nature of art would appear to be a distinct, historically specific 
and relatively recent construction. Many of the visual cultures of 
the nineteenth century were not intended to be understood ex-
clusively as visual cultures but in terms of a more or less clearly- 
defined textual and narrative framework.140
This text-based way of reading is, of course, not new to the 
modern era but part of an ancient tradition of mythological alle-
gories and religious iconography. The allegorical aesthetic would, 
in this sense, establish at least one common criterion within the 
visual cultures of the late nineteenth century: the close connection 
between image and story. Here, the allegory may be likened to 
what Kant called the parergon: an element, or layer, which exists 
both alongside and inside the work (ergon), like the frame of the 
painting, the drapery of a statue or the columns of a building.141 
In neo-classicism, a distinction was, in fact, made between sub-
stance and ornament, with truth/beauty being constituted by the 
former, although the latter (in the form of myth and history) was 
deemed equally necessary to adorn, as it were, the ideal and to 
uphold the intellectual level of the work.142 The allegory appears 
to have served rather as an interface between the work’s external 
and inherent qualities. While its various linguistic levels created 
a duality, they also interacted and displaced one another. How 
this interaction and its reception function is entirely dependent 
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on convention, but even though the meaning of the allegory may 
be fixed by a particular iconography, a gap nevertheless exists 
between idea and image. A gap that meant, according to Walter 
Benjamin, that the allegorical idiom had to be understood as dia-
lectical and, thus, in principle, open-ended.143
The distinction between allegory and symbol may seem pecu-
liar at first because both terms appear to be so closely related in 
many ways. Even though the concept of allegory has its origins 
in a rhetorical practice, Hans-Georg Gadamer has described how 
both concepts clearly relate to a philosophical and religious con-
text in which they function as a means to understand and make 
visible a concealed meaning/truth:
Both words refer to something whose meaning does not consist 
in its external appearance or sound but in a significance that lies 
beyond it. . . . The allegorical procedure of interpretation and the 
symbolical procedure of knowledge are both necessary for the 
same reason: it is possible to know the divine in no other way than 
by starting from the world of the senses.144
The semantic problem is made all the more intricate by the exis-
tence of so many different definitions. Although both allegory and 
symbol may be defined as the representation of something in the 
guise of something else, and although an allegory may also con-
tain symbols, there are nevertheless some crucial differences. First, 
there is the unity and closed nature of the symbol, as opposed to 
the allegory’s syntactical merging of discrete entities and its open-
ness and, second, the sense in which the symbol communicates 
by means of an immediate insight, as opposed to the reflexive 
and postponed reading of the allegory.145 The distinction between 
symbol and allegory that was drawn in the late eighteenth century 
also entailed a redefinition and transformation of the meanings of 
the terms, and this led to a shift in the intuitive (aesthetic) conno-
tations of the allegory and the rational (scientific) connotations of 
the symbol; they changed place, so to speak: the symbol was now 
presented as an intuitive and occasionally irrational fusion of the 
sensual and the transcendental in contrast to the way in which the 
allegory maintained a meaningful, although artificial, relation be-
tween these two levels.146 From the end of the eighteenth century, 
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this change in the way art was perceived also entailed a relatively 
explicit criticism of the cold rationalism of classical doctrine, both 
in terms of its forms of education and the increasingly abstract and 
bloodless allegorical tableaux that resulted from its aesthetics.147
The shift in meaning reflected a broader current of ideas that 
not only affected the distinction between allegory and symbol, but 
also brought about a revaluation of the former at the cost of the 
latter. Ernst Gombrich has aptly described the new value assigned 
to the symbol:
[T]he implication that the Great and the Beautiful provide the 
mind with a symbol through which we can grasp a hidden truth 
certainly led back to Platonism. And while German classicism had 
thus taken the upward path on the ladder of analogy through the 
image of harmonious forms to the idea of harmony, Romanticism 
re-discovered the Areopagite’s alternative, the power of the mys-
terious and the shocking to rouse the mind to higher forms of 
thought.148
What emerges here is not simply a change in aesthetics and in ar-
tistic ideals, but a change, too, in the way the nature of art and its 
linguistic identity and function were seen. In the work of Goethe 
and Schelling, for example, this distinction was formulated in 
terms of a critical polarisation between two forms of presenta-
tion, an idea to which Friedrich Creuzer would return somewhat 
later in Symbolik und Mythologie der alten Völker, besonders der 
Griechen (1810–12). In this work, the allegory is presented as a 
general concept or an idea separate from itself; whereas, the sym-
bol constitutes the very incarnation and embodiment of the idea. 
The mediation of the idea by the symbol takes place not through 
a conventional reading of its syntactically arranged attributes, but 
through an immediate and intuitive insight, and this constitutes, 
in Creuzer’s view, the very ground of ‘the nature of pictorial ex-
pression’.149 This would suggest that these defining characteristics 
were not being identified on the basis of a neutral desire to clas-
sify categories of images of rhetorical figures, but from an already 
existing need to draw a distinction between two fundamental ap-
proaches concerning the essence and communicativeness of art. 
Interestingly, one of the basic tenets of classicism—the idea of 
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the unity of the work of art—would appear to have undergone a 
transformation, from forming part of an aesthetic ideal to becom-
ing a defining characteristic of the nature of art, the work of art, 
that is, seen as an organic whole integrating form and content.150 
As part of this process, the function of the symbol would alter, 
from serving as a pictorial element to being a definition of the art 
work in itself.
Critical Margins
Modernity may be described as a phenomenon that encompasses 
both an extensive historical process and a definitive change. In 
this sense, it calls to mind Norbert Elias’ description of the process 
of civilisation itself: an interweaving of individual human plans 
and actions whose outcome is quite different from what anyone 
planned, creating a particular kind of order that is both more 
powerful and more compelling, but also more diffuse, than any 
purpose or formulation on the part of an individual or a group.151 
The break between the modern and the premodern should not, 
therefore, be seen as absolute, but understood, instead, in terms 
of both continuity and discontinuity. The specifically new context 
created as a result of the change in social and experiential patterns 
introduced by modernity may have broken with tradition, but the 
resulting forms of experience were far from unambiguous. On the 
one hand, the present and the future were described in many con-
texts as a process of continual expansion in all fields, which, in its 
most extreme form (the discourse of the twentieth century avant-
garde), would lead to historical memory, as such, being declared 
superfluous or even reactionary—a notion that, in some instances, 
would result in a cult of the future.152 On the other hand, reference 
may also be made to a modern cult of the past.153 In both cases, 
modernity introduced a situation in which a particular relation to 
the past was established: a sense of circumspection and loss that 
created a need to bridge the gulf to the past—not in the sense of 
a real return, but in the form of various means of reexperiencing 
(and thus transforming) what had come before.
An array of ideological and institutional changes may be iden-
tified with modernity, which constituted and characterised the 
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development of the value sphere of the visual arts in the Western 
world during the nineteenth century, with Paris as its more or 
less accepted centre. Let me focus here on three of these changes: 
(1) the expansion of the art academies, (2) the interaction between 
the public and the private and (3) the development of a system 
based on competition within and around a critical margin. All 
these structural changes affected the relation of the visual arts to 
what Jürgen Habermas has called the ‘bourgeois public sphere’: 
an expanding and increasingly significant public arena in which 
the middle class gained a role in the formation of opinion and in 
economic and social exchange. It was in this arena that new forms 
of economies of the sign in the world of art were established as 
part of major structural transformation. This change was not per-
ceived as linear and unidirectional in the world of art or in social 
life as a whole; on the contrary, a broad range of trends can be 
identified that worked both in its favour and against it. It thus 
provides a classic example of the pluralism, contradictoriness and 
ambivalence of the modern era.
By the beginning of the century, the system of art academies 
had become increasingly specialised while also expanding in un-
precedented fashion: from only a score or so art academies in 
Europe at the beginning of the eighteenth century to well over a 
hundred by the start of the following one.154 The significance of 
the art academies thus appears to have gradually increased by the 
start of the modern era. Nikolaus Pevsner explains this expansion 
both in terms of the ever greater emphasis on the social, political 
and national-economic benefits of the dissemination of knowl-
edge brought about by the Enlightenment and a new realisation 
of the commercial value of art and design on the part of manu-
facturing industry.155 The demands on the administrative agencies 
to maintain the political, administrative and normative continuity 
of society were an additional factor. Despite the growing scale 
of political conflict, as exemplified in the various revolts of the 
nineteenth century, the overriding function that the Art Academy 
fulfilled to the satisfaction of every regime was to meet a require-
ment increasingly experienced during the modern age for a stable 
organisation of various areas of administrative responsibility.156 
Academic discourse was thus an integral part of the growth of a 
90 Modernism as Institution
normative scheme for mediation, discipline and control within the 
fields of both production and consumption. While the didactic, 
economic and political explanations correspond in this regard to 
various kinds of needs within the modern public sphere, they also 
provide a pattern-card of the way the old and the new interacted 
in modernity, allowing us to observe how some traditional institu-
tions and ideals continued to survive while undergoing changes in 
a number of crucial respects.157 It was, of course, essential for any 
regime that was not completely authoritarian to create a certain 
(acceptably large) space for new movements and changed ideals 
within the art world, as in other fields.
An academic code could, nevertheless, be said still to exist 
that embraced a range of distinctions—both in practice and in 
 principle—affecting the various parts of the art world: the defi-
nition of art and the value of art, the way the function of art was 
seen in society, the practise of artistic education, the definition 
of the social and professional identity of the artist as subject. In 
broad terms, the academic code may also be considered to have 
been a means of determining the boundaries between various fields 
within the visual culture of modernity.158 This differentiation cor-
responded both to a change and a need that affected all the fields 
of the art world. Having constituted a boundary between various 
genres of subject matter (history and genre painting), the distinc-
tion between high and low—which had, of course, been codified 
within the hierarchy of genres—would later be transformed in 
Romantic/Modernist aesthetics into a universally applicable defi-
nition of a difference in kind within visual culture. This difference 
in kind did not, however, necessarily entail a distinction between 
the fine and the applied arts but, rather, that Art should be under-
stood as a transcendent attribute of a particular type of artefact 
(the work of art).
What this makes clear is that the order of the academic code 
should be understood in relation to the gradually more autono-
mous position of the art world within the bourgeois public sphere. 
It was becoming increasingly evident at the same time, however, 
that this autonomy was dependent on public life, because the in-
fluence of the public sector encompassed not only the produc-
tion but also the distribution and consumption of art. Applying 
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Jürgen Habermas’ distinction between the public and the private, 
the structural change that occurred from the middle of the 1850s 
onwards may be described both in terms of the general develop-
ment of different types of institutions within the art world and in 
terms of a greater and more complex exchange between the public 
and the private sectors. While the power base of the art academy 
was still very influential at this point, two other public institutions 
were becoming increasingly significant: the art museum and the 
university. The role of leading producer of art theories increas-
ingly shifted to the university, while the art museum was develop-
ing into an ever more important arena for the encounter between 
the art world and the public sphere.159 Perhaps the most crucial 
aspect of the position of the art world in the late nineteenth cen-
tury was not, however, the roles played by the institutions within 
the system when seen as a static entity, but rather the interaction 
between the public and the private.
This was not a new phenomenon. For an artist working in 
mid-eighteenth century Paris, this dynamic would, in many cases, 
have been a prerequisite for survival. While the official sanction 
of the Académie royale de Peinture et de Sculpture through the 
awarding of commissions and prizes provided vital status, in or-
der to survive financially, an artist had to obtain private commis-
sions, mainly in the form of portraits. Just over a hundred years 
later, however, and as a result of a gradual process of change, the 
definition of the order of the discourse itself became the subject 
of a debate formulated largely within the bourgeois public sphere.
The initially problematic position of art criticism—private opin-
ions on the works of the Salon were published in pamphlets and, 
subsequently, in the press—may be seen as emblematic of the chang-
ing nature of this dynamic. The general debate about art was taking 
place neither in private isolation, nor in the studio or the house of a 
collector, nor in closed sessions of the Academy, but in an open arena 
aimed at a literate general public— and thus beyond the sanction 
and control of the Art Academy. The definition and interpretation 
of the relevant issues, the establishment of aesthetic ideals and the 
evaluation of artistic devices was increasingly transferred into the 
private sphere during the second half of the nineteenth century. Thus 
the Art World was increasingly subjected to a fundamental form of 
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institutionalised doubt that, according to Antony Giddens, may be 
understood as an all-pervasive feature of the critical reasoning of 
the modern age.160 The rhetorical and occasionally self- glorifying 
presumptuousness that characterised many of the theoretical and 
critical pronouncements of the modern era could, therefore, be seen 
as a consequence of such a form of doubt. Modern institutions, 
too, may be defined on the basis of the particular dynamic created 
by this form of doubt, such that a particular order may at times be 
stubbornly and aggressively defended as the ultimate truth, while 
nevertheless always (in principle at least) remaining open to revi-
sion and rejection. Similarly, a concept that has become established 
in a particular field may be challenged and even ousted without the 
institutional structure of the discourse collapsing.
In this sense, the private world may be seen as interacting with 
globalising trends and official institutions to create a dynamic in-
terplay in which specific rules can be described for the possible ex-
tent of transformation within the art world. This interplay affects 
individuals in their choices (of career and artistic practice), but it 
also means that an officially sanctioned pronouncement may be 
challenged and flouted by the individual. A degree of democratic 
freedom that allows for the development of competition within 
a critical margin is, however, a precondition for a dynamic inter-
action of this kind between the public and the private.
This transformation corresponds to what Pierre Bourdieu has 
described as the development of an autonomous field. The spe-
cific meaning Bourdieu attributes to this phrase is not simply 
concerned with a process of successive position-taking within a 
permanent order, but describes rather an unstable state charac-
terised by continually occurring competition for positions and by 
open conflict over the power to define the legitimacy and funda-
mental nomos of the field:
This relatively autonomous universe (which is to say, of course, 
that it is also relatively dependent, notably with respect to the 
economic field and the political field) makes a place for an in-
verse economy whose particular logic is based on the very nature 
of symbolic goods – realities with two aspects, merchandise and 
signification, with the specifically symbolic values and the market 
values remaining relatively independent of each other.161
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The ways in which the field and the various orientations of artists 
are differentiated generate a wealth of variables, by which they 
are also evaluated: pure (intellectual) production as opposed to 
that on a large-scale (commercial), different political positions, 
the degree and significance of economic gain, the degree and type 
of consecration (initiated, sanctified, recognised). A key point of 
Bourdieu’s concept of the field is that it makes visible a structure 
that is both fundamental and dynamic. Even if the structure of 
the field remains constant over time, the reciprocal relationships 
between the actors are subject to change, as are the values rep-
resented by the different positions. The private sector served as 
the main driving force for the field at the end of the nineteenth 
century, with the official institutions found above it (or rather 
in the background). An inverted economic structure provided 
one of the cornerstones of this arrangement, reflecting the lack 
of importance attached to financial matters in the self-image of 
avant-garde artists, while also serving as a reminder of how vari-
ous types of capital are actually interdependent—the economy of 
signs of the avante-garde served as a reflection and function of the 
capitalist market.
In the decades both before and after 1900, a development 
may be observed that proved fundamentally similar throughout 
Europe with the expansion of subcultural infrastructures, whose 
focal points consisted of private galleries, periodicals, manifestos, 
theoretical writings, private art schools, social coteries. This in-
frastructure lacked the very features that provided the foundation 
for the expansion of the system of art academies during the nine-
teenth century, namely uniformity and continuity. However, this 
lack proved the key to its success: unlike the academic system, an 
informal, temporary and pluralist infrastructure was capable of 
adapting relatively quickly to changes in aesthetic, economic and 
social conditions.
These were the circumstances in which the idea of a cultural 
avant-garde was established, both then and subsequently, as a cor-
nerstone of the historiography of this period. Such an occurrence 
would have been unthinkable without the profound structural 
change we have been discussing. The problem here, however, is 
that this phenomenon—the avant-garde—eclipsed the scale of this 
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transformation precisely because it so pointedly dramatised and 
heroicised the outsider status of art and the artist. Given its mil-
itary connotations, the word avant-garde should never be under-
stood as a purely descriptive or empty social category.162 Applied 
to the cultural sphere, the constituent parts of the term (an avant 
and a garde) encompass a range of diverse attributes: a temporal 
aspect (being part of, or ahead of, one’s time), a social dimension 
(a restricted circle that espouses a divergent viewpoint), an ideo-
logical aspect (opposition to the prevailing values) and an aesthetic 
one (unconventional forms of artistic expression and approaches). 
According to Matei Calinescu, the avant-garde would have been 
inconceivable without a modern consciousness in which the var-
ious attitudes and forms set up by the avant-garde appeared to 
serve as a kind of kaleidoscopic distorting-mirror, which showed 
fragments of modern life that were amplified, exaggerated and 
taken out of their context.163 It is in this sense that the avant-garde 
appeared not simply dependent on modernity for its intellectual 
raison d’être but, rather, a dramatisation of modern society, in 
which every comment or judgement on the surrounding bourgeois 
culture can only ever remain a gesture because the avant-garde is 
dependent on this culture for every aspect of its existence. Within 
the framework of the economy of signs referred to above, however, 
this gesture is not empty but, in fact, of crucial importance.
In his critical analysis of the contemporary art world, Bourdieu 
describes a principle crucial to the modern value sphere of the 
visual arts: the necessity for different strategies to create both eco-
nomic and symbolic capital. He also describes how these incom-
patible interests give rise to remarkable and ritualised patterns of 
behaviour for various types of actors as an interaction between 
symbolic and physically concrete factors: the different symbolic 
values/charges of the private institutions and their geographic dis-
tribution in Paris, for example. This led to a situation in which the 
artists of the avant-garde were able to (or were obliged to) create 
a matrix for the interpretation of their own art and its rules and 
forms of legitimacy. This mixture of reality and fiction, of collec-
tive identity and individualism, of pragmatism and utopia and of 
the historical and the contemporary may, in fact, be considered 
to have constituted a particular narrative concerning the notion 
Conflicting Truths 95
of an aesthetic avant-garde—a story that would, in certain cases, 
be refashioned into romantic myths about ‘the misunderstood ge-
nius’ or ‘the starving artist’.164 For the most part, however, this 
narrative was produced retroactively in history books.
Let us return once more to the example of Jules Lefebvre in 
order to examine what the career of a successful academic art-
ist during the second half of the nineteenth century was like. He 
was awarded a place at the École des Beaux-Arts in 1853 and 
made his debut at the Salon three years later. In 1861, he won the 
Prix de Rome, which made it possible for him both to live and to 
work during the following five years. In the 1870s, he worked as 
a teacher of drawing at the Académie Julian, a private art school 
with close connections to the Académie des Beaux-Arts, of which 
he was made a member in 1891. Despite this unimpeachable ca-
reer within the official art world, it was primarily as the supplier 
of portraits and sensual female nudes to the middle classes that 
Lefebvre made a living. He appeared to have opted at an early 
stage for these genres, which were much less celebrated by the 
Academy, than for history painting. Although he was awarded 
few official commissions, he enjoyed all the more success as a re-
sult in the private market.
To compare this career path with that of an artist of the same 
generation as Lefebvre, such as Edouard Manet, elicits not only 
a different story but a different type of story. Manet, who never 
gained a place at the École des Beaux-Arts, was educated privately 
at Thomas Coture’s studio (1850) and at the Académie Suisse 
(1861). He made his debut at the Salon in 1861 when he showed 
two portraits (after a failed attempt two years before) that, al-
though given an honourable mention, made little impact. In the 
years that followed, he increasingly distanced himself from the 
academic ideal he had learnt under Coture and developed what 
might be called an increasingly complex form of realism. He failed 
in his attempt to get three works entered in the Salon of 1863 but 
was given the chance to show them at the officially sanctioned 
Salon des refusés instead. Although his ‘Olympia’ caused an out-
cry when it was shown at the Salon two years later, Manet con-
tinued to send in works to this institution throughout his working 
life, while also exhibiting at various private galleries.
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That is about the full extent to which Manet’s career was in-
volved with the official institutions. It is worth pointing out the 
alternative direction he followed and the entirely different events 
that marked his future path, whose significant milestones in-
cluded the following: his visits to the Café Guerbois in 1865 and 
his meetings with the younger Impressionists, the transfer of his 
loyalty to the Café de la Nouvelle Athènes in 1872, the rejection 
of his work for the World Exhibition in Paris in 1867 and his con-
sequent decision to show fifty or so of his paintings at a private 
gallery instead, becoming close friends with Emile Zola at the end 
of the 1860s, the marriage of his brother to Berthe Morisot in 
1874, his various travels, his relationship with the regime during 
the Paris Commune of 1870, his professional links with the art 
dealer Durand-Ruel, the changing nature of his social life, his in-
terest in graphic prints and, above all, his development as an art-
ist. Manet’s career would be accorded a rather unexpected official 
finale when his friend Antonin Proust was installed as minister for 
the fine arts in 1881 and awarded him the rank of chevalier in the 
Légion d’honneur that same year.
Although this comparison could, of course, be fleshed out in 
greater detail, it reveals not only two different artistic careers, but 
also, more significantly, two distinct patterns of movement in the 
French art world of the later nineteenth century. An artist emerges, 
in the case of Lefebvre, who was able to move between the private 
and public sectors and for whom, even though success in the one 
did not necessarily mean success in the other, these sectors were 
not opposed in principle. Despite these movements, social and 
aesthetic interconnections were established in Lefebvre’s career 
that were determined by the discursive practice of the Academy. 
These provided him with an identity that allowed the artist access 
to specific opportunities within both the sectors referred to above. 
For Manet’s part, his failure within the official institutions meant 
that his career took a different route and led to acceptance within 
quite different circles. The entire institutional framework took 
on a different guise in his case. While it is entirely possible that 
Lefebvre visited the Café Guerbois in the mid-1860s, these prem-
ises played no role in his career, neither in terms of the narrative 
of an artist’s oeuvre as a form of social identity, nor, presumably, 
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in terms of actual networks or social contacts. The narrative form 
Manet’s career subsequently generated in art-historical writing 
became, in fact, normative of the social and aesthetic identity of 
the artist in general. According to this narrative, which relies on 
tropes regarding the exclusion and individuality of the artist, his 
social agony and aesthetic autonomy, the originality and authen-
ticity of the work and the connection between the artist’s oeuvre 
and his life, not only would Lefebvre’s irreproachable career have 
been a failure, but also all but impossible to integrate within the 
confines of such a story.
Thierry de Dueve has described Manet’s artistic activities in the 
period 1860 to 1870 as heralding a radical change in the dis-
cursive standardisation and classification of officially exhibited 
works of art. Furthermore, the shift in question also applied to the 
narratives that legitimised this altered situation, both for Manet’s 
peers and posthumously.165
This shift encompassed not only movements within an insti-
tutional framework, but also, ultimately, a change in the concept 
of truth in art as well. Although the requirement for originality 
and individuality in execution and concept were also empha-
sised within a classicist tradition regulated through the discursive 
practice of the academy, authenticity in that instance referred to 
the credibility of the image as a representation of a transcendent 
 (historical/metaphysical) ideal. The artist was expected to work 
in a rational manner and meticulously calculate each step in the 
process, starting with the sketch. This ideal might perhaps be bet-
ter described in terms of the distance and the absence that char-
acterised how the artwork was seen—the distance in time from 
both the historical/mythological models and the canonical art of 
the Hellenistic period and by genre from the realm of the Ideal. In 
terms of this approach, the work of art seemed to be a language 
that might describe the truth and, at best, even approximate it 
by means of its form, iconography and dramaturgy, but it could 
never, in itself, be anything other than a reflection or a trace of the 
Absolute. The Romantic aesthetic was a different matter. Here, 
the issue was no longer the acquisition and mediation of a foreign/
extinct language—to attempt to reflect the connection between 
the natural and the ideal that had been lost by modern man by 
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means of a rational analysis of the composition and by the use of 
allegorical stagings—it involved, instead, the creation of an or-
ganic whole in which the authenticity of the sign was understood 
in terms of proximity to and presence in a specific origin (the 
artist/the contemporary world). It is this shift in particular that is 
indicated by the change in metaphorical language from describing 
art as a mirror (representation) to a lamp (expression).
This approach meant that truth appeared to be manifested di-
rectly in the authentic work of art as both meaning and aesthetic 
value. The transcendental or prelinguistic meaning was fused with 
the linguistic (conventional) reference to the surrounding world 
and relocated to a higher sphere of eternal values. While the artist 
was free, in principle, to create his or her own interpretation, it 
was evaluated on the basis of a new requirement that the image be 
a representation of an integrated subject. In contrast, the require-
ment formulated within the discursive practice of modernism was 
for the uniformity and continual development of an artist’s oeu-
vre, which could, ultimately, be evaluated in the form of repre-
sentation provided by the retrospective exhibition, because the 
authentic image had to bear the hallmarks of an inner necessity 
rather than any external factors.166 The discursive context used 
to legitimise what were, in their time, the extreme forms of trans-
gression represented by some of the key works of modernism may 
be understood on the basis of this form of legitimation through 
authenticity.
A gradual process of adoption meant, however, that a partic-
ular tradition and hierarchy were established over time and that 
the legitimation of the avant-garde occurred at the cost of its fun-
damental openness. It might be said, in this regard, and to para-
phrase Foucault, that in order for an utterance to appear to be 
true it must be uttered ‘in the true’: the various transformations of 
the avant-garde could only be inscribed as representations in the 
value sphere of the visual arts within a discursive system of norms 
that emphasised the interaction between ‘change’ and ‘authen-
ticity’.167 However, the development of this position—both with 
regard to its linguistic transparency and the critical legitimation 
of that openness—involved a radical reformulation of what the 
concept of Art might encompass.
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The change we are referring to here did not, however, involve 
the kind of definitive break that results in the fracturing of the 
discursive structure at a particular moment but, still in the words 
of Foucault, in a process that brought about a shift:
To say that one discursive formation is substituted for another is 
not to say that a whole world of absolutely new objects, enunci-
ations, concepts, and theoretical choices emerges fully armed and 
fully organized in a text that will place that world once and for all; 
it is to say that a general transformation of relations has occurred, 
but that it does not necessarily alter all the elements; it is to say 
that statements are governed by new rules of formation, it is not to 
say that all objects or concepts, all enunciations or all theoretical 
choices disappear. On the contrary, one can, on the basis of these 
new rules, describe and analyse phenomena of continuity, return, 
and repetition: we must not forget that a rule of formation is nei-
ther the determination of an object, nor the characterization of a 
type of enunciation, nor the form or content of a concept, but the 
principle of their multiplicity and dispersion.168
A mistake that is often made is to consider the most aesthetically 
radical groups as providing the pattern for this process. This risks 
obscuring both the true scale of the process and the variation in its 
artistic effects. The avant-garde movements of the late nineteenth 
century could be said to have revealed the development of a field 
within the discourse of the visual arts. These movements signalled 
the presence of radically different aesthetic perspectives but did 
not, in themselves, define the existence of the field. The advent of 
the avant-garde was incorporated, rather, as part of a larger insti-
tutional and aesthetic process of differentiation, whose consistent 
theme was defining a position outside the order of academic dis-
course as such. Even during the first half of the nineteenth cen-
tury, an increasing measure of pluralism was an ongoing feature 
of the official art world as well.169 The complex and disparate 
course of art history of the modern age may be understood within 
this context, which extends from the ever-greater acceptability 
of Romantic art to the increased significance of landscape and 
genre painting at the Salons to the establishment of various kinds 
of juste-milieu painting to the more radical groupings that were 
called avant-garde (by their contemporaries or posthumously).
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An array of alternative codes were established in turn within 
the value sphere of the visual arts, which stipulated different types 
of aesthetic ideals and different kinds of identities to those that 
had been approved and mediated by academic discourse. The ap-
proximate timeframe for this conflict over interpretive privilege 
extends from the mid-nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth 
century. A decisive shift took place in the course of these hundred 
years that redefined what art is and what it may be, what form of 
legitimation a work of art must espouse in order to be accepted 
within the discourse and what types of transformation the discur-
sive space will allow. Or to put it another way, it was a shift that 
created a context in which Duchamp’s bottle rack would become 
a possible utterance; whereas, Lefebvre’s mirror would not.
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the Aristotelian doctrine of the unity of action served as the guiding 
principle in the visual arts for the harmonisation of the different ele-
ments of time and action in painting (Lee, p. 63).
106. Marta Edling, Om måleriet i den klassicistiska konstteorin. 
Praktikens teoretiska position under sjuttonhundratalets andra hälft 
(Diss. Stockholms universitet 1999), Stockholm 1999, p. 87. The 
boundaries set by the hierarchy of genres also imposed a definition 
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of the ideal and autonomous functions of art as opposed to its rep-
resentative and ideological ones. Both these poles were the subject of 
continual debate during the nineteenth century, particularly during 
turbulent historical periods, such as in the wake of the French revo-
lution of 1789 and after the insurrections of 1848. Making a direct 
link between the (general) value of the visual arts and the (particular) 
demands of politics could be hazardous. An interesting example is 
provided by the disputes about the continued survival of both the 
hierarchy of genres and the academy of arts following the French 
Revolution, when radical groups proclaimed the necessity of elimi-
nating these remnants of the old society (Wrigley, pp. 287–290). The 
problem then arose that the framework for the definition and inter-
pretation of art would also have been dissolved and the function of 
art in society made unclear, which might have led at worst to the vi-
sual arts becoming a subversive element in the new republic. The con-
tinued crucial role played by the hierarchy of genres in both Republic 
and Empire, as well as during the Restoration, demonstrates the com-
mon need felt by these different regimes for stability. While history 
painting in the form of battle scenes was explicitly employed during 
the Napoleonic era to glorify the military efforts of the regime, the 
tendency during the Restoration was to tone down the political role 
of painting and emphasise instead its autonomous and ideal mean-
ings (Wrigley, p. 332 and pp. 339–340).
107. The aesthetic and communicative implications of academic 
doctrine were to do with scope—the artist, quite simply, being ex-
pected to express as much as possible with the least possible means. 
Simplicity and refinement may be considered the two key virtues in 
this regard, not only as a result of a fixed aesthetic ideal, but also in 
order to retain the concentrated focus of the image while extending 
its capacity to affect the viewer.
108. An example of this approach can be seen in Joshua Reynold’s 
third ‘Discourse’ (1770), in which he describes the educational course 
to be followed by the artist, from the introductory mechanical copy-
ing of objects in the surrounding world to the necessity of developing 
an individual form of interpretation and the capacity to correct na-
ture in order to achieve both maturity as an artist and beauty of style, 
no matter how difficult it was to capture the nature of this grand style 
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in words (see Reynolds, “Discourse III. Delivered to the Students of 
the Royal Academy on the Distribution of the Prizes, December 14, 
1770” (1779), Discourses on Art, (ed. Robert R. Wark), New Haven/
London 1981 (1959), pp. 41–53).
109. This theme had already been discussed in Weber’s study Die 
protestantische Ethik und der Geist der Kapitalismus, Tübingen 
1934 (1904–05) and was raised in his posthumously published work 
Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundriss der verstehenden Soziologie, 
Tübingen 1980 (1920).
110. The continual expanse of rationalisation in science and social 
life during the twentieth century may also be deemed to have re-
sulted in periods that witnessed an upswing both in the practice of 
traditional religion and the development of new spiritual and eso-
teric movements. Neither did demystification lead to an absence of 
the mystical dimension in general; mention need only be made here 
to the increased significance of the nation state, nationalism and re-
gionalism during the twentieth century, all of which frequently made 
allusion to mystical narratives about historical origins and ethnic/
national identity.
111. Weimark, 1996, p. 134. The linguistic metaphor has been drawn 
from Mathias Duval’s and Édouard Cuyer’s Histoire de l’anatomie 
plastique (1899).
112. Alison Smith, The Victorian Nude. Sexuality, Morality and Art, 
Manchester/New York 1996, p. 17.
113. Schiller, pp. 31–32.
114. Johann Joachim Winckelmann, Geschichte der Kunst des 
Altertums, Wien 1934 (1764), pp. 128–131. One example mentioned 
by Winckelmann is how artists were able to study the perfect bodies 
of young men at Gymnasia and the other places, where the latter 
trained in order to take part in games and sporting events, and, by 
doing so on a daily basis, artists could acquire a superior understand-
ing of the structure of beauty (Winckelmann, p. 151).
115. Ibid, p. 149.
116. See Calinescu, pp. 26–35. As early as the seventeenth century, 
in the work of writers such as Charles Perrault, the compilation of 
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rules brought about by rational and scientific thinking for the field 
of aesthetics as well provided the stimulus not only for a greater and 
more informed awareness about the nature of beauty, but also for the 
production of works of superior quality. This was lent added force by 
the self-evident moral superiority of the absolute truth of Christian 
doctrine demonstrated by contemporary understanding when com-
pared with the pagan cultures of antiquity.
117. Schiller, p. 57.
118. Sabrina Norlander, Claiming Rome. Portraiture and Social 
Identity in the Eighteenth Century, (Diss. Uppsala universitet 2003), 
Uppsala 2003, pp. 6–9.
119. Maiken Umbach, “Classicism, Enlightment and the ‘Other’: 
Thoughts on Decoding Eighteenth-Century Visual Culture”, Art 
History, vol. 25, June 2002: 3, p. 333.
120. Meyer Howard Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp. Romantic 
Theory and the Critical Tradition, Oxford 1971 (1953), pp. 51–52.
121. Abrams, p. 70.
122. The use of the term pivot (cheville in French) is derived from 
Jacques Derrida, The Truth in Painting, (Trans. Geoff Bennington and 
Ian McLeod), Chicago/London 1987 (1978), p. 18. I use the terms, 
however, in a different sense: not as a metaphor for how Kant suc-
ceeded in turning philosophical investigation towards his own prem-
ises, but as a much simpler image of how a particular intellectual shift 
can create a new and different paradigm over time.
123. Liedman, 1997, p. 453, the paperbook edition of the same book, 
respectively (Stockholm 2000), p. 453.
124. The history of electric light runs parallel to that of the electric 
generator. Edison’s patent, both of a particular type of electric bulb 
and of a system for the provision of electric current, heralded rather 
the start of the practical and commercial use of electrical lighting (see 
Thomas P. Hughes, Networks of Power. Electrification in Western 
Society, 1880–1930, Baltimore/London 1983). Although rudimen-
tary forms of apparatus for the production of electricity were already 
in existence in the seventeenth century, access to a continuous form of 
electric current only arrived with Alessandro Volta’s pile (a battery) 
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in 1800. By 1802, the English chemist Sir Humphrey Davy used elec-
tricity from the Voltaic pile to make threads of platinum glow, and in 
1808, he demonstrated an electric arc lamp to the Royal Institution 
of Great Britain. Practical operation of the arc lamp became possible 
from the 1850s but only on a very limited scale. Various attempts 
to develop more practical forms of incandescent bulbs were made 
during the first half of the nineteenth century. Ideas about electric-
ity and electric light were prevalent throughout the entire nineteenth 
century and were not just the province of obscure laboratories but 
increasingly formed part of public awareness through various types 
of demonstrations and events, such as the first use of the arc lamp 
as a stage prop at the Paris Opera in 1836, when the electric light 
it produced was, presumably, as much a matter of dramatic extrav-
agance as a practical source of illumination. References to electric 
light can also be found in the fiction of the period, particularly in 
Jules Verne’s novels A Journey to the Centre of the Earth (1864) and 
Twenty Thousand Leagues Under the Sea (1869–70), in which elec-
tric light serves as a symbol that underpins the theme of both works: 
the combination of fear and fascination at the effects of the (prospec-
tive or Utopian) achievements of modern technology.
125. See, e.g., Louis Énault, Paris-Salon 1881, Paris 1881, p. 26, 
A. M. Belina, Nos Peintres dessinés par Eux-Mémes, Paris 1883, 
p. 267 and Jules-Antoine Castagnary, “Année 1870 ”, Salons, Paris 
1892, pp. 420–421.
126. Smith, pp. 104, 115.
127. Carolyn Marvin, When Old Technologies Were New. Thinking 
About Electric Communication in the Late Nineteenth Century, New 
York/Oxford 1988, p. 158.
128. Ibid, pp. 232–233.
129. David E. Nye, Image Worlds. Corporate Identities at General 
Electric 1890–1930, Cambridge (Mass.)/London 1985, p. 122.
130. A comparison of the presentation of the Veritas motif in aca-
demic art and the recycling of the same motif in various trademarks 
can be found in Jan Garnert, Anden i lampan. Etnologiska perspek-
tiv på ljus och mörker, Stockholm 1993, pp. 150–159. For AEG’s 
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trademark and its ideological context, see Tilmann Buddensieg, 
“Behrens und Messel. Von der Industriemythologie zur ‘Kunst in der 
Produktion’”, in Tilmann Buddensieg (edit.), Industriekultur. Peter 
Behrens und die AEG 1907–1914, Berlin 1980 (1979), pp. 21–23.
131. See Roland Barthes, “Rhetoric of the Image” (1964), Image, 
Music, Text, (Trans. Stephen Heath), London 1977, p. 38.
132. Nochlin, 1976, p. 41.
133. Marvin, pp. 56 and 59.
134. Daniel Bell, The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism, New 
York 1976, pp. 7–8.
135. Jonathan Crary, Techniques of the Observer. On Vision and 
Modernity in the Nineteenth Century, Cambridge (Mass.)/London 
1992 (1990), p. 9.
136. Linda Nochlin, Realism, New York/Baltimore 1976 (1971), p. 25.
137. Stanley Baron, Sonia Delaunay. The Life of an Artist, London 
1995, pp. 51–52.
138. John Berger, “The Moment of Cubism” (1969), Selected Essays 
(ed. Geoff Dyer), New York 2002 (2001), pp. 84–85.
139. Fried, 1988, pp. 75–76.
140. Lena Johannesson, Den massproducerade bilden. Ur bildindus-
trialismens historia, Stockholm 1978, p. 243.
141. Kant, § 14, p. 72. See also Derrida, 1987, pp. 17–147.
142. Abrams, p. 269.
143. Walter Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, (Trans. 
John Osborne), London/New York 2003 (1928), p. 160 and passim.
144. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, (Trans. Joel Weinsheimer 
& Donald G. Marshall), New York 1995 (1960), pp. 72–73.
145. In various publications Paul de Man has analysed the allegory as 
a particular form of reading, see e.g., “The Rhetoric of Temporality” 
in Blindness and Insight. The Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism, 
Minneapolis 1997 (1971).
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146. For a historical survey of this change, see Götz Pochat, 
Symbolbegreppet i konstvetenskapen, Kungl. Vitterhets Historie 
och Antikvitets Akademins Handlingar, Antikvariska serien 30, 
Stockholm 1977, pp. 3–35.
147. See Gombrich, 1978, p. 183.
148. Gombrich, 1978, p. 187.
149. Friedrich Creuzer, Symbolik und Mythologie der alten Völker, 
besonders der Griechen, Bd. I, Leipzig 1819 (1810), p. 80. See also 
Walter Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, (Trans. John 
Osborne), London/New York 2003 (1928), pp. 164–165.
150. See Benjamin, 2003 (1928), p. 160.
151. Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process. Sociogenetic and 
Psychogenetic Investigations, (Trans. Edmund Jephcott), Oxford 
2000 (1939), pp. 376–379. The notion of modernity as a post-tradi-
tional idea nevertheless presupposes a process of change of vast pro-
portions, which could obviously not be understood simply through 
causal explanatory models. The fact alone that the various phenom-
ena which characterise the modern as an epoch range in time over a 
hundred or so years, and that they also vary between different cul-
tures and even exist, on occasion, in a contradictory relationship to 
one another, disqualifies explanations of this kind.
152. This view reflects, perhaps, both a general desire for change (the 
desire of the aesthetic avant-garde to seek out and constantly shift 
the frontline between the present and the future) and the pursuit of a 
particular kind of future (the utopian goals cherished by the political 
avant-garde for the society to come). The utopian ideal would, how-
ever, seem paradoxical in terms of modernity’s approach to time, be-
cause it defines the goal of development as a state that transcends all 
change. Were the utopia of art to be realised, change would no longer 
be possible and art would die. It was for this reason, in the view of 
Theodor Adorno, that art had avoided this catastrophe by continu-
ally altering and postponing utopia. This would also mean that the 
disavowal of a historic purpose on the part of the avant-garde ap-
peared legitimate as long as it was the new itself, which served as its 
sole aim. (Adorno, 2009, p. 41).
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153. An illuminating example of this can be found in the work of the 
historian of ideas Karin Johannisson. In Nostalgia. En känslas his-
toria, Stockholm 2001, she describes how nostalgia, in the course of 
the modern epoch, has changed from being a medical diagnosis to a 
social symptom and how this feeling has, in some instances, acquired 
meanings that are critical of civilisation while, in others, is channelled 
into a modern and rational view of society.
154. Pevsner, pp. 140–141. Although this expansion occurred pri-
marily in France and the German and Italian states, a similar trend 
may be observed in the rest of Europe. In terms of organisation, exhi-
bitions and the institution of competitions and prizes, the structure of 
almost all of these art academies was based on that of the Académie 
royale de Peinture et de Sculpture in Paris. The comprehensive nature 
of the expansion makes it possible to refer to the development of a 
particular discursive order and process of standardisation in relation 
to the public administration of the art world, even though the estab-
lishment of these academies would also have to be considered from 
the perspective of the different national contexts.
155. Pevsner, pp. 149–152.
156. One example is the changes in France during the First Republic. 
As a royal institution, the Académie royale de Peinture et de Sculpture 
was the target of fierce criticism. From 1791, the Salon was open to 
all French artists, and the exhibition was no longer under the monop-
oly control of the members of the Academy; its members formed, in 
fact, a minority on the jury appointed to evaluate the works submit-
ted (Daniel M. Fox, “Artists in the Modern State: The Nineteenth-
Century Background” (1963), in Milton Albrecht, James Barnett 
& Mason Griff (ed.), The Sociology of Art and Literature, London 
1970, pp. 375–376). The aesthetic ideals of the Academy were also 
called into question, but this proved to be a sensitive issue: the new 
regime did not want the standard of the art exhibited to fall and so 
undermine the reputation of the republic (Wrigley, p. 44). The aes-
thetic requirements were thus upheld, even though the ideological 
guidelines were changed. In organisational terms, however, the entire 
system of the academies was changed in 1791 when a majority of the 
established institutions were amalgamated and subordinated to the 
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Institut de France. Its art section was given a name more in keeping 
with the times: the Académie des Beaux Arts. Under its aegis, artis-
tic education was carried out at the École des Beaux Arts (Pevsner, 
pp. 199–200). The fundamental role played by the Academy within 
the art world and public administration nevertheless remained intact, 
and it even gained in importance during the Empire and was con-
firmed during the Restoration.
157. Various political upheavals, particularly in France, also in-
fluenced the composition, influence and ideology of the Academy. 
T. J. Clark describes, for example, how the revolution of 1848 created 
a vacuum in the art world, which was confronted with the major issue 
(as was, indeed, the case after the 1789 revolution) of what approach 
to art the new republic should embrace (see Clark 1973, pp. 31–71). 
The problem was there was no accepted aesthetic model with which 
to replace the established academic code. More reform-minded forces 
wanted to provide greater scope for Romantic or Realist artists, such 
as Eugene Delacroix, Honoré Daumier, François Rude and Auguste 
Préault, while others were intent on upholding the established val-
ues. The politicisation of the art world during the Empire and the 
rapid change of course that took place after the Restoration deterred 
many, no doubt, from defining themselves too explicitly in terms of 
a particular political orientation. In this phase, the Academy appears 
to have been made up of what was, in ideological terms, a relatively 
heterogeneous collection of individuals whose unifying characteristic, 
nevertheless, was that they had invested their careers in a particular 
system. Demolishing academic doctrine in its entirety would not only 
have risked creating aesthetic uncertainty or even decline (which the 
rulers of the republic were determined to avoid at all costs), also it 
would have demonstrated that the investments made by many of the 
key actors had been a failure. Moreover, the aesthetic preferences that 
prevailed in the developing private art market (which admittedly suf-
fered a major decline during the period following the revolution) were 
based on particular norms defined by the academic code. Although 
the art policy of the Second Republic could not be said to have intro-
duced a revolution of any kind, alternative aesthetic approaches were 
established during the four years it lasted, which would, in the long 
term (several decades later), undermine the monopoly position of the 
academic code together with its general legitimacy.
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158. Although the increased economic importance of the visual arts 
provided a major incentive for the expansion of the academic system 
at the turn of the nineteenth century, when art schools and schools 
in the applied arts were, in many cases, amalgamated, an entirely 
opposite trend was also affecting the entire art world at the same 
time. Perhaps the most distinctive feature of nineteenth century art 
teaching was the segregation, rather, of these kinds of schools. In 
the case of some of the art academies, this meant that although ele-
mentary courses were set up in commercial art and design, the more 
advanced lessons were only open to those in training to become cre-
ative artists: a process that eventually laid the foundations for a more 
explicit separation between colleges of fine arts and those teaching 
craft and design (Pevsner, pp. 228–229). Although the cause of this 
change was primarily practical in nature, rather than an administra-
tive matter, and reflected a growing social need for certified profes-
sional skills, this differentiation may also be considered in terms of 
the problem of the artistic identity in the new public sphere of the art 
world. In this new social and professional landscape, the distinction 
between fine art and applied art became increasingly important. The 
need for this distinction did not, however, involve a one-sided and 
patronising form of exclusion from the fine art establishment but 
was instead emphasised by both sides. By the mid-nineteenth century, 
there was a growing demand for the provision of a more practical 
and realistic form of training within the applied arts. However, edu-
cation within the applied arts long remained influenced by the aca-
demic ideal, centred as it was on drawing. Growing dependence on 
machinery in manufacturing industry nevertheless entailed the end 
of the craft skills of previous epochs, and the need for better and 
more practical training within the design industry became increas-
ingly pressing. The Great Exhibition held in London in 1851 may 
be considered a watershed in this debate to the extent that the first 
major international exhibition of the state of the applied arts led to 
criticism and reconsideration within both established and more rad-
ical circles. Referring explicitly to this exhibition, Gottfried Semper, 
for example, observed that the solution to the problems of the day 
lay in changing the taste and approach to art of the general public 
on the one hand, while raising the level of education on the other, 
by entrenching it in practical requirements through the introduc-
tion of on-site training and the creation of a better foundation for 
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aesthetic judgement by reconnecting education in Art with that in the 
applied forms (Gottfried Semper, Wissenschaft, Industrie und Kunst. 
Vorschläge zur Anregung nationalen Kunstgefühles bei den Schlusse 
der Londoner Industrie-Ausstellung, Braunschweig 1852, pp. 37–40 
and pp. 61–62). A similar, if politically more radical, view of the so-
cial problem of the art industry was formulated somewhat later by 
William Morris, when he maintained that the commercialism and 
competitiveness of modern society were the cause of the decline of 
both the intellectual and the applied arts (for several key texts on 
these issues, see William Morris, On Art and Socialism, (Ed. Norman 
Kelvin), New York 1999).
159. Görts, p. 195. Tony Bennett interprets the development of the ex-
hibitionary complex as a parallel to what Michel Foucault described 
as the modern society’s apparatus for apportioning punishment (‘the 
carceral archipelago’), which was designed at the same time, with 
both systems being seen as responding to a need on the part of the au-
thorities for differentiation, control and order. With the considerable 
difference, however, that the direction of the disciplinary apparatus 
of the exhibitionary complex was the reverse of the modern prison’s 
panopticon: instead of control by an invisible watchman, it provided 
control by making the ideals, principles and extent of the powers 
that be visible to the public. Surveillance in this case involved the 
legitimation by the official institutions of particular types of knowl-
edge, codes and representations (see Tony Bennett, The Birth of the 
Museum. History, Theory, Politics, London 2002 (1995), pp. 59–69).
160. Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity. Self and Society 
in the Late Modern Age, Cambridge 1991, pp. 2–3.
161. Pierre Bourdieu, The Rules of Art. Genesis and Structure of the 
Literary Field, (Trans. Susan Emanuel) Cambridge 1996 (1992), p. 141.
162. As a general metaphor, the concept of the avant-garde first en-
tered use at the beginning of the nineteenth century in political and 
cultural contexts. Subsequently, both these contexts frequently ap-
peared in such close proximity that the radical aesthetic vanguard 
was able to derive its forms of representation, rhetoric and legitimacy 
from the political and vice versa. A key etymological aspect, which 
lingered on from the military origins of the metaphor, was the idea 
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that a battle had to be fought against some form of enemy. According 
to Renato Poggioli, the notion of an avant-garde movement in France 
in the years prior to the Revolution of 1848 had a general, but nev-
ertheless distinctly political, connotation, as part of which art was 
seen primarily as an instrument of social change; not until after 1870 
was the concept used in a specifically cultural sense (Poggioli, p. 9). 
Nevertheless, the concept was not definitively separated into two dis-
tinct areas of meaning, and it would long embrace a link between art 
and politics. From then on, however, it was interpreted in various ways 
depending on which side employed it. As Matei Calinescu has con-
vincingly demonstrated, the crucial distinction was that the aesthetic 
avant-garde emphasised the independent revolutionary potential of 
art whereas the political avant-garde saw art as being subordinate 
to the needs of politics (Calinescu, p. 105). These two diametrically 
opposed interpretations of the function of art in society were a source 
of confrontation throughout the nineteenth century wherever the po-
litical avant-garde (of left or right) managed to seize power.
163. Calinescu, p. 95.
164. The combining of descriptive and normative criteria in which 
the self-image of the avant-garde is interwoven with the characterisa-
tion of a historical reality is a recurrent problem in every analysis of 
the avant-garde. One example is provided by the four fundamental 
attitudes shared, in Renato Poggioli’s view, by all the different avant-
garde movements to a greater or lesser extent: activism (the pursuit 
of the unknown), antagonism (its counter-cultural position), nihilism 
(the desire to break with established norms) and agonism (heroic suf-
fering) (see Poggioli, pp. 25–40, and pp. 61–77). Poggioli’s survey 
helps to make comprehensible many of the apparently paradoxical 
phenomena within the different representations of the avant-garde, 
but it also creates a blueprint for the definition of the aesthetic avant-
garde that is based entirely on its own self-image. The values that 
underpin a particular discursive position are simply taken for granted 
in the historical analysis of that position. A similar, though slightly 
different, problem arises with Peter Bürger’s description of the avant-
garde, in which he employs a highly restrictive definition of what the 
avant-garde is based on certain ideological criteria: the avant-garde 
equlans anti-aestheticising movements that are critical of institutions 
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and whose ideal model are the attacks by Dadaism (and Duchamps 
in particular) on the autonomy of the art work in bourgeois soci-
ety (Bürger, pp. 47–54). Here, too, although the selection is more 
restrictive, particular historical values and identities are being taken 
for granted. As such. certain criteria are deduced from an empirical 
material and then allowed to form an a priori matrix for the inter-
pretation of this material. As part of this process, exclusions are made 
(A is avant-garde, but not B), gradations arise (A is more avant-garde 
than B) and a vicious circle of descriptive and normative statements 
is allowed to determine the historical analysis. There is a clear need, 
in my view, for a sociological and historiographical analysis of this 
problematic context in which the issue of how a historical situation 
may actually be described is linked to the displacement of meaning 
between the concepts used and to the gradual normalisation of the 
judgements involved.
165. Thierry de Duve, Kant after Duchamp, Cambridge (Mass.) 
1996, pp. 264–265.
166. For a discussion of the retrospective exhibition as a key ‘lan-
guage game’ within modernism, see Clark, 1999, pp. 55–56.
167. Michel Foucault, “The Order of Discourse”, (Trans. Ian McLeod) 
in Robert Young (ed.), Untying the Text. A Post-Structuralist Reader, 
Boston (Mass.) 1981, p. 60.
168. Michel Foucault, The Archeology of Knowlege, (Trans. A. M. 
Sheridan Smith) London 2001 (1972), p. 173.
169. Boime, s. 14 ff.
PART II 
THE NORMALISATION OF THE 
AVANT-GARDE
The rise and fall of modernism does not . . . simply tell us some-
thing of what we have become. It does, in a way, but it also tells 
us how we have come to understand or interpret ourselves, and so 
it introduces a question as well as a historical event. The question 
concerns the potential fragility or distortion of the narratives that 
generate these “grand categories”. 1
Robert B. Pippin, Modernism as a 
Philosophical Problem (1991)
Benjamin’s “aura” may wither away in the age of mechanical 
reproduction but authenticity remains. What is made more ex-
plicit, more transparent, by the so-called “dematerialization” of 
the object, is that the production of authenticity requires more 
than an author for the object; it exacts the “truth” of the authorial 
discourse.2
Mary Kelly, ‘Re-viewing Modernist Criticism’ (1981)
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Complex Settings
Distinguishing the particular moment or event that constitutes a 
definitive turning point is a problem in many historical accounts. 
Frequently, the attempt to pinpoint the exact cause and date of 
comprehensive and complex changes appears to be essential to 
the analysis and, on occasion, even its goal. The need to distin-
guish such critical junctures is linked to some extent at least to the 
desire to explain a complex phenomenon by means of a coher-
ent and effective account whose linear structure requires a fixed 
beginning and end. An event derived from empirical historical 
data that exemplifies in startling fashion something whose im-
pact extends far beyond its factual determinants is fixed on—and 
transformed into—a metaphor with an extraordinary rhetorical 
force. Such widely disseminated mythical notions as the birth 
of Renaissance Man with Petrarch’s ascent of Mont Ventoux in 
1335, the beginning of the modern era with the outbreak of the 
French Revolution in 1789, and the start of the First World War 
with the shots in Sarajevo in 1914 may be considered to form 
part of this intellectual pattern. Charles Jenck’s description of 
the death of modern architecture with the demolition of Minoru 
Yamasaki’s ‘Pruitt-Igoe Housing’ in St. Louis on 15 July 1972 at 
3.32 pm could also serve as an extreme (and, it must be hoped, 
ironic) example.3
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A revolutionary or apocalyptic narrative of this kind risks, 
however, becoming a violation of history by historiography, with 
the need for simplification and distillation excluding more gradual 
processes and interconnections that are inevitably polysemous and 
harder to understand. The problem is one that is ever-present in 
this study as well. How is one to distinguish and describe the insti-
tutionalisation of modernism as a distinct historical phenomenon 
without falling into the trap of the revolutionary narrative? The 
simple, if rather unoriginal, answer—although the appropriate 
one in my view—is to emphasise that aspect of the phenomenon 
to do with process in order to compose a story that develops out 
of a number of different but reciprocally determined fragments, 
perspectives and nodal points, rather than as a linear structure 
with a fixed beginning and end. To risk abandoning the effec-
tiveness of the revolutionary narrative in favour of an attempt to 
formulate a connection between continuity and discontinuity is of 
crucial importance here. To that end, I would like to highlight two 
different periods that were of decisive importance for the process 
under discussion: the 1930s until the Second World War and the 
post-war period until the second half of the 1950s.
This process should not, however, be seen as a straightforward 
chronological course of events that encompassed the gradual ac-
ceptance of modernism and was only interrupted by World War 
Two. As stages in this process, the pre- and post-war periods were 
quite different in kind, while the experience of both the war and 
the terror practised by the dictatorships clearly played a signif-
icant role in the institutionalisation that took place in the post-
war period. That difference may, of course, be described solely 
as an aesthetic matter, but it can also be understood in political 
terms. In After the Great Divide (1986), Andreas Huyssen has 
analysed how the divide reconfigured the relationship between the 
avant-garde and mass culture and how, under the influence of the 
general political situation of the 1930s, it generated a need for an 
elitist and exclusive cultural discourse:
I would suggest that the primary place of what I am calling the 
great divide was the age of Stalin and Hitler when the threat of 
totalitarian control over all culture forged a variety of defensive 
The Struggle for Interpretive Privilege 137
strategies meant to protect high culture in general, not just mod-
ernism. Thus conservative culture critics such as Ortega y Gasset 
argued that high culture needed to be protected from the “revolt 
of the masses”. Left critics like Adorno insisted that genuine art 
resist its incorporation into the capitalist culture industry which 
he defined as the total administration of culture from above. And 
even Lukács, the left critic of modernism par excellence, developed 
his theory of high bourgeois realism not in unison with but in 
antagonism to the Zhdanovist dogma of socialist realism and its 
deadly practice of censorship.4
The gradual institutionalisation of the avant-garde served, in 
other words, as a link between the decades before and after the 
Second World War. However, the situation in the post-war period 
was qualitatively different in that the historical avant-garde was 
no longer presented as a marginal phenomenon but as the unques-
tioned art-form of the twentieth century. This multifaceted process 
involved not only a codification of the avant-garde as modernism 
and the widespread inculcation of the essential difference between 
Art and popular culture, but also a greater emphasis on the devel-
opment of modernism qua the development of modern art. The 
course of this process, its rhetoric and gradual shifts, is crucial to 
understanding the institutionalisation of modernism. Before ana-
lysing the process of institutionalisation in the post-war period, I 
begin by setting out two different perspectives on the situation of 
modernism and modern art during the second half of the 1930s. 
The first is based on one of the last major world exhibitions be-
fore the outbreak of war, the second on two minor texts published 
on the margins of the established culture.
****
The Exposition Internationale des Arts et Techniques dans la Vie 
Moderne held in Paris in 1937 has gone down in history, per-
haps primarily, as a symbolic showdown between the two major 
European dictatorships. Like two menacing monoliths, the pa-
vilions of the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany stood facing each 
other at the very centre of the Fair, between the Eiffel Tower and 
the Palais de Chaillot. In the light of subsequent history, the image 
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of their location opposite one another has been considered an 
omen of the dreadful acts of war that would characterise the re-
lationship between these countries a few years later. The German 
and Soviet pavilions were, in fact, constructed at the very time ne-
gotiations were being conducted to create a nonaggression pact be-
tween the two states.5 Such posthumous symbolism, however, also 
encompassed the small, and in terms of its relation to those of the 
other two countries, somewhat overshadowed, Spanish pavilion. 
Represented here by the Republican side, Spain, which had been so 
afflicted by civil war, was making its final international appearance 
before Franco’s seizure of power and had chosen to show a paint-
ing that has become the stuff of legend for many reasons: Pablo 
Picasso’s ‘Guernica’. In this scenario, what history later proved one 
of the most important art-political tropes of the post-war period— 
modernism as the symbolic champion of liberty in the face of re-
pression and dictatorship—was manifested in a single painting.
The extensive exhibitions of historical and modern art mounted 
by France, the host nation, have been all but eclipsed by this fate-
ful and dramatic image. Nonetheless, the fair provides a number 
of interesting clues to the situation of modernism prior to the out-
break of war. The most prestigious exhibition, Chefs-d’œuvre de 
l’Art Français, was arranged by the French state and shown at the 
Palais de Tokio. It comprised some 1300 works of art and objects 
spanning two millennia of French art history, concluding with the 
Impressionist and post-Impressionist painting of the late nine-
teenth century. The show emphasised the great tradition of French 
art and its universal and authoritative value with nationalist bra-
vura.6 Attention had been drawn during the planning phase to the 
fact that this comprehensive exposé came to a stop just before the 
contemporary period, and this led the government to arrange an 
additional art exhibition in the Petit Palais entitled Les Maîtres de 
l’Art Indépendant, 1895–1937, which was made up of over 1500 
works. Shown here—and with the emphasis on the movements 
based on Fauvism and Cubism—were works that eventually came 
to be seen as constituting the accepted canon of modernist art, 
although now the majority of the 117 chosen artists are not con-
sidered to form part of the representative and canonical selection 
of modernism.7
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In the entrance hall, the visitor encountered a pair of sculptures 
by Emile-Antoine Bourdelle and a large collection of plaster-casts 
and bronzes by Charles Despiau (52 works) and Mateo Hernandez 
(26 works). He or she then proceeded around an inner circle of 
galleries, which alternated the showing of works by a group or 
by a single artist. Those apostrophised as modern masters, inas-
much as they were accorded a room of their own with space for 
30 or so works, included Maurice de Vlaminck, André Derain, 
Georges Rouault, Maurice Denis and Pierre Bonnard, while 
Henri Matisse (61 works) and Aristide Maillol (60 works) were 
accorded one large and three smaller halls, respectively. Having 
toured the inner galleries, visitors found themselves in a room in 
one of the wings, where some relatively radical works, or perhaps 
ones that were simply harder to categorise, were on show. The 
artists on display here included Auguste Herbin, Jacques Villon, 
Francis Picabia, Giorgio de Chirico, Gino Severini, Max Ernst, 
Chaim Soutine and Marc Chagall. From this room, the visitor 
was then led into an outer sequence of galleries made up of some-
what smaller halls in which the leading names of Cubism were 
exhibited: Roger de la Fresnaye, Georges Braque, André Lothe, 
Fernand Léger, Maria Blanchard, Pablo Picasso, Juan Gris, Ossip 
Zadkine, Henri Laurens and Jacques Lipchitz. The tour was not 
simply an innocent stroll through the world of modern art; it 
involved a carefully calculated and normative choreography of 
the visitor’s route: from the post-Impressionist and Fauvist tra-
ditions toward more or less experimental variants of Cubism. 
Movements, that is, which could all be inscribed within the great 
School of France.
Although its selection was also geared towards French art, the 
rhetoric of Les Maîtres was of a very different kind to that of Chefs 
d’œuvre. In the former exhibition, Paris was asserting its cosmo-
politan character as a city by highlighting the independence of 
the modernist tradition from the official establishment. This was 
emphasized even more clearly at the exhibition Origines et dével-
oppement de l’art international, mounted at the Jeu de Paume, 
which described the development of the international avant-garde 
in terms of various movements (Fauvism, Cubism, Dadaism, 
Surrealism, Constructivism, Abstraction), while accentuating the 
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significance of Primitivism for modern art in particular. Taken to-
gether, the exhibitions and the various national pavilions provided 
what would have been at the time an unequalled opportunity to 
acquaint oneself with modernism in all its guises.
It was Chefs d’œuvre and Les Maîtres, however, that jointly 
established a paradigm for the national programme of France at 
the World Fair. Despite their obvious differences, a continuity be-
tween the exhibitions can be discerned on a more abstract level: 
at the point where the two selections meet in the late nineteenth 
century. The compatibility of the two chronologies made it possible 
to assert the existence of an evolutionary trend that underlined the 
importance of France in various ways for the development of art 
in general and modern art in particular. This meeting point could 
also be described in terms of continuities: with the older canon 
representing the continuity of tradition, while the contemporary 
selection revealed a continuity of individualism. James Herbert has 
described this complex interplay as stemming from two different 
standpoints, both of which tended to marginalize the academic 
tradition:
Where the Chefs-d’œuvre de l’Art Français gave no real play to the 
old chestnut about the battle between hackneyed academic tech-
nique and fresh artistic innovation – indeed, its defenders tended 
to discount the importance of the Academy in the development of 
true French art over the centuries – the chief organizer of the Les 
Maîtres de l’Art Indépendant resuscitated that distinction in order 
to declare the city of Paris the defender of novel and important 
work produced since 1895.8
By this time, the academic tradition had disappeared from both 
the official version of the art history of the modern age and the 
somewhat less official one as well. To point to the disappearance 
of the Académie des Beaux-Arts from the historical narrative of 
modern art is not, however, the same as saying that its role as an 
institutional centre of power in the French art world had been 
played out; rather, academic discourse had for various reasons 
been gradually excluded from the historiographic record. This 
took place at the same time various forms of modernist art were 
becoming an increasingly accepted part of the official art world, a 
The Struggle for Interpretive Privilege 141
state of affairs emphasised by the architecture and exhibitions of 
art on display in many of the other national pavilions.
The open functionalist building and exclusively modernist art 
of the Spanish pavilion was not, however, representative of the 
rest of Europe: although modernism had been accepted, it was 
not the dominant element on show at the World Fair. The works 
chosen for exhibition in Les Maîtres provoked fierce criticism 
from politically conservative circles and from what was at that 
time the still influential academic establishment. In their view, the 
one-sided apostrophe of modernism was tantamount to a betrayal 
of the fundamental values represented by the noble French tradi-
tion.9 In this respect, the particular selections made for these two 
exhibitions could also be seen as a key indicator of the way in 
which the French state was apparently unwilling to engage with 
the complexity and potentially subversive nature of modern art; 
whereas, the city of Paris considered avantgardiste contemporary 
art and cultural life to be one of the most important components 
of its identity.
While the avant-garde as a phenomenon may have been con-
sidered a positive symbolic value, this should not be taken to 
mean that this value encompassed all parts of the avant-garde 
subculture. After all, the works selected for Les Maîtres excluded 
not only academic art, but also the more ideologically and aes-
thetically aggressive (not to say transgressive) movements within 
modernism: Futurism, Dadaism and Surrealism. The exclusion of 
Surrealism in particular sent an unmistakable signal in the arena 
of art politics, because this movement was a vital and high-profile 
force on the contemporary French art scene.10 These movements 
were not entirely censored, however: they could be included in an 
international event but not serve as representations of the great 
French tradition. Although the clearly official nature of this sig-
nal might be considered a failure for the Surrealist movement, it 
was entirely in keeping with the anti-bourgeois attitude of André 
Breton and his compatriots, an attitude on display in Paris just a 
few months after the closure of the World Fair at the Exposition 
Internationale du Surréalisme in 1938.11
The increasing acceptance of the art and theory of modernism 
did not amount to its integration as a self-evident component of 
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the normative political and cultural structures of the western de-
mocracies in the years leading up to the outbreak of war. Like 
open and democratic society as a whole, modernism was con-
fronted with the immediate and very real threat posed by the two 
totalitarian blocks. The exposed position of the Spanish pavilion 
was a metaphor not just for the heroism of modern art, but also 
for the reality of the political situation.
It was this particular state of affairs that provided the back-
ground to Walter Benjamin’s ‘Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner 
technischen Reproduzierbarkeit’ (1936) and Clement Greenberg’s 
‘Avantgarde and Kitsch’ (1939). Both essays were written from 
ideological standpoints informed by a Marxist analysis of soci-
ety and culture, and both may be considered reactions to what 
many perceived to be an acute crisis in the cultural life of the 
time. This was a crisis with political and aesthetic consequences 
and one that came about as a result of changes in the nature of 
the perceived threats, domestic and foreign. The external and 
most tangible threat was the triumphal progress of European fas-
cism and Nazism, but another kind of threat existed, too, from 
within the mechanisms of capitalist society, which meant that the 
avant-garde had to legitimate and reformulate its art in line with 
a changed social reality. The problem both these essays describe 
was the risk of eradication facing the tradition of progressive art 
as it had existed to this time. But their respective solutions to the 
problem appeared to be diametrically opposed.
Benjamin describes how the techniques of reproduction in the 
modern age, photography and film in particular, have introduced 
a potentially subversive and substantive change in the perception 
of the unique nature of the work of art, of its aura, which in turn 
calls into question its traditional authority and authenticity.12 
This change is linked to a transformation in the social and per-
ceptual patterns of the modern age, as part of which, perception 
has increasingly shifted from the observation of the unique to a 
sense of the similar. The sacrosanct connection of the aura and 
a unique here and now has been replaced by a secularised func-
tion, everywhere and everywhen as it were. In this situation, film 
appears to be a much more relevant medium than the ancient art 
of the easel:
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Magician and surgeon compare to painter and cameraman. The 
painter maintains in his work a natural distance from reality, the 
cameraman penetrates deeply into its web. There is a tremendous 
difference between the pictures they obtain. That of the painter is 
a total one, that of the cameraman consists of multiple fragments 
which are assembled under a new law. Thus for contemporary 
man the representation of reality by the film is incomparably more 
significant than that of the painter, since it offers, precisely be-
cause of the thoroughgoing permeation of reality with mechanical 
equipment, an aspect of reality which is free of all equipment. And 
that is what one is entitled to ask from a work of art.13
Unlike the unique work of art, film (like the mechanical repro-
duction of images) offers a social context of collective consump-
tion, a new form of social participation that has to be affirmed by 
progressive forces but is continually under threat from the manip-
ulations of fascism and capitalism. The metaphor of the magician 
and surgeon is used by Benjamin to highlight the need for a radi-
cal break with tradition in particular, as the definition of modern 
art can no longer be contained within the regime of authenticity. 
Although he cites Dadaism as an example of painting still being 
able to fulfil a function even within this changed situation, that 
function, as he sees it, requires an acceptance of the necessity of 
the technology of reproduction if it is to respond to the changing 
needs of the modern age. The Dadaist artist, therefore, deliber-
ately obliterates one of the key characteristics of the tradition, (the 
aura of the work), by ‘branding’ his work as ‘a reproduction’ by 
dint of its ‘means of production.’14
Clement Greenberg, too, was fully aware of these altered cir-
cumstances. As we saw earlier, he describes the avant-garde as a 
specific territory within cultural life. He saw it as the only area, 
in fact, that remains unaffected by the harmful consequences of 
modernisation and still characterised by an authentic form of ex-
pression.15 It is in this sense that the history of the avant-garde 
can be described as a kind of critical awareness, a function al-
most of modernity’s progressive and emancipating tradition of 
ideas. Greenberg draws a distinction here between the educated 
elite (which supports progressive culture) and the great masses 
(which have always been indifferent to it); this parallels his most 
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important distinction between the avant-garde and kitsch. For 
Greenberg, the difference between these domains was not just a 
difference of degree, between good and bad art, but a distinction 
in kind: whereas avant-garde art imitates artistic processes, kitsch 
imitates their effects.16 The avant-garde, defined as the higher crit-
ical awareness of bourgeois culture, must constitute a preserve 
set off from the rest of the culture, in which the efforts made by 
artists to investigate the specific preconditions of their own media 
inevitably result in an art that is cut off from the society around 
it and the unpredictable chaos of popular culture. An interesting 
conflation also occurs in Greenberg’s text when the description of 
the historical situation shifts to the contemporary scene: this con-
cerns the adaptation of the superficial and rigid eclecticism of the 
academic tradition to the demands of the market and modernisa-
tion and its transformation into an equally false and mechanical 
version of the parasitisation of the forms of the living culture per-
petrated by industrial popular culture.17
Greenberg is entirely in agreement with Benjamin that the new 
ways of using images introduced by popular culture constitute a 
threat to authentic art. This is not a situation Greenberg embraces, 
however. He focuses instead on the essential duties of the elites in 
relation to modern society: the educated economic elite has to 
shoulder its responsibility and support the tiny elite of artists who 
are still working beyond the influence of capitalist culture and its 
dumbing-down of key values. Advanced avant-garde art can only 
be identified by its qualities as a unique work of art and by its 
capacity to reflect critically on the conditions of its own medium. 
His view of modern art actually involves an even greater emphasis 
on the necessity of authenticity.
Benjamin’s and Greenberg’s essays represent two possible ap-
proaches to the state and future development of the contemporary 
visual arts at the end of the 1930s. These two texts could hardly 
be more dissimilar in the way they formulate the problem: where 
the former expands the domain of the visual arts so as to abolish 
the boundary between different media and between Art and art, 
the latter shrinks the definition of avant-garde art to an extremely 
restricted area within visual culture, drawing clear distinctions be-
tween it and both other media and mass culture. Although neither 
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essay was widely read in its own time, both have since emerged 
as key texts in the art debate of the twentieth century. In terms of 
their reception in the last few decades, Walter Benjamin’s essay is 
considered to be one of the most important historical documents 
concerning a change in the perception of art and one that still 
possesses an astonishing and almost prophetic topicality for the 
art world of today. Clement Greenberg’s text, in contrast, serves 
as one of the key documents for an approach to aesthetics and 
history from which postmodernist theorists have been keen to dis-
tance themselves. How are we then to explain that in the period 
contemporary with these essays, particularly after the end of the 
Second World War, it was Greenberg’s type of response that was 
considered to have real significance rather than Benjamin’s?
It would be easy to respond to this question using the narra-
tives of modernism itself to the effect that Benjamin was before his 
time or history has proved him right. But if we refrain from this 
kind of naive mythologizing, we can see instead that his version of 
events failed to fit in to the political, social and aesthetic process 
of change that the art world was undergoing in the middle of the 
twentieth century. The approaches of Benjamin and Greenberg 
correspond to two powerful trends in the art world and visual 
culture of that time, which might be called critical utilitarianism 
and autonomous individualism, respectively. These trends re-
flected two diametrically opposed attitudes to the function of the 
visual arts in modern society that could not be contained within 
the same institutional framework.
In his analysis of the political function of the visual arts, 
Benjamin made a telling distinction between Fascism’s ‘aestheti-
cisation of political life’ and the response of Communism, which 
was to ‘politicise art’.18 His analysis is based on a vision as to how 
art should be integrated into modern socialist society as a clearly 
defined function of its workings, not simply as a tool for the pow-
ers that be, but because of its critical potential for the enlighten-
ment and activation of the masses. Here Benjamin is radicalising 
and developing further an aspect of the progressive utilitarianism 
of the Russian avant-garde in the years following the Revolution, 
whose manifestos called for the casting off of all forms of bour-
geois culture and Art in what we have described as one of the most 
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radical attempts to break away from the regime of authenticity. In 
terms of realpolitik, the problem with Benjamin’s view was that 
it presupposed a situation in which art had been institutionalised 
within the socialist state; whereas, that same state had, in fact, 
liquidated critical utilitarianism. Benjamin’s essay was published 
two years after Socialist Realism had been made the official doc-
trine of the Soviet Union and in the same year that the Moscow 
show trials were first held. Apart from its political and historical 
drawbacks, it also failed to conform to every legitimate form of 
political discourse in the bipolar structure that obtained after the 
Second World War, and, within which, critical utilitarianism in 
the Benjamin mould seemed to be an ideological formulation of 
modern art whose time had passed and that no one could possibly 
support.
In contrast, Greenberg’s view appeared to be entirely in keep-
ing with the political landscape of the post-war West. Far from 
presupposing a subversive Utopian vision, it amounted, instead, 
to an apology for the individualised and autonomous existence of 
high art in capitalist society. And these were the very aspects that 
proved crucial to the institutionalisation and normalisation of the 
avant-garde in Western Europe and the United States. There was 
an additional element in his essay that turned out to be of decisive 
importance for this process: it established a link between the con-
temporary world and the historical one. According to this inter-
pretative matrix, the once radical and revolutionary avant-garde 
could be adapted to the already existing institutional structure of 
the art world: it was depoliticised, made to fit within a chronol-
ogy and its ideological connotations were partially realigned in 
terms of freedom and individualism (as opposed to antagonism, 
activism and collectivism). Even though radical art might still be 
perceived as difficult, offensive and politically questionable, the 
idea of the autonomy of the work of art so long cherished by the 
avant-garde now served a new ideological purpose: to legitimate 
a particular type of action and representation in a purely aesthetic 
context, cut off from any obvious political connection.
The aesthetics of disparity that developed as a defence against 
various repressive regimes during the 1930s thus emerges as the 
model applied in the West during the post-war period: a disparity 
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that concerned not only the relationship between Art and mass 
culture, but also the Cold War bipolar structure of two antithet-
ical ideological systems. This was also the context in which the 
cluster of aesthetic social and ideological concepts of the historical 
avant-garde was labelled (and thus transformed into) modernism.
There can be no question that the process of institutionalisa-
tion and normalisation modernism underwent after the Second 
World War saw modern art assume a new ideological function 
in the West, with the result that one type of definition became 
possible, while another did not. In this context, ideological does 
not necessarily mean ‘false consciousness’ but should be under-
stood rather as a ‘socially necessary illusion’ and as an ‘interac-
tion between philosophical theories and political power’.19 A new 
form of socially necessary illusion was needed to make possible 
the problematic encounter between culture and counterculture—
an encounter in which certain accepted ideas were legitimated, 
generalised and historicised, while others were excluded. In this 
respect, the World Fair held in Paris in 1937 signalled, as did the 
essays by Benjamin and Greenberg, a distinct historical shift in the 
situation of modern art, both within the domains of established 
culture and within the avant-garde. The nature of this shift must 
be understood to make possible an interpretation of the institu-
tionalisation of modernism in the political and social context of 
the post-war period and the Cold War.
Although the notion of the avant-garde of modern art was, of 
course, not abandoned, the social function and descriptive signif-
icance of the term—as characterising a countercultural identity 
within contemporary discourse—were largely transformed into a 
historicising narrative of the heroic and tragic alienation of modern 
art. The myth of the artist as a misunderstood genius, struggling to 
create his or her own truth in the face of the ignorance of the sur-
rounding world, became a central trope in the popularisation of the 
historical avant-garde in particular. This trope has been described 
by Donald Preziosi as crucial not only to the ideological formula-
tion of the identity of modernism in public contexts, but also to 
interpretive practice in art criticism and art history as a whole. He 
exemplifies this state of affairs with reference to the 1956 film Lust 
for Life about the life and work of Vincent van Gogh:
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The artist-hero . . . is also revealed as a filter or aesthetic mediator, 
refracting the prose of the world into poetry; he is a distillator of 
the Essential from the world in which we live. In this refractive 
regime, the artwork is framed as a record or a trace of the art-
ist’s originality and individuality. Indeed, the film indicates that the 
measurable difference or distance between painted image and en-
catalyzing scene is isomorphic with the artist’s degree of difference 
from the mundane world of the ordinary mortal – an iconic sign 
of artistic genius. As that distance changes, so too does that genius 
change and grow. Vincent’s life is presented as a journey of growth 
from realism to naturalism to abstraction: a quest for the essential 
or higher reality increasingly different from the ordinary.20
This is an extremely condensed, and perhaps somewhat exagger-
ated, description of the process entailed in the post-war normali-
sation of the art and culture of the avant-garde in which the genre 
(popular artist biographies), the originator (a vast Hollywood 
production) and the intercultural identification (Kirk Douglas is 
Vincent van Gogh) constitute a circulation of levels of meaning 
to a much broader target group. The date of the production of 
the film and of its premiere are indicative both of this state of 
affairs and the way in which key aspects of what constituted the 
ideology of modernism at this time had become public property. 
However, what is really interesting here is the paradoxical meet-
ing between elite culture and popular culture. This film about van 
Gogh brought about a popular-cultural dissemination of certain 
modernist myths at the same time that modernism was being 
legitimated as an aesthetic of disparity, whose boundaries were 
clearly defined in opposition to the cultural industry.
This example is also rather telling in relation to the difficulty in-
volved in incorporating the countercultural identities of the avant-
garde within the dominant culture’s system of norms. This triumph 
of the avant-garde was not, according to Serge Guilbaut, a total or 
even particularly popular victory, but amounted rather to a ‘typical 
avant-garde victory, that is to say, fragile and ambiguous, since it 
was constantly threatened by opposing tendencies in the world of 
art.’21 There was, in fact, a fierce debate after the end of the Second 
World War about how the relation between art and society could 
and should be perceived, with particular reference to the function 
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of modernist art in modern society. While this debate took place all 
over the world, its nature was, of course, determined by the specific 
situation that characterised each particular domain, ranging from 
the ideology of individual political parties to more general issues to 
do with modernity, democracy, tradition and humanism.
The Criteria of Normalisation
An exhibition entitled documenta opened in the West German 
city of Kassel on 15 July 1955. This exhibition was inaugurated 
slightly more than two months after the Allied occupation offi-
cially came to an end and the Federal Republic became a fully 
sovereign state. The choice of location was not a matter of chance. 
Kassel had been one of the cities worst affected by Allied bomb-
ing raids.22 The former capital of the kingdom of Westphalia was 
situated at the centre of Germany and had also been chosen be-
cause it could represent any German city, a fairly important, but 
by no means exceptional, industrial town in the state of Hessen. 
Undergoing reconstruction on an extensive scale at the time, 
Kassel had a certain historical importance but lacked any sym-
bolic resonance with the Third Reich. With the drawing of the 
new boundary between the two Germanies, it had also acquired a 
new political significance as an outpost to the East, because it lay 
only 30 kilometres from the border with the GDR.23 The exhibi-
tion was mounted in the bomb-damaged Museum Fridericanum, 
which had not yet been restored.
The driving force behind the exhibition was Arnold Bode; he 
was assisted by a committee made up of representatives from gov-
ernment and industry, as well as individuals with art-historical 
and museal expertise. Documenta’s patron was the West German 
president Theodor Heuss, and it was organised in collaboration 
with an honorary committee made up of prominent West German 
politicians and envoys from the Western nations.24 In addition to 
West Germany, the participating countries were France, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Switzerland, Great Britain and the United States. 
Documenta thus became a national demonstration—sanctioned 
at the highest level—of the reestablishment of the ties between 
Germany and the Western democracies.
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The exhibition comprised 570 works by 148 artists and was 
divided into two levels: history and the present. The ideologue 
behind this form of presentation was the art historian Werner 
Haftmann, who had published a comprehensive historical survey 
of twentieth-century modernist painting in the preceding year.25 
The focus of the show was an exhaustive survey of the tradition of 
modernism in art and architecture, to which a smaller exhibition 
of contemporary, especially nonfigurative, art was added.
Documenta may have been a temporary exhibition, but it 
highlighted many aspects of the problems facing the modern art 
museum. The exhibition was also entitled ‘the Museum of One 
Hundred Days’; a label that has served to define it ever since: 
creating, as it did, an institutional framework for the presentation 
and interpretation of modern art by virtue of its sheer scale and its 
authoritative interpretation of the relationship between the con-
temporary and the historical. Although not aimed at creating a 
permanent collection, the selection—the temporary collection—
made a significant impact on the contemporary art world and its 
perception of the historical. The various documenta exhibitions, 
like the biennales in Venice and São Paulo, have come to be seen 
as an index of how different trends succeed one another and how 
ideological positions become established within the institution-
alised awareness of modern art.
It was no coincidence that the exhibition acquired this partic-
ular structure. The historical section was not simply an art-his-
torical survey but, in its particular context, made reference to 
Entartete Kunst, the peripatetic exhibition mounted by the Nazi 
regime that opened in Munich in 1937.26 Documenta could be 
seen as a means of reclaiming history, and as a result of its of-
ficially sanctioned status, the exhibition came to exemplify the 
way art and culture were viewed by the new German democracy. 
Wilhelm Lehmbruck’s sculpture ‘Knieende’ (1911), for instance, 
was given a prominent location; it was the same sculpture the 
Nazis had been so keen to ridicule eighteen years earlier.27 Great 
pains were taken, however, to ensure that the exhibition did not 
take on the stamp of official doctrine. Screens with photographs 
of the participating artists were set up in the exhibition halls, as if 
to display the individual behind the work. This could be seen as 
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a direct response to the demonisation of the modern artist by the 
Third Reich: he would be on show here as a heroic figure and an 
autonomous agent who, despite difficult or even inhuman circum-
stances, had created the masterworks of our time.
Two contrasting but synergistic interpretive matrices in modern-
ism’s own historiography were being fixed in place here: on the one 
hand, a historical understanding of the development of modern art 
as an evolutionary process governed by an immanent logic and, on 
the other, an accentuation of the responsiveness, initiative and en-
ergy of the individual in modern society. A fundamental paradox 
may be perceived in this bipartite matrix with the supra- individual, 
contextless and incomprehensible nature of progress appearing to 
conflict with the reflexive individuality of modernity. Furthermore, 
a state of tension between both these narrative starting points—
evolutionism and individualism,  respectively— characterises large 
parts of modernist historiography.
But the emphasis on the creativity of the individual was not with-
out risks of its own. This notion comes close, after all, to what mod-
ernism’s most vehement critics had once used as a springboard for 
discrediting or entirely eliminating avantgardiste counterculture: 
the artist as a Bohemian and a transgressor of boundaries, outside 
the norms of society but in touch with areas beyond the normal or 
the natural or, to put it another way, the myth of the modern artist 
as a genius bordering on madness, who possesses the capacity to 
establish a mystical connection to the primeval, primitive sources 
that have been lost in modern civilisation. This is the context in 
which Walter Grasskamp described the interest in primitivism, ex-
oticism and the art of the sick as the ‘perilous sources’ of modern-
ism.28 The prime example of this entire area of concern—and its 
watershed—was Entartete Kunst, which made direct comparisons 
between radical modernism and photographs of deformed human 
beings, images created by the mentally ill and works from primitive 
cultures, all with the aim of demonstrating the decline of modern 
art and decadence of the modern artist. The comparisons drawn by 
the Nazis should, however, be considered the culmination of a long 
process of heaping suspicion on modern art.29
The problem that arose for the champions of modernism after 
the war was how to deal with these associations with the irrational. 
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A connection with those perilous sources was something many 
artists and critics were keen to embrace, but it was that very con-
nection that risked reactivating the suspicions of the general public 
towards what might be perceived as humbug or incomprehensi-
ble ravings. In the case of documenta, this also involved taking a 
stand in relation to recent history. One of Haftmann’s fundamen-
tal theses, which existed as a subtext in 1955 but would charac-
terise the next documenta of 1959 to a much more considerable 
extent, was that abstraction served as a lingua franca of the visual 
arts.30 This made it possible to interpret contemporary art on the 
basis of the same universal explanatory model— irrespective of in-
dividual, national or cultural peculiarities—as a distinctive mode 
of existential expression for the modern age. But the formalist and 
existential model also had a diachronic dimension. In addition to 
the screens displaying artists’ photographs at documenta 1955, 
there were others showing art from all four corners of the world 
and from all of history. Therefore, modern art was linked at an 
abstract level to history, with the result that modern art’s potential 
aesthetically and politically subversive content was transferred to 
a world of formal, universal and archaicising correspondences 
that went beyond any historically and culturally specific context, 
transcending time and place.31
Two ideological tropes can be discerned behind these trends in 
the presentation of the exhibition: individualism and evolution-
ism. Whereas the accentuation of the individual involved rehabili-
tating the identity of the modern artist, the evolutionist trend was 
concerned with neutralising the dubious ideological and poten-
tially revolutionary associations of modern art. The spatial bor-
ders these images were provided with contributed further to this 
neutralisation inasmuch as the white walls and the aestheticising 
hang asserted the autonomy of the individual work and its purely 
visual qualities— the price being that every link to the surround-
ing world appeared to have been sundered.
At documenta, this form of presentation had an obvious ideo-
logical function: reestablishing modernism/history and demon-
strating the freedom of movement (intellectual and physical) of 
the individual in the Western democracies. It also called atten-
tion to the need for a democratic state to engage not only with 
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art that was contemporary, but also with that of the avant-garde. 
Although the exhibition may be seen as an official legitimation of 
modernism, it also involved an aestheticisation of the position of 
the avant-garde, with every manifest or latent form of political 
connotation being dressed up in art. A number of fundamental 
ideological values were presented here that continually recur (al-
though in different ways) in the artistic discourse of the  western 
world after the Second World War: restoration, individuality, free-
dom and modernity. And the form this took clearly coincided with 
the cultural and political goals of the federal chancellor Konrad 
Adenauer and the policy of the victorious powers: to reestab-
lish both the political and economic system and the structure 
of the cultural values of the democratic state, so as to integrate 
the German Federal Republic into the Western democratic hemi-
sphere.32 In a nutshell, the avant-garde had to be depoliticised if it 
were to be made useful for political ends.33
While the process of normalisation may be considered global 
in extent within the Western (or non-Communist) hemisphere, its 
nature and effects varied between different nations and regions. 
Although the bipolar structure of the Cold War provided a similar 
stimulus for the association of modernism with individuality, free-
dom and modernity in all the Western countries, culturally spe-
cific differences could be concealed in the interpretation of these 
values. Irrespective of the regionally and culturally determined 
variations, it was the story of the victor that was being written 
here. Worth noting in this regard is the extraordinary efficiency 
with which the modern institutions carried out their classification: 
one and the same historical scheme appeared to lie behind a mul-
tiplicity of different reproductions, thus establishing a genealogy 
of modernism that effectively ruled out ambivalence of any kind 
through various forms of exclusion and neutralisation.
This shift was not, however, unquestioned, and it did not take 
place over a single night. Just as we saw in the development of 
modernism and the time frames concerned, it involved the com-
bination of a diffuse process with a critical juncture. Neither did 
this process of normalisation take place in silence: it was the sub-
ject of much debate after World War Two, particularly within the 
circles of avant-garde art itself. An example from the beginning 
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of the 1960s is found in German cultural critic Hans Magnus 
Enzensberger’s description of what he called the dilemma or 
self-contradiction of the avant-garde:
Every avant-garde of today spells repetition, deception, or self- 
deception. The movement as a doctrinairely conceived collective, 
as invented fifty or thirty years ago for the purpose of shattering 
the resistance of a compact society, did not survive the historic 
conditions that elicited it. Conspiring in the name of the arts is 
only possible when they are being suppressed. An avant-garde that 
suffers itself to be furthered by the state has forfeited its rights. . . . 
It deals in a future that does not belong to it. Its moment is regres-
sion. The avant-garde has become its opposite: anachronism.34
It is true that the problem he was formulating applied to the le-
gitimacy of radical art in his own time. And the dilemma could be 
said to have been that of the state as much as that of the avant-
garde: the difficulty faced by the latter in legitimating its newly 
acquired position can be linked with the problem confronting 
various authorities in legitimating an art that, in essence, rejected 
the very legitimacy of the authorities in question. Enzensberger 
was not, however, the first—and certainly not the last—to make 
this observation about the dilemma of the avant-garde. In fact, 
the idea of the problematic position of the avant-garde, its death 
and possible resurrection, was a recurrent trope in the diagnoses 
by the art world of its own contemporary period ever since the 
1960s.
Another example is provided by the literary critic Leslie Fielder, 
who referred to the death of the literary avant-garde at the be-
ginning of the 1960s, although not in terms of loss or a necessary 
resurrection, but rather as a natural part of a progression in which 
the antagonistic strategies of yesterday become a form of enter-
tainment for the middle class, with the result that any attempt to 
resist the establishment through new ways of violating taboos is 
almost immediately transformed into the kitsch of the cultural 
industry. William Burroughs’ desert island is transformed into a 
densely populated suburb.35
To radical parts of the American art world in particular, the 
avant-garde appeared to be an antiquated historical remnant of 
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a Europe that had vanished, an irrelevant anachronism as far 
as contemporary artistic practice was concerned. In ‘Notes on 
Camp’, Susan Sontag provides a telling description of how var-
ious types of social, sexual and aesthetic subcultures transgress 
the boundaries that separate them from one another and from the 
various levels (high as well as low) of the normative culture in a 
way that appears almost to exclude the very idea of an avantgard-
iste and openly antagonistic counterculture.36 The interpretive 
horizon established by postmodernism at the end of the 1970s 
was clearly associated with the trope about the death of the avant-
garde: the idea of a radical pluralism appearing to have replaced 
the idea of an antagonistic avant-garde as the leading trope of 
the narrative of contemporary art. At the same time, several of 
the leading actors of the art world attempted in various ways to 
define other forms of (neo-)avantgardiste positions so that the po-
tential for contemporary art to criticise institutions not be entirely 
lost in the economic, institutional and mass-medial expansion of 
the  market-oriented ideologies.37
The fact that the issue remained so obviously topical in the 
1980s and 1990s is one of the clearest indicators of how compre-
hensive the significance the notion of modernism as institution 
and narrative has been for the interpretation of modern and con-
temporary art. In this context, the dilemma of the avant-garde 
appears to be a dilemma of critical categories and historical narra-
tives: the extent to which the interpretation of the contemporary 
period is still determined by the discursive criteria of modernism. 
The issue also has much to tell us about the extraordinarily crucial 
role played by the notions of antagonism and critical alienation 
in the modernist conception of modern art. An artist or critic of 
the 1850s would presumably have been utterly astonished by the 
entire discussion. It also raises a number of additional questions. 
In particular, how are we to understand what happens when rep-
resentatives of the most critical margins of the culture move in 
towards the heartlands of the official institutions and establish 
themselves there? This is, of course, a matter that has been the 
subject of countless analyses and theories, but how is this move-
ment and the kind of institutional change involved to be under-
stood from a historical perspective?
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The Issue of the Function of Modern Art
Just as it did before the war, the reaction against modernism 
occurred at both ends of the political spectrum in the post-war 
period. The principal demand made by the Marxist camp as a 
whole was that art be committed, but what this meant in prac-
tice depended on the particular degree of ideological orthodoxy. 
Europe’s Communist parties, which were intimately linked to 
the Soviet Union at the time, advocated the subordination of art 
to the directive on Socialist Realism. This viewpoint naturally 
met with greater sympathy in countries where the Communists 
benefited from a considerable measure of popular support, such 
as in France and Italy. The artistic doctrines of the Communist 
Party in France provided a powerful and controversial alternative 
stance, not only as a result of the party’s significant status among 
French opinion-makers, but also because after the war a num-
ber of well-known artists and intellectuals such as Pablo Picasso, 
Fernand Léger and Jean-Paul Sartre had allied themselves with 
the Communist Party (the PCF) to varying degrees. The problem 
was, however, that after 1948, the French Communist party chose 
increasingly to follow the official Soviet party line, which meant 
that Socialist Realism became an absolute aesthetic doctrine as far 
as the art world was concerned. An artist such as André Fougeron, 
who has been more or less forgotten, was lauded in these circles as 
a modern master. In contrast, the idea of creating a contemporary 
social modernist art as championed by Léger, in particular, was 
roundly condemned.38
For less dogmatic Marxists, however, the requirement that art 
be committed did not necessarily imply criticism of modernism 
as such. One significant example is Jean-Paul Sartre, who sum-
marised his view of the relationship between commitment and 
freedom on the part of the writer or the artist in Qu’est-ce que la 
littérature? (1947):
Thus, whether he is an essayist, a pamphleteer, a satirist, or a nov-
elist, whether he speaks only of individual passions or whether he 
attacks the social order, the writer, a free man addressing free men, 
has only one subject – freedom. . . . Thus, however you might have 
come to it, whatever opinions you might have professed, literature 
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throws you into battle. Writing is a certain way of wanting free-
dom; once you have begun, you are committed, willy-nilly.39
But this description, which out of context might have been taken 
from simply any bourgeois or ecclesiastical text, reveals its ideo-
logical (Marxist) stance somewhat later when Sartre maintains 
that ‘actual literature can only realize its full essence in a classless 
society’.40 Nevertheless, there is a yawning gulf between Sartre 
and the more dogmatic defenders of Socialist Realism. He makes 
no direct requirement of the writer or artist to adapt his language 
and idiom according to any fixed political dogma; neither does 
the artist, in his view, have to be in the vanguard of the struggle 
to make socialism victorious or subordinate his work to this one 
overriding goal. Instead, he understands the political function of 
literature to be dependent on the social context in which it is in-
scribed. The strict adherence of the European Communist parties 
to the Moscow line meant, however, that the appeal of their alter-
native artistic approach was extremely limited: Socialist Realism 
was scarcely an acceptable option for the majority of Europe’s 
more progressive artists during the post-war period.
There was a very different reaction to both modernity and 
modernism from the champions of conservative values. Art acade-
mies, such as the Académie des Beaux-Arts in Paris and the Royal 
Academy of Arts in London, still maintained an extremely con-
servative, anti-modernist stance, which was not without influence 
on contemporary cultural life. Furthermore, modernism contin-
ued to be regarded in conservative, church and political circles 
as ideologically and politically suspect. The symbolic position a 
defender of freedom assigned to modernism in certain contexts 
was portrayed by them as a particularly dangerous lie, because 
they considered its aesthetic and world view to have arisen from 
the same nihilistic quagmire as the ideas of the revolutionary and 
authoritarian regimes.41
In the United States, the questionable ideological connotations 
of the avant-garde led to a ferocious dispute about the coun-
try’s official cultural policy. This was exemplified in 1948 when 
the Institute of Modern Art in Boston abandoned its previously 
modernist-oriented exhibition policy and published an officially 
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anti-modernist statement. It was modernism’s obscure, arcane and 
extremist tendencies that were objected to. The museum was in-
tent on emphasising a humanist middle way: a position that Serge 
Guilbaut has shown to have been impossible in practice in the 
extraordinarily fraught and politicised climate of the debate for 
and against modernism.42 The political overtones of this polemic 
were further heightened at the beginning of the 1950s by the an-
ticommunist campaigns waged by Senator Joseph McCarthy that 
led to the notion of what was American or un-American, deter-
mining both what was possible in the discourse of the visual arts 
and the capacity of the political establishment to provide financial 
support for contemporary art. To advocate radical modernism in 
such a situation meant having to walk a veritable rhetorical tight-
rope, as we shall see.
The European debate followed a somewhat different pattern. 
Within conservative and ecclesiastical antimodernist circles, mod-
ernist art was portrayed as expressing a complete lack of respect 
for humanism, tradition and established norms on the part of in-
dividuals and society. Pope Pius XI had condemned the use of 
modernist art in the building of churches as early as 1932, and the 
Catholic church, which took an unfavourable view of both the de-
formation of human and religious figures and the absence of nar-
ratives in art, reiterated its condemnation after the Second World 
War, when abstract and nonfigurative motifs were used in some 
instances in the decoration of churches.43 Although this negative 
attitude towards modernism was far from universally prevalent, 
it served to articulate the scepticism that had long characterised 
the Catholic sphere. Both the religious and political opposition to 
modernism could thus be said to have aesthetic, ideological and 
ethical origins.
One of the most controversial examples of this antimodern-
ist rhetoric was Hans Sedlmayr’s Verlust der Mitte, published in 
1948.44 In this work, the author describes modern art as a symp-
tom of a disease with which modern society has infected culture: 
a falling away from the path of truth and eternal values. Sedlmayr 
considered it his task as a historian to present a diagnosis of this 
spiritually deadly affliction. He portrays a historical course of 
events, beginning in the French revolution and culminating in 
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the modernist art of the contemporary world, in which mankind, 
society and art have lost their meaning, their essential centre. A 
culture that had once been so coherent has splintered into frag-
ments: modernist art merely reflects the chaos and dissolution, the 
inhuman isolation and alienation modern life has brought with 
it. Modernism patently distorts the perception of human nature 
in his view, which results in a demonisation of the human being; 
all these -isms express the same fundamental decline in their affir-
mation of chaos, disease and fragmentation. Modernism is a path 
that leads away from everything worthy of the name of art and 
spirituality; it is an art of the devil.45
Sedlmayr’s almost apocalyptic vision of how modernity inevita-
bly leads to the decline of civilisation can no doubt be inscribed in 
that shared intellectual construct we touched on earlier concern-
ing the relationship of the modern age to tradition (antiquity), 
but it also bears witness to the more specific influence of Oswald 
Spengler’s Der Untergang des Abendlandes (1922), a work that 
was highly controversial in its time.46 In Sedlmayr’s argument, the 
historical analysis of modernity is interwoven with a normative, 
and ahistorical, evaluation of the eternal nature of true art. But his 
own position, as an Austrian who was only too ready to put his 
services at the disposal of the Nazi German forces of occupation, 
renders his arguments if not empty, then at least dubious.47 He 
completely fails to mention the attempts to solve the problem of 
the loss of the centre in the modern era that had been made only 
a few years earlier as part of the cultural and political practices of 
the Third Reich. Neither does he hesitate to compare modernism 
with a mental illness, even if he hastens to add that this is not the 
same as saying that modernist artists are mentally ill.48 Implicit in 
his diagnosis is an a priori thesis that permits no deviation: all the 
artistic utterances of modernism are and have to be symptoms of 
the fundamental illness of society (modernity).
Sedlmayr’s proposed way out of this state of affairs and his 
prognosis for the future are, however, much vaguer than his diag-
nosis of contemporary society. One problem is the contradictory 
character of his approach, as it is based on an evolutionist ex-
planatory model, on the one hand, while resembling, on the other, 
some basic features of a superficially Marxist reflection theory: 
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Art should evolve towards an ever-greater degree of ideal beauty 
but is inevitably dragged down to the very opposite of such an 
ideal as it reflects the insanity of contemporary Western society. 
Such an approach results not only in an inferior historiography, 
but also undermines any form of active intervention, unless one 
is willing and capable of changing the direction of contemporary 
social conditions as a whole. Human beings appear locked in the 
iron cage of the modern era with no means of extricating them-
selves. Unlike the various alternative proposals and programmes 
that have had an actual impact (against all the odds in some cases) 
on modern cultural life—from William Morris’ critique of the 
design culture of the nineteenth century to Clement Greenberg’s 
defence of the avant-garde—Sedlmayr fails to start from a con-
crete formulation of the problem. His sweeping rejection of both 
modern art and modern society was little more than a gesture of 
resignation. As the crisis of modern art was perceived in terms of 
an essentially spiritual crisis by this devout Catholic, any change 
could only be brought about, in his view, through a renewal of the 
spiritual climate and of religious art.49 But what would a renewal 
of this kind be like? The book provides no guidelines of any kind 
in this respect and comes across instead as an agonized and bitter 
elegy to a degenerate present that is fundamentally and irretriev-
ably lost.
Sedlmayr’s work resulted in an extensive debate that demon-
strated the existence of significant groups in the Western democ-
racies that shared his doubts—or rather his despair—about the 
contemporary world and were explicitly opposed to the normal-
isation process of modernism. But the problem for the forces of 
reaction from both the Marxist and the conservative camps was 
that they lacked any viable, or even conceivable, visual codes in 
the cultural policy climate that developed after the war. Moreover, 
the effects of recent history, which had witnessed the elimination 
of the avant-garde by Nazi Germany, and the contemporary po-
litical situation created by the Cold War meant that the privilege 
of defining the problem had slipped away from the antimodernist 
forces.
As a counterweight to works such as Sedlmayr’s historiog-
raphy, Werner Haftman wrote what was, in its time, the most 
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comprehensive history of modernism, published in 1954 under 
the title Malerei im 20. Jarhhundert. Haftmann’s survey started 
with Impressionism in the 1870s and worked its way through all 
the -isms of the twentieth century, right up to the author’s own 
time. The chronological pattern is reminiscent of the historicisa-
tion of modernism in the interwar years as presented in survey 
works and exhibitions, such as the scheme Alfred Barr employed 
to organise Cubism and Abstract Art at the Museum of Modern 
Art in 1936 or the linear sequence Christian Zevros set out in 
Histoire de l’art contemporain in 1938.50 The number of subjects, 
topics, questions and cross-references is so large in Haftmann’s 
work, however, that its structure has been broken down into a 
series of interrelated essays, whose reading may seem at times like 
a labyrinthine journey through a wild and untamed landscape. 
But it is the same issue that formed the basis of Sedlmayr’s work— 
modernity entailed a fundamental change in the way human be-
ings perceived reality—that allows both the overall structure and 
the individual analyses to cohere.
This notion, however, meets with a completely different re-
sponse in Haftmann’s work, whose rhetoric inverts Sedlmayr’s 
alienation from the modern era by putting modernism in a clearly 
defined relationship with history:
Modern painting is indeed the most striking expression of the uni-
versal process by which one cultural epoch with a long history 
yields its place to another. It bears witness to the decline of an old 
conception of reality and the emergence of a new one. The view 
of the world that is being superseded today is that which was first 
shaped by the early Florentine masters with their naïve enthusiasm 
for the concrete reality of the visible world, which they set out to 
define.51
Instead of reinforcing nostalgia and bitter lament, the notion of 
the decline of the old culture and its art is transformed here into 
a progressive argument in favour of the relevance and value of 
modernist art. Although the rapid shifts of the modern age may 
appear alienating, and although modern art can seem obscure 
and strange, this is nothing new in itself. The reference to the 
Italian Renaissance in particular is, of course, no accident but a 
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calculated way of linking the once revolutionary potential of the 
most elevated and classical of epochs to the freshness and origi-
nality of contemporary art. Then, as now, art can be understood 
as a reflection of the way the wider culture perceives the world, 
and this is what makes modernist art so significant today: it is an 
authentic expression of its own time and demonstrates the way 
in which the perspectives of ages past have been replaced by new 
ones. To cling to antiquated aesthetic ideals amounts to not only a 
false and fundamentally reactionary form of nostalgia, but also a 
refusal to see the changed reality of the contemporary world and 
its future direction.
And yet, even though it presented an impartial historical anal-
ysis and an alternative interpretation, the publication of Werner 
Haftmann’s book formed only an indirect argument within an on-
going debate. His art-historical arguments gained a much greater 
public hearing the following year when he organised documenta 
together with Arnold Bode—an exhibition whose selection has 
been described as an illustration almost of Haftmann’s survey 
work.52 Indeed, this show made a much more explicit contribution 
to the debate—and one whose message could not fail to be heard. 
What it exemplifies so strikingly is that it was not the approaches 
and actions of various individuals that were of crucial significance 
for the changed status of modernism after the war, but the re-
sponse of official institutions and public bodies. Because the orig-
inator in this case was the state and not a number of subcultural 
groups at the margins of the bourgeois public sphere, documenta 
signalled very clearly that a new order had been established.
This example also demonstrates something else; namely, the 
frontline had shifted by this time. It no longer separated the de-
fenders of tradition and innovation, respectively, but was now 
drawn between east and west. The bipolar structure of the Cold 
War established a matrix for interpretation, understanding and 
evaluation that transcended every interest or conflict in specific 
areas of activity, a matrix to which the normalisation of modern-
ism may largely be related. However, the Cold War was not in 
itself the sole cause of this process. The Second World War should 
be considered a far more important cause of the rapid course of 
events that took place during the post-war period. It was then that 
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all the energy dammed up by the war, which had proved such a 
fatal setback to the normalisation of modernism already initiated 
during the 1930s, was liberated. Moreover, the increasingly reac-
tionary tone of American domestic politics was quite clearly an 
attempt to uphold aesthetic, cultural and ideological values that 
were in direct conflict with the theory and ideology of modernism. 
What the Cold War context demonstrates was the possibility of 
legitimating the avant-garde by means of a rhetoric that inscribed 
these phenomena in specific ideological images.
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The Aesthetic and Ideological Criteria of 
Normalisation
The Dictates of the Antitheses: The Cold War Cultural 
System
Jürgen Habermas has characterised a fundamental change within 
the public life of the early twentieth century as a paradoxical in-
terplay between the state and civil society, with society becoming 
increasingly ‘statified’, while the state was being ‘societalised’ to 
an ever greater degree.53 According to Habermas, the cause of this 
change lay in an escalating need for state regulation within the 
private realm at the same time that social issues were increasingly 
becoming an issue for the state. When applied to the art world, 
this abstract formula can be understood in terms of a more ob-
vious interaction between the private and public sectors, deter-
mined in particular by the establishment and expansion of the 
radical art world and its supporters. In contrast with the image of 
constant flux evoked in analyses of the cultural field, such as those 
of Pierre Bourdieu, what Habermas makes apparent is how offi-
cial institutions, in public or private ownership, become increas-
ingly important as norm-constructing actors in the contemporary 
radical or avantgardiste art world.
The new official and institutional interest in modernist art after 
the War had ramifications beyond cultural policy; it also served 
ideological, political and symbolic functions: for the ideological 
entrenchment of the modern democracies in a rational and pro-
gressively-oriented modernity, for enhancing the image of a par-
ticular nation as progressive and open, for the restoration of value 
structures and historical connections that had been crushed by 
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repressive regimes, for establishing a democratic alternative to the 
dictatorships in Eastern Europe. While none of these causes need 
exclude any of the others, national and regional differences in the 
rhetoric relating to the establishment of the modern art museums 
and their exhibition programmes can be clearly identified. We 
are not invoking a turning point that was uniform and universal 
when referring to the normalisation of modernism, but pointing 
rather to a diffuse process with considerable regional differences. 
One country can, however, be singled out as playing a key role in 
the post-war international art world, a role, moreover, that would 
be of crucial importance in historical terms for the process of nor-
malisation: the United States of America.
Before we consider the details of how this process was legiti-
mated in several different contexts, it may be worth attempting to 
provide a backdrop to the cultural life of Western Europe and the 
US after the Second World War and how the Cold War created a 
potent incentive for the Western powers to define a more distinct 
cultural policy. This subject has all but become an art historical 
genre of its own ever since Serge Guilbaut published How New 
York Stole the Idea of Modern Art in 1983, and it is aptly sum-
marised in his subtitle ‘Abstract Expressionism, Freedom, and the 
Cold War’. Guilbaut’s book in particular, albeit in tandem with 
many other works within this genre, has unquestionably served to 
enrich our understanding of the complexities of art history and 
cultural policy in the post-war period.54 However, the intense focus 
on the dynamics of the Cold War by some experts and authors has 
established what is, in my view, a rather determinist and conspira-
torial narrative whose subtext appears concerned with delegitimis-
ing Abstract Expressionism as no more than an instrument of—or 
conceivably the invention of—the American intelligence service. 
Another recurring trope in this genre is how and when New York 
took over the role of international art centre from Paris. Although 
this, too, is an interesting question, it is only of secondary relevance 
to this study. My starting point is understanding how the rhetorical 
function of avant-garde art in a geopolitical context became a cru-
cial impetus for its institutionalisation after the Second World War.
Obviously, the Cold War was of major significance in this re-
gard as well. The escalation of the confrontation between the US 
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and the Soviet Union after 1945 meant that it was vitally import-
ant for both sides to maintain the intactness of their respective 
hemispheres. Reconstruction and the military balance of power 
were considered issues of vital importance from political, eco-
nomic and military perspectives, as well as social and cultural 
ones.55 The ideologised nature of the situation led to the active 
involvement of both the Soviet and American sides in ensuring 
that the border between the two systems was not a grey zone, but 
a clearly demarcated frontline so that all global conflicts would 
be interpreted within the framework of the bipolar structure of 
the Cold War.56 The rhetorical logic of the structure calls to mind 
Zygmunt Bauman’s description of modernity’s system of segre-
gating and classifying the world: a structure that acknowledges 
the existence of thesis and antithesis, of friends and enemies, but 
not of a third category outside the system—it refuses to recognise 
the existence of the Stranger.57 In the structure of the Cold War, 
the Stranger not only posed a threat to the entire set-up, but also 
risked undermining the efforts of the two blocs to gain absolute 
legitimacy within their respective spheres.58 The polarity between 
the US and the Soviet Union consolidated a way of thinking that 
could be applied in almost every different context: political, eco-
nomic, cultural and military.
At one level, this involves the major discursive field Friedrich 
Engels once called ideological powers: the reproduction of norms 
by public institutions. More specifically, it also concerns the need 
at a particular historical stage to produce condensed, uniform 
and normative ideas about, and in, a complex and ambivalent 
situation so that it could be simplified, explained and mediated 
to the public in the form of concentrated ideological represen-
tations. These reproductions ranged from obvious ideological 
manifestos to vaguer notions, images and metaphors. It is this 
discursive production of ideological images that is of interest 
here, images that, irrespective of whether they were produced 
in the East or West, could be said to inhabit the borderland be-
tween interpretations of a real situation and mystical illusions. 
The Western images served as the very real boundaries for the 
representation and interpretation by the official art world of both 
history and the present.
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One example of an interpretive approach of this kind can be 
found in the work of Stephen Kotkin, who has described the so-
cialist society that developed in Russia after the 1917 revolution 
as an ideological model that, while highly flexible in many prac-
tical respects, was based on the absolute tenet that socialism was 
the radical antithesis of capitalism. 59 The ideological stance of the 
Bolsheviks brought with it a tendency to make their own thesis 
universal, with every single truth having to be based on a correct 
(scientific) analysis of the aims of history. While their analyses, 
and political orientation, were frequently subject to change, the 
Communist party had an absolute monopoly over every analysis 
and every change. This fundamental principle of anti-Capitalism 
interlaced all the various processes and details of society and life 
as a whole, with the habits and behavioural patterns of the indi-
vidual considered just as significant as the planning of economics, 
politics and the various social institutions:
The story of socialism was nearly indistinguishable from the story 
of people’s lives, a merged personal and societal allegory of prog-
ress, social justice, and overcoming adversity – in short, a fable of 
a new person and a new civilization, distinct because it was not 
capitalist, distinct because it was better than capitalism.60
The politicisation of the Soviet state entailed extraordinarily ex-
tensive efforts to create a new social identity and a comprehensive 
model for perceiving and conceptualising the world that would 
encompass all the different parts of society, from culture and the 
mass media to the teaching of Marxist-Leninism at the very begin-
ning of school. This was a system for the total political indoctrina-
tion of society, which involved a colossal attempt to force people 
to learn to speak—and think—Bolshevik, as Kotkin puts it. 61
The art world was, of course, also integrated into this sys-
tem of blanket control. After the revolution, a range of inter-
pretations and definitions existed of what the art of the socialist 
state should be, from an academic classicism to various forms of 
Constructivism and Futurism. By the beginning of the 1930s, it 
had become increasingly obvious that the state favoured the re-
alist and classicist wings. The bringing together of all the various 
artistic institutions under the aegis of the Union of Artists in 1932 
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was a crucial step towards subordinating all cultural activities to 
party control.62 The institutional structure was further centralised 
after the Second World War when all art affairs were brought un-
der the control of the Soviet Council of Ministers and adminis-
tered by a hierarchical structure of central and local committees. 
A central Soviet art academy was founded in Moscow in 1947 
that became the long arm of the regime in the art world, as it as-
sumed responsibility for education, exhibitions, commissions and 
prizes.63 The post-war Soviet art world was completely dominated 
by official institutions and quite beyond the reach of any critical 
margin; neither was there any real possibility for disseminating 
alternative forms of representation within a private sector—other 
than in extreme secrecy.
After intensive discussions among Soviet cultural workers and 
party functionaries at the beginning of the 1930s, the necessity of 
Socialist Realism was officially proclaimed in a speech by Stalin’s 
cultural commissar and subsequently Politburo member Andrei 
Zhdanov at the first Soviet Writers’ Congress in 1934.64 Socialist 
Realism was not simply a matter of a specific idiom; it was also a 
method and a concept for the way the visual arts were to function 
in society: as the engineers of human souls, artists and writers were 
to refashion the mentality of the people in the spirit of socialism. 
The artist was supposed to describe reality in its revolutionary 
development, which meant a break with the individualised and 
unrealistic romanticism of earlier periods and which heralded the 
beginning of a new kind of revolutionary romanticism that was a 
source of inspiration while remaining firmly rooted in the material 
basis of real life. The visual arts’ repertoire of stylistic devices and 
methods was thus combined with a determination of its function 
based on the decree prescribing realist form and socialist content: 
the visual arts were to be figurative and narrative in epic fashion 
and their content should reflect and praise the political goals of 
the party.65 As Boris Groys has suggested, Stalin’s arts policy could 
in fact be understood as a radicalisation and transformation of 
the basic tenet of the constructivist avant-garde: art should both 
represent and become part of the changed lifestyle and circum-
stances of the new man in the overall aesthetic-political plan of 
the Soviet state.66 The aesthetic was to be totally subordinate to 
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the political, and if the political leadership judged that the aes-
thetic was failing to fulfil its function, it would have to be made 
to conform to the goals of policy. To this end, aesthetic parame-
ters were developed that defined acceptable visual language for 
the arts in various contexts—a specific aesthetic code—that was 
largely aimed at developing the propaganda value, clarity, legibil-
ity and rhetorical power of art as an antithesis to the ‘cosmopoli-
tanism’ and ‘formalism’ of Western modernism.67
In reality, the situation for artists and intellectuals in Eastern 
Europe differed between each country, and it was also a situation 
that changed over time. As recent research has emphasized, this 
situation was tremendously complex: the cultural production be-
hind the iron curtain could embrace both Socialist Realism and 
modernism, but it cannot be understood only as a reflection of 
ideals derived from the Soviet Union, nor merely as peripheral 
and unmatched attempts to imitate modernist movements in the 
West.68 However, the logic of the Cold War demanded—on both 
sides—an idea of two separate and fundamentally different sys-
tems and cultural expressions. The intimacy of the connection 
bet ween political and cultural discourses within a single dominant 
hegemonic order marked an essential difference between Soviet 
and Eastern European cultural life on the one hand and that of 
America and Western Europe on the other. However, the bipolar 
structure of the Cold War also created a new need for the US to 
coordinate different representations within the framework of a 
single overarching ideological ideal. For the culture of post-war 
America, the result was both continuity and change in this regard: 
ideas and identities that had developed and become established 
earlier in the twentieth century became more clearly defined while 
also acquiring new or partially new meanings.
The increasing need for greater clarity in defining the front-
line against the Soviets created one very particular problem: how 
could a society characterised by a pluralist approach construct a 
clear and coherent alternative to the distinctiveness of Soviet dis-
course without abandoning the democratic freedoms and multi-
plicity that were the very cornerstone of the Western way? With 
the lessons of President Woodrow Wilson’s failures after the First 
World War in mind, the goal of the Truman administration was 
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to establish a new stability in the period immediately following 
the end of the Second World War by setting up a variety of in-
stitutions aimed at creating an open global market and foreign 
policy order. Truman, however, was being pressured not only by 
the growing geopolitical ambitions of the Soviet Union, but also 
by domestic opinion, particularly from a Congress that was under 
the control of the Republicans. A significant measure of politi-
cal freedom of manoeuvre could be achieved by creating a situ-
ation that linked the foreign and domestic policy issues closely 
together while also associating the problem of the reconstruction 
and stability of Western Europe with an increasingly pronounced 
anti-Communist rhetoric. The historian Richard Freeland has de-
scribed how a series of actions were initiated between 1947 and 
1948 with the aim of mobilising the American public so as to cre-
ate this freedom of manoeuvre by rhetorical and political means.69 
Various measures were targeted specifically at oppositional indi-
viduals and groups, actively linking the issue of freedom with the 
question of loyalty. Freedom was not to be understood as an ab-
solute civil right but must always be interpreted within the frame-
work of patriotic loyalty to the political interests of the US. A 
specific myth of what it meant to be American—a uniform and 
ideologised image—had to be established as an integral part of the 
post-war ideological discourse of the United States. And because 
the Cold War was a symbolic war to a very considerable extent, 
propaganda was its foremost weapon. The cultural sphere, too, 
would have to be extensively mobilised as part of the production 
and reproduction of this myth.
And yet it would be mistaken to see the Cold War as the sole 
cause of the changes in American cultural and social life after the 
Second World War. The historian Alan Brinkley has shown how a 
wealth of different factors interacted to bring about these devel-
opments: the unparalleled degree of economic growth above all, 
the ideological assurance that unfettered capitalism was the best 
means of achieving a just society, the importance of the expand-
ing middle class and its increasingly homogeneous self-identity. In 
tandem with the bipolar structure of the Cold War, these factors 
clearly made the creation of an illusion of unity in the ethnic, 
 political and social heterogeneity of American society essential:
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The architects of the Cold War came to view a diverse and rap-
idly changing world through the prism of a simple ideological 
lens, smoothing out the rough spots and seeing a uniformity of 
beliefs and goals that did not in fact exist. The architects of post-
war  middle-class culture looked at a diverse and rapidly changing 
society in the United States through a similarly limited and self- 
referential perspective. They constructed and came to believe in an 
image of a world that did not exist.70
The disjunction between these official images and the perceived 
commonplace reality of American citizens also provides a key to 
understanding the differences between the American and Soviet 
discourses. Although American ideology was repressive at times 
and sought to limit the freedom of thought and action of the citi-
zenry, it would, of course, have been impossible for a democratic 
state to establish a distinct doctrine for cultural policy in the same 
way as had been done in the Soviet Union. The existence of a 
sub- and countercultural critical margin could, in fact, be consid-
ered a distinguishing feature of American and Western European 
culture, even though the official image that prevailed during the 
Cold War served to underpin and strengthen conservative ideas 
within a range of areas.71 The political and cultural discourses of 
the West were not based on a single hegemonic perspective despite 
the obvious attempts by various reactionary groups, particularly 
in the US, to influence and restrict public debate.
The pluralism of American society did, however, pose many 
kinds of dilemmas for successive administrations that had to cre-
ate a clearly defined line against an enemy able to produce an 
image without any cracks and without any critical opposition. 
The constitutional and institutional structure of the United States 
was entirely different in kind. Prior to 1965, there was no sin-
gle authority in the US with responsibility for art affairs, neither 
was there any federal budget for such matters, although both the 
Department of the Interior and the intelligence services consid-
ered them part of their own area of interest.72 In contrast with the 
extraordinarily top-down and centralised structure of the art and 
cultural spheres of the Soviet Union in the 1940s and 1950s, the 
American authorities had to rely on various private institutions, 
social networks and secret contacts. The degree of awareness that 
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an open and democratic society had to impose certain limits on 
the conduct of psychological warfare also varied considerably 
within different administrative and security organisations.73 There 
was quite simply no consensus in the political debate about what 
foreign and cultural policy direction the US should follow.
The American response to the ideological and cultural agenda 
of the Soviet Union and the massive resistance to avant-garde and 
‘un-American’ art from influential parts of the political establish-
ment may be seen as constituting two major fields of force in the 
official promotion and normalisation of modernism, irrespective 
of whether the aim was to spread a particular type of culture or to 
use the latter for political ends.
This state of affairs made it essential to employ elaborate strat-
egies within fields where explicit diktats would have been impos-
sible. The opposition to modern art and culture in general and 
to avant-garde movements in particular within large parts of the 
political sector meant that contacts had to be more or less secret 
both to maintain the liberal notion of a free art world and to 
produce an alternative image to that presented by the authori-
tarian cultural policy of the Soviet Union. The key institution in 
this context was the Museum of Modern Art and its International 
Council.74 The ownership structure of MoMA—in the form of 
a private foundation—in combination with the membership of 
its board made it the centre of a remarkable and influential net-
work of contacts that consisted of individuals in key positions in 
American politics, the security services and trade and industry.75 
MoMA was, therefore, linked by professional and social ties to 
the pragmatic forces in American politics that wanted to retain 
the ideological offensive as well as to an internationally oriented 
cultural policy. With financial aid from private funds and the 
partially concealed backing of the American Department of the 
Interior, MoMA launched its international programme for artistic 
exchanges with other countries in 1952. It was also responsible 
for American participation at various international art events, 
such as the biennales held in Venice and São Paulo.76
Employing and exporting visual art for propaganda purposes 
naturally posed a particular dilemma for a democratic nation. For 
one thing, direct indoctrination was likely to be counterproductive 
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and would not be taken seriously by European intellectuals. For an-
other, visual art and art exhibitions, no matter how wide- ranging, 
constituted a rather blunt propaganda weapon when compared 
with the public dissemination of popular culture through the 
daily and weekly press, comics, popular music, advertising, radio, 
television, film. And although modernism was established within 
the framework of the cultural policy of the United States and the 
Western European states, nonfigurative art as such proved to be 
an extremely diffuse instrument of propaganda in comparison 
with Socialist Realism: just where exactly in a painting by Jackson 
Pollock could freedom and democracy be seen?
The Production of Identity as Realpolitik
A key issue for the ideological function of every art genre and 
mass medium is the relation between rhetorical clarity and criti-
cal autonomy. The role of the visual arts in the democratic states 
was not primarily a matter of images but rather their use and 
involved an ideologised context for the interpretation of works 
of art, rather than explicit presentations of an ideological content 
in particular works. Here, as in so many other respects, the Cold 
War created an intricate and very peculiar logic for the interpreta-
tion of matters both large and small.
The position of ‘leading nation of the free world’ that the US 
attempted to occupy after the end of the Second World War re-
quired not only extensive economic and military spending, but 
also the investment of cultural and intellectual capital. Within the 
art world, this was a struggle that could be said to have been 
waged on several different fronts: against the Soviet Union pri-
marily, but also against the art and cultural life of old Europe 
(France in particular) and against the reactionary tendencies of 
domestic opinion. If a powerful alternative to the Eastern bloc 
was to be successfully promoted, it would have to be legitimated 
both within the cultural spheres of the European states and to 
opinion at home. The key to the success of the international estab-
lishment of the American art world as a vital centre of the arts—
and to the successful dissemination of the image of American art 
by the authorities after the Second World War—was not primarily 
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a matter of conspiracies or the promotion of particular artistic 
idioms, it had to do instead with the establishment of a dynamic 
institutional structure whose principal strengths lay in its flexi-
bility, its financial position and the mobility it afforded between 
the private and the public spheres. The part played by Europe in 
this game was not one of passive submission it had more to do 
with a shared interest on the part of certain key actors in dis-
seminating the image of modernist art—and nonfigurative art in 
 particular—as the free world’s response to Socialist Realism.77 A 
rich and varied artistic life developed in several different places in 
Europe after the War, which meant that the post-war European 
art scene also had a significant role to play in the normalisation 
process of modernism.
An important aspect of this process was the necessity of legit-
imating and reproducing specific values with which modern art 
could be associated. However, as we saw earlier, this also brought 
a two-pronged dilemma: for the dominant culture in having to 
embrace parts of a counterculture as a bearer of its norms and for 
the avant-garde, which would lose its raison d’être, its countercul-
tural position, as a result. The problem was not entirely confined 
to the post-war period but may be understood in historical terms, 
at least in part, as a process involving the gradual establishment 
and consecration of the various avant-garde movements. What 
was different about post-war normalisation was that it did not 
simply entail a gradual and retroactive form of acceptance; it ac-
tively involved the institutionalisation and official sanctioning of 
certain values peculiar to the avant-garde.
This process was freighted with different ideological values 
in different nations and was legitimated by them in different 
ways. As we have seen, documenta served as an extraordinarily 
significant paradigmatic manifestation of modernist art in West 
Germany, a country whose historical situation created an entirely 
different impetus for the normalisation of modernism than that 
of the US. A central theme of this exhibition was the issue of the 
restoration of the democratic system of values and the creation of 
a national identity within the framework of that system. And yet 
German official art policy could also be described—as Benjamin 
Buchloh has done—as being determined by a collective political 
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and psychological loss of memory.78 When considered in these 
terms, the years between 1933 and 1945 emerge not as a period 
that had been the object of systematic analysis and description 
but rather as a gulf across which restoration formed a bridge to 
a recent history (parts of the progressive culture of the Weimar 
republic, in particular) that could serve as a sounding board for 
the new democratic republic.
The issue of restoration also played a crucial role in France 
after the war. Although the situation here was less chaotic than in 
Germany once hostilities had ended, the nation had nevertheless 
been wounded economically, socially and culturally.79 The coun-
try’s problem of cultural restoration took on a different ideologi-
cal connotation than in the German Federal Republic. The making 
of extensive cultural policy initiatives was also made more diffi-
cult by political instability and the weakness of France’s economic 
position.80 There was, however, a pronounced awareness on all 
political sides of the importance of culture for social life and na-
tional identity. This was particularly evident in the efforts made as 
part of French art and cultural policy during both the Fourth and 
Fifth Republics that revolved around the same symbolic theme 
permeating so much of French post-war policy as a whole: affirm-
ing the role of the nation as a great power in political, military 
and cultural terms, while keeping up the image that the continuity 
of the great French tradition had never been broken. What was 
reestablished was, in essence, the same image that was promoted 
by the World Fair held in Paris in 1937; although, now the French 
government played a much more active part in the mediation and 
legitimation of modern art.
An example is provided by the exhibition programme of the 
Museée Nationale d’Art Moderne, which emerged after the war 
as the central institution and the major actor in the official French 
art world.81 Its hallmark throughout the post-war period was an 
emphasis on the Frenchness of the development of modern art.82 
The contemporary art it promoted was in the main the work of 
those artists active within what was known as the Nouvelle Ecole 
de Paris, such as Jean Bazaine, Roger Bissiére, Alfred Manessier 
and Bernard Buffet. This could be referred to as a kind of mod-
ernist juste-milieu painting, whose primary significance lay in that 
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it codified key values of official French cultural policy in purely 
iconographic terms, thus creating continuity with tradition. The 
aim of the museum was not to exhibit what was local or national 
but to set for the international art world a standard whose na-
tional character may to a very large extent be considered both 
nationalist and universalist.
This is not to say that French art or the Parisian art world 
after the Second World War lacked vitality or dynamism. On the 
contrary, the 1950s were an extremely lively period in the areas of 
art and art debate. Alternatives to the official line were provided 
by less formal networks that linked together galleries, periodicals 
and private art schools and in which a new generation of art-
ists and critics could operate.83 It is evident, nonetheless, that the 
establishment of a particular image of the relationship between 
French contemporary art and historical national development oc-
curred as an interaction between the public and private sectors: 
through coverage by the mass media, as a result of the reports 
by leading critics and their assessments, by means of exhibitions 
at private galleries, and through the publication of survey works 
and monographs. A measure of change, dynamism and mobility 
within the institutional structure of the official art scene should 
also be taken into account; this created greater scope for vari-
ous types of nonfigurative art during the 1950s, particularly those 
works that went under the name of abstrait chaude (lyrical ab-
straction) or art informel.84 Although it is clear that the discursive 
practice of the visual arts in France, as in the rest of the Western 
world, was shaped by an interplay between the private and public 
spheres, the existence of much stricter boundaries between the 
two than in America, for instance, made the French art world ex-
ceptional, with the French government all but entirely in control 
of international exchanges and presentations.85
However, it would be a mistake to interpret this situation as 
though the image of France as a cultural great power had been 
turned into nothing more than illusion. As Kathryn Boyer has 
shown, the French government devoted significant financial re-
sources to retaining the initiative at both the national and inter-
national levels. The French authorities also proved successful at 
disseminating the image of a continuous French tradition on the 
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international art scene. The official international art programme 
was organised by the Association Française d’Action Artistique, 
which managed to arrange an average of twenty-two exhibitions 
per year between 1949 and 1965 that toured various places all 
over the world.86 Although these exhibitions were made up of 
both older and more recent French art, the emphasis was on the 
older material, and among the exhibitions of twentieth-century 
art that were shown, there was a marked preponderance from the 
first half of the century when the Fauvist and Cubist traditions 
were dominant.87 One of the association’s most important com-
missions was organising the French pavilions at the prestigious 
biennales held in Venice and São Paulo. The arts policy of the 
French state met with great success at these events, and France 
was able to assure its international position by winning the top 
prizes at these biennial exhibitions on an annual basis during the 
1950s.88 It is evident, moreover, that the Venice Biennale in par-
ticular was characterised by a retrospective spirit in the years fol-
lowing the Second World War that was demonstrated in thematic 
displays of early modernism and also influenced the awarding of 
its prizes.89
The problem of restoration played a subordinate role in the 
US, which meant that American rhetoric was formulated in some-
what different terms. The issue here was not a matter of estab-
lishing an image of an unbroken tradition but of asserting the 
dynamism and progressive modernity of American culture. The 
nucleus of this rhetoric involved the reproduction of an image of 
the vitality of American art, with the aim of gaining acceptance 
for it and ensuring its power to convince in contexts beyond direct 
American control. But the American self-image had to be adapted 
in order to be successfully exported and legitimated in a European 
intellectual milieu. Serge Guilbaut has described the necessary 
adaptation as occurring in two stages: first, from nationalism to 
internationalism and second, from internationalism to universal-
ism.90 Establishing a position within an international context in-
volved getting rid of the stamp of provincialism that had marked 
the (socially committed) art of the 1930s. Once the required level 
had been reached, where the leading role of Paris was beyond dis-
pute, an aesthetic approach based on values specific to American 
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art had to be formulated, and these values had to be perceived as 
universally applicable.91 What the French were keen to portray as 
a natural and self-evident continuity involved a kind of represen-
tation based on exactly the same shared intellectual construct that 
certain actors within the American art world were simultaneously 
attempting to establish for their own ends. For the most part, this 
struggle over interpretive privilege could be said to have been a 
struggle over the right to define what was universal.
The reproduction of this new self-image was quite clearly one 
aspect of the larger process of the production of national identity 
at this time, while also forming part of a greater plan, as some have 
maintained, directed by the powers that be to export American 
culture to the wider world. Although if there were a plan, it could 
only have been successfully enacted owing to an aspect of the 
situation that appears to have been more random and difficult to 
control: the export of the new cultural self-image of the US began 
at the same time the domestic avant-garde (the New York School) 
was making great advances and entering its productive heyday. 
The US was at this time definitely capable of manifesting a level 
of artistic production fully comparable with that of any European 
nation, although it lacked breadth and the deep historical roots 
found in France in particular. The war years had led to an exodus 
of leading European figures to the United States in the art field as 
well, just as the American art world was establishing what was to 
some extent a new institutional structure.92 But the absence in the 
US of a dynamic cultural tradition of modernist art brought with 
it specific problems for this process of legitimation. Unlike France, 
there was no cosmopolitan and bohemian avant-garde to point to 
as a historical marker of national identity. On the contrary, this 
very type of identity—and its politically subversive, cosmopolitan 
and, therefore, ‘un-American’ values—seemed highly suspect to 
large parts of the political and cultural establishment. Bringing 
together culture with subculture proved more problematic in the 
US than in most European countries.
A solution that proved viable was formulated by Alfred Barr, 
when describing the symbolic role of modern art in his brief sur-
vey What is Modern Painting (1943): ‘[T]he work of art is a sym-
bol, a visible symbol of the human spirit in its search for truth, for 
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freedom and for perfection.’93 In the context of its time, this was a 
defence of the freedom of art against the oppression of Stalin and 
Hitler, although in the political context of the post-war period, the 
same argument could be used against both the cultural policy of 
the Eastern bloc and conservative opinion at home. At the height 
of McCarthyism, Barr formulated a defence of modern art as the 
expression of a free democratic society in more explicit terms in 
‘Is Modern Art Communistic?’ (1952) when he asserted that the 
conformity and lack of freedom represented by Nazi Germany 
and the Soviet Union reflected the particular intolerance of these 
regimes to the creativity, freedom and individuality of modern 
art.94 The fundamental theme of both these essays was that the 
artist serves as a symbolic representative whose art and identity, 
even though they may exceed the boundaries of the acceptable 
according to the social and moral codes of everyday life, must be 
understood and accepted by any society that calls itself free.
By assigning to modernist art an extraordinary symbolic sig-
nificance, not as a representation of sound American values but 
as a litmus test of how free and democratic a society actually is, 
Alfred Barr was, in fact, employing, and inverting, the very rheto-
ric adopted by reactionary opinion in order to suppress the avant-
garde. He was evidently aware of the need for counterreactionary 
arguments in the debate on modern art with just as much aggres-
sion and force as the opposing side could ever mobilise.
What was also evident in the US was the development of an im-
age of a particularly American synthesis of historical modernism, 
an art that even though it could be located in a historical context 
was nevertheless genuinely modern. Moreover, a particular set of 
values was being identified as typical of American art: violent, 
spontaneous, new, vital, big, brutal, unfinished.95 Hence, it was 
viewed as different from the art of France, which was described 
as weak, conservative, feeble, cultivated, mannered and charm-
ing. This rhetoric, with its peculiar gender-stereotyped metaphors, 
presents a snapshot of what Laura Cottingham has tellingly de-
scribed as ‘the masculine imperative’ of modernism.96 The image 
it produced was of American culture offering a revitalising, mas-
culine energy capable of injecting new life into the old, stagnant 
and feminised cultural tradition of Europe. An obvious example 
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is provided by the mythologising approach at this time to Jackson 
Pollock—as a representative of the contemporary modern artist—
in both the art world and in the public sphere.97 This mythol-
ogising served to inscribe the contemporary artist in a historic 
context of the heroic but misunderstood geniuses of modern art, 
albeit with the crucial rhetorical difference that genius was now 
accepted and legitimated by the system of norms that pertained 
in the democratic states. In its particular political context, this 
rhetoric appeared essential to distinguish what was specifically 
American from an alien and politically subversive European her-
itage. The myths of Romanticism were readopted, as it were, and 
refashioned into a progressive and aggressive narrative of the gen-
uinely modern, the genuinely American.
This rhetoric did not, however, bring any automatic benefits to 
American artists in terms of support, sales of work and financial 
gain, other than ensuring their ability to operate on a public stage. 
During the post-war period, the New York art world consisted 
of fairly loosely connected networks of artists, critics, collectors 
and intellectuals who set up particular social milieux and who 
embraced similar aesthetic approaches and issues.98 There is no 
sense in which the group known as the New York School was a 
favoured elite of artistic functionaries in the service of the state, 
although a great deal of space was subsequently devoted to them 
in the international programme of MoMA.99 Neither was it a 
question of culture being integrated into the official political dis-
course, as was the case in the Eastern bloc in particular, but also to 
some extent in the official art world of France. As Serge Guilbaut 
has shown, the production of value and meaning by the American 
art market was based right from the outset, and to a much greater 
extent, on ideas and identities that had become established among 
critics, gallery-owners and artists in the avant-garde art scene of 
New York. These were later subsumed within an overarching 
symbolic representation whose subject was modern art in a free 
and democratic society.
As we have seen, a crucial aspect of the rhetoric of normalisa-
tion has to do with the individualisation of works of art, and this 
led to the avant-garde being understood as consisting of a number 
of individuals with personal visions, rather than as a collective 
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counterculture. Abstract Expressionism possessed a specific qual-
ity in this regard, which meant it could be used as part of a wider 
geopolitical rhetoric. As so interestingly described by the secret 
service agent Donald Jameson,
We recognized that this was the kind of art that had nothing to 
do with socialist realism, and made [S]ocialist [R]ealism look even 
more stylized and more rigid and confined than it was. And that 
relationship was used in some exhibits.100
According to this argument, the freedom in a painting by Jackson 
Pollock lay in its stylistic differences from Socialist Realism; this 
is not then a matter of iconographic identification but rather a 
rhetorical use of the painting (and the particular phenomenon of 
Abstract Expressionism) in a larger political context.
There is a strange irony to this rhetorical game in that the 
Soviet approach to art was defined as an antithesis to the capi-
talist view; whereas, the American rhetoric provided an antithesis 
to this antithesis, as it were. This was a calculated strategy on the 
part of America and Western Europe that intended to allow them 
to make use of representations from the private art and cultural 
worlds as part of their official rhetoric. But in order to do so, a 
very peculiar interpretive model had to be applied.
The Model of Indirect and Symbolic Interpretation
The rhetorical individualisation of the avant-garde was of decisive 
importance for the process of normalisation beyond the borders 
of the United States as well. At documenta 1955, the various ideo-
logical connotations of the historical avant-garde were neutralised 
by the concept of a supra-individual formal evolution in which 
the struggle for freedom of the individual as such was emphasised 
(irrespective of his or her personal deviations in political or so-
cial terms) as a vital symbol of the open and democratic society. 
The notion that the value sphere of the visual arts constituted an 
isolated preserve clearly set off from the surrounding world was 
interwoven into this approach. This necessitated the depolitici-
sation of modern art in order to be able to use it politically and 
the recoding of avant-garde art as a private form of expression 
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without any representative function beyond its own aesthetic ex-
istence. The problem lay in defining parameters for the interpreta-
tion of nonfigurative art capable of satisfying both sides: allowing 
art to retain (the semblance of) its avantgardiste legitimacy while 
ensuring that it appeared to be a legitimate representation of the 
cultural norm systems of the Western democracies.
This was not a question of various authorities acting repres-
sively when it came to selection and interpretation, as in Abstract 
Expression serving as a representation of the ideology of the Cold 
War or the decreeing of a direct prohibition of certain kinds of 
interpretation, but involved instead the overlayering of different 
contexts for the interpretation of contemporary art. And, as pre-
viously mentioned, this was a transformation that first took place 
in the art world. The isolationist viewpoint was expressed most 
explicitly by Clement Greenberg, who wrote in ‘Avantgarde and 
Kitsch’ (1939) that avant-garde art had to cut itself off from soci-
ety and create a distinct separation between itself and the arenas 
of politics and popular culture: a culture that was vital, progres-
sive and advanced had to be a culture of disparity. Greenberg 
was far from alone in promoting an approach of this kind. 
More  existentialist-minded or psychoanalytically oriented critics 
and historians, such as Harold Rosenberg, the German Werner 
Haftmann, the Englishman Herbert Read and the Frenchman 
Michael Tapié also emphasised—independently of one another—
individual expression as a manifestation of ‘personal mythology’, 
‘inner necessity’, ‘metaphysical anguish’ and ‘universal creativity’ 
that transcended the confines of the contemporary political and 
social worlds.101 A general and universalising intellectual con-
struct may be seen to underpin these mutually differing positions 
and diverse definitions that served to distinguish modern art from 
other social and intellectual spheres and whose rhetoric and scope 
extended, in principle, beyond specific national contexts.
How did this shared intellectual construct actually function in 
practice in the interpretation of a particular oeuvre or an indi-
vidual image? An example that can shed light on this question is 
the promotion of Jean Fautrier. His breakthrough came with a 
series of paintings called Les otages (The Hostages), which were 
begun in 1943 and shown for the first time at the Galerie René 
The Aesthetic and Ideological Criteria of Normalisation 183
Drouin after the end of the war in 1945. The peculiar technique 
he employed attracted much attention. The paintings were exe-
cuted in a series of different layers and types of material: on a 
piece of paper thinly painted in earth colours, Fautrier built up 
a thick cake of distemper and gypsum at the centre of the paint-
ing. Drawn around the coarsely applied painting materials was an 
amorphous outline that suggested the shape of a human face. In 
context, this outline creates not only the shape of a head, but also 
an illusion of volume in relation to the background that accen-
tuates the plasticity of the colour elements and their function as 
symbols of incarnation. Fautrier scratched and painted a number 
of strokes, cutting through the outline and the paint, which may 
be interpreted in many ways but are, in context, highly suggestive 
of extreme violence: a face being demolished by a series of slashes 
and cut into pieces. Or was this simply an example of the defor-
mation of the surrounding world by modern art? The question, 
in the context of the post-war period, was how these images were 
actually to be understood.
In Un art autre (1952), Michel Tapié declared that the value 
of Fautrier’s work and of art informel lay in that it transposed 
the viewer to a situation that could not be understood by tradi-
tional yardsticks. He or she was forced by the enigmatic qual-
ity of the image into new existential considerations beyond the 
norms and truth claims of convention.102 André Malraux, how-
ever, who took part in the Resistance movement with Fautrier, 
saw a more obvious association between the subject matter and 
a specific historical situation: ‘Les otages’ served as ‘hieroglyphs 
of grief’, as ideograms of the horrors of war, portrayed in a way 
that conveyed an immediate experience beyond language.103 This 
much more specific interpretation was based on the allusion in 
the title of the series to oppression and to the associations with 
violence evoked by the demolished face, in which the colours not 
only accentuate a difference between its various parts, but also 
conjure up an image of greenish decomposition and of a devas-
tating blood-drenched wound. Serge Guilbaut has provided an 
account of the way in which these and similar interpretations sit-
uated Fautrier and other practioners of art informel in a specific 
context:
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Fautrier took a very gruesome topic, one quite literally unrepre-
sentable: the Holocaust. His task was ambitious but quite diffi-
cult if he cared not to exploit and sentimentalize such a painful 
topic. . . . Fautrier, who painted extraordinary powerful dead rab-
bits à la “Soutine” before the war, found, with the horror of the 
camps still very present, a way to talk about the unspeakable by 
withdrawing from direct discourse and replacing it with allusions, 
connotations. The physical, painful, difficult constructions of lay-
ers of transparent, thin papers on the canvas, the pulverization 
of white paint, the transformation of painting material, became 
a metaphor for the suffering many still felt in France.  . . . What 
is special in Fautrier is that he makes these connotations barely 
visible, transforms them, buries them under an avalanche of tech-
nical virtuosities. We are here at the edge of the Inform, at the edge 
of figuration, when the drawing, the image, when the corpse, the 
stump, the flattened face, all in an advanced state of decompo-
sition, tend to subside, to be transformed into soil, into matière 
(matter). But this one is of course an archeological matière, with 
signs of history buried in it, in order to jolt the casual viewer into 
recalling elements themselves buried in one’s memory.104
The key problem in both these interpretations touches on the 
question of representation or, rather, on a borderland of repre-
sentation. For how could what was essentially unportrayable (the 
Holocaust) ever be portrayed? And how could the portrayal of 
such a subject be legitimated in an artistic context (art informel) 
that repudiated not only the realist tradition, but also the very 
idea of the representative function of the visual arts? This prob-
lem resembles the one that confronted Picasso in his efforts to 
combine the expansive movement of Futurism with Symbolism’s 
introspective preoccupation with the language of pictorial art; it 
could be said to lie at the very heart of the entirety of the mod-
ernist discourse of the twentieth century. For Fautrier’s part, the 
answer lay in the absence of conventional representations of a 
subject or theme, which meant that the image operates in the 
disjunction between the apparent and the possible by employing 
metaphors, allusions, connotations and associations.
Although the interpretation was still based on a preunderstand-
ing (the historically specific horizon of the interpreter), the work, 
as such, continued to remain open to a multiplicity of differing 
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interpretations. The limited, though nevertheless extant, iconic 
sign functions of the image and the title, in particular, obviously 
provided a measure of guidance. Had Fautrier given his series of 
hostage pictures a more neutral title (‘nr 1’ to ‘nr 33’, for exam-
ple) the horizon of interpretation would in all likelihood have 
been different. But an interpretation that treats the title seriously 
comes up against the question: is the subject here—in a quite lit-
eral sense—a realistic representation of the formation of a wound 
as a result of external violence? In that case, its significance would 
be fixed to a particular historical experience: the factual outcome 
of being a hostage of the Nazi occupation forces and/or their 
 fellow-travellers. Or is it rather a matter of also understanding 
the image as a metaphor of the split in personality caused by the 
individual having to adapt to the demands of the occupying forces 
and, therefore, by a form of internal violence? The theme of the 
hostage would also then describe the condition of internal exile 
and the complex of lies, collaboration, submission and oblivion 
in which so many people found themselves while suffering op-
pression. And can the latter interpretation be said to represent not 
only the experience of the horrors of war, but also to evoke (on 
a deeper metaphorical level) a more universal image of the alien-
ation and the sense of fragmented identity that so characterise 
modern society? Or is it the case instead that Fautrier’s paintings 
should be seen as a continuation of the great French tradition, 
with their exquisite handling of light and materials being under-
stood as a modern version of the sensibility of a Chardin or a 
Watteau? Is this actually a form of art suited to the drawing-room 
walls of the comfortably-off middle classes?
The communicative and linguistic problems posed by Fautrier’s 
hostage pictures are typical in many regards of the way modern-
ism, and the radical art of the post-war period in particular, is able 
to refer to the external world. A more explicitly realistic represen-
tation of the subject matter could not have been legitimated within 
avant-garde discourse but would have been consigned to the non-
position of Socialist Realism or the trivial art and kitsch culture 
of the bourgeoisie. A picture entirely lacking any form of mimetic 
representation could, it is true, have been interpreted indirectly or 
on a metaphorical level as a statement critical of civilisation, but 
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it would then have lost any connection at all to the surrounding 
world in terms of its subject matter. This demonstrates how the 
visual arts are characterised by a multifaceted discursive logic at 
a particular time and in a specific social and political situation. 
However, the very vagueness of Fautrier’s critique of civilisation 
could also be identified as one of the factors that made it possible 
to subsume modernist art within the dominant system of cultural 
norms: it was not explicitly antagonistic to the ideological norms 
of the society that surrounded it, neither was it a call to political 
activism, but it involved, in most cases, an individual reaction to a 
particular situation. It is possible to refer here to forms of absence 
and alienation that were different from those that characterised 
the avant-garde of the early twentieth century in a new era, whose 
hallmarks were a tangible sense of trauma, the extinction of uto-
pias and the impossibility of collective experience. The key words 
in this regard are individualism and doubt, in contrast to the col-
lectivism and antagonism of the historical avant-garde.
In fact the absence of any explicitly political and propagan-
dist content was a precondition for any use of modernist art as 
propaganda, because the acceptance of the avant-garde served as 
a rhetorical device for freedom and individualism, which meant 
its idiom could serve as an antithesis to Socialist Realism and 
because it would have been impossible in the art worlds of the 
Western nations to employ propaganda directly and still be taken 
seriously. The same goes for American Abstract Expressionism to 
a very considerable extent. Jackson Pollock may serve as an exam-
ple of the difficulty involved in fixing any obvious or even possible 
meaning, which explains the very diverse metaphorical interpreta-
tions of his paintings that have been produced over the years: as a 
Gothic, morbid, extreme and supremely American exponent of the 
medium-specific efforts of modern art (Clement Greenberg); as an 
example of the attempts of Communism to infiltrate American 
society and create chaos within it (George Dondero); as a portrait 
of the complex social and psychological situation of the modern 
urban man (Rudolf Arnheim); as a means by which contemporary 
art could free itself from the material constraints of painting and 
develop art as process rather object (Allan Kaprow).105
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Kirk Varnedoe has described how Pollock’s works constitute 
a historical turning point in the history of modern art, because 
his work always involved oppositions in a way that made any 
definitive assignment of meaning impossible, thus illustrating the 
openness of aesthetic interpretation.106 But in my view, this both 
exaggerates and diminishes the significance of Pollock’s contribu-
tion. It exaggerates in the sense that neither Jackson Pollock, nor 
American Abstract Expressionism as such can be put forward as 
the sole exponents of this openness; informal art and the critical 
debate in Europe played at least as important a role in the es-
tablishment of the post-war changes in the definition of art and 
interpretation. And it diminishes because the ramifications of this 
issue extended far beyond matters of aesthetics or philosophy. For 
if it is not possible to say where in a painting by Jackson Pollock 
or Jean Fautrier freedom and democracy are being expressed, nei-
ther is it possible to say where their potentially transgressive or 
politically subversive message lies.
The deliberately radical opening-up of the possible interpretive 
horizons of the work that informal and Abstract Expressionist art 
introduced had implications that were aesthetic, political and so-
cial. It was not only the meaning of the work that seemed vague, 
arbitrary and subjective in this light, but also its ideological posi-
tion. The strategy that was characteristic of the established insti-
tutions in their interpretation of avant-garde art could be called 
the model of indirect and symbolic interpretation. This meant 
that the propaganda value of the visual arts in the West was to be 
found on a more subtle level, with the paintings and exhibitions 
playing a subordinate role: it was the demonstration of the place 
of avant-garde art in the norm systems of the free world instead 
that was crucial. And this is a key point for the process of normal-
isation, because what is being institutionalised here is a context 
for the understanding of modern art that is, in essence, open to 
both a cultural and a countercultural pattern of interpretation at 
one and the same time.
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The Modernist Metanarrative
Between History and the Present
The establishment of modernism in the system of cultural norms 
of the Western world and the new role of New York as the centre 
of the art world are largely bound up with questions of power, 
of ideological representations and of interpretive privilege. This 
situation was, in essence, not unlike that of the late eighteenth 
century when the academic system expanded and Paris increas-
ingly eclipsed Rome as the most vital city on the art scene. In both 
cases, these shifts determined the circumstances of contemporary 
artists and the historiography of later generations. For here, as 
ever, it is the victor who writes the history.
The American artist Mark Tansey has produced a wonderfully 
ironic painting of the triumph of American art over the French, 
entitled The Triumph of the New York School (1984). The work 
was executed as a traditional academic historical painting—with 
obvious Socialist Realist features—in terms of its subject matter 
and idiom as well as its vast scale. At the centre of the picture, 
André Breton is being obliged to sign the treaty of surrender in 
front of Clement Greenberg. Behind Breton stand the aging rep-
resentatives of the once mighty French avant-garde; visible on the 
American side are the exponents of Abstract Expressionism.107 
Note, too, the difference between the equipment of the two 
sides, with the French troops apparently reliant on their cavalry, 
while the Americans have access to modern tanks. The subject 
of the work is, in other words, the outright victory of modernity 
over tradition, portrayed in the traditional academic style. The 
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backdrop against which the treaty of surrender is signed is a pan-
oramic view of the landscape—the art world—that has been laid 
waste by the battles.
This is at once a penetrating, problematic and disquieting 
rendering of the historical image. The irony in Tansey’s paint-
ing is directed not so much at the representatives of Abstract 
Expressionism as at the historiographic view, which accentuates 
both the masculine metaphors of the battlefield and the conspir-
atorial metaphors associated with espionage in portraying how 
a particular view of art became established. The cultural logic of 
the Cold War does, of course, provide an essential context for un-
derstanding the normalisation of modernist art after the Second 
World War. But the context created by more local and national 
social and aesthetic considerations that serve to define a range 
of specific situations in which individual artists operated and ex-
pressed themselves is just as crucial. In this way, a much more 
multifaceted complex of factors is revealed than those suggested 
by the signing of a treaty of surrender. What Tansey’s picture, like 
much of the research on this subject produced in recent years, fails 
to say is that the real victory was not won on the battlefield but 
in the historiography.
Another image should be introduced here as a supplement 
to Mark Tansey’s painting: a little drawing by Alfred Barr from 
1941.108 He called it ‘Torpedo moving through time’, and it out-
lines a diagram for an ideal permanent collection at the Museum 
of Modern Art. The drawing was part of an argument in an ongo-
ing debate about whether MoMA would build its own permanent 
collection or if the museum should serve as a transit museum and 
a branch of Metropolitan Museum of Art.109 What Barr tried to 
accomplish was to give a graphic form to the idea that MoMA 
must be built around a permanent collection that would consti-
tute a canon of international modern art as well as a historical 
foundation for contemporary art and design. The upper torpedo 
is drawn along a time-axis reaching far back into the historical 
past and is almost entirely dominated by the French traditions. 
Once the torpedo in the lower part of the image has moved for-
ward nine years, a new and much more uniform pattern emerges. 
Jacketed in the French and European tradition, the torpedo is now 
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equipped with a high-explosive warhead consisting of American 
contemporary art.
The martial metaphor obviously implies that this is something 
more than a schematic image of an ideal museum collection: it 
demonstrates both that a shift in the American awareness of the 
front line of contemporary art had taken place at this time, with 
Barr considering that the US had taken over the initiative, and 
that MoMA should be more actively engaged in supporting this 
change. But it also demonstrates something far more important: 
the existence of a focal point between the historical and the con-
temporary, around which the gradual shifts in art taking place in 
the present create new historical perspectives and patterns. For, on 
one level, the institutionalisation of modernism after the Second 
World War brought about a radical change in the practice of the 
individual artist, such that every formulation of the new was al-
ready inscribed in tradition from the outset.
Institution and Narration
The post-war period is portrayed in art-historical handbooks as 
a time when a new generation of artists emerged. A generation 
characterised by various aesthetic movements and -isms: Abstract 
Expressionism, art informel, Cobra, Tachisme, Action Painting, 
art autre, art concret, Color Field Painting. The story told here is 
of the establishment of new forms of nonfigurative and abstract 
art on both sides of the Atlantic that became a key part of the pre-
vailing value system of the official art world. At the same time, the 
history of modernism was also being written in the form of exhi-
bitions and texts of different kinds and with various levels of am-
bition: from the megaexhibitions (the biennales held in Venice and 
São Paulo, documenta in Kassel) and ambitious historical surveys 
presented at the major museums to minor retrospective exhibi-
tions at private galleries; from historical and theoretical specialist 
studies and general handbooks to reviews, newspaper articles and 
pamphlets. This took place in parallel with a comprehensive insti-
tutional change in the art scene of the Western world that saw an 
increasing number of galleries and magazines promoting radical 
modernist art to an ever-larger audience. At the same time, the 
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pioneers of the historical avant-garde were being appointed to po-
sitions at the leading art schools and academies in Europe and the 
US, whose students were now able to acquire knowledge about 
the theory and practice of the historical avant-garde first-hand.
An enormous and continually expanding amount of proposi-
tions and statements were being produced about modernism both 
past and present. This expansion can be described in both qual-
itative and quantitative terms, as exemplified in Diana Crane’s 
in-depth study of the New York art world of the period:
During the fifties and sixties, the New York art world could be de-
scribed as an extensive social network in which many participants 
performed more than one role: artists served as critics; critics as 
curators and vice versa; art editors as curators; curators as collec-
tors; and curators as trustees of museums and as backers of art 
galleries. Groups of artists were linked to groups of sponsors or 
“constituencies” whose members were able to obtain a sense of 
new developments and trends through their participation in this 
network.110
Many other critics and historians have described this complicated 
interplay of roles and the changing of roles within the art world as 
social networks, such as Irvin Sandler who, in American Art of the 
Sixties, characterises the New York art scene in terms of a number 
of coteries that functioned as distinct, although not per se closed, 
groups, each of which was defined by a specific orientation.111 
What is perhaps most interesting about such an analysis is that it 
points to a degree of mobility in the field that was both social and 
intellectual.
Although the jostling for position might lead to refinements of 
artistic style and aesthetic statement, these positions were far from 
as rigid as the posthumous categorisations of art history. The re-
sult of this flexible and complex system was that both the private 
and public sectors were able to play an active role in the economic 
make-up of the art world, as Diane Crane has shown:
Beginning in the middle sixties, federal and state governments, 
corporations and foundations began to give more support to the 
arts in general. For example, support for the arts by the National 
Endowment for the Arts, which was created in 1965, increased 
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from $1.8 million in 1966 to $131 million in 1983. Corporate 
spending increased from $22 million to $436 million. Support by 
all the state governments increased from $2.7 million in 1966 to 
$125 million in 1983, while foundation support increased from 
$38 million in 1966 to $349 million in 1982. Museums received 
the largest share of both corporate, federal and state funds.112
This economic expansion is, of course, only one index among 
many of a complicated process of institutionalisation in which the 
distribution of capital had not only a financial aspect but also ma-
jor social and symbolic dimensions. And although Crane provides 
a fairly stereotypical description of how the impact of this expan-
sion affected the establishment of different styles, she has a point 
in that idioms and aesthetic approaches can also be inscribed and 
analysed in this economic and social context. And, given this con-
text, the promotion, evaluation and interpretation of a particular 
artistic trend can never be considered innocuous or refer solely to 
a sphere of exclusively aesthetic considerations.
Although Diane Crane’s study reflects the circumstances of the 
American art world in the main, the model of unrivalled expan-
sion and of a complex pattern of interaction between the private 
and the public spheres can also be applied to Europe and other 
areas within the Western hemisphere. We can recognise a type of 
rhetoric at work here that we encountered earlier, one in which 
the regional, the arbitrary and the hierarchical have been embed-
ded in a notion of the universal. It is an idea whose origins clearly 
lie in a European (and Eurocentric) canon of aesthetic, ideologi-
cal and epistemological representations irrespective of how this 
canon would subsequently be transformed and expanded.
From the 1980s onwards in particular, this expansion has led 
to an increasingly evident globalisation of the art world. This has 
been portrayed on occasion as no more than the incorporation 
of new territories within that world, with its growing expansion 
into a worldwide network. But just as the promotion of a partic-
ular type of art cannot be described as an innocuous or purely 
aesthetic matter, neither should the globalisation of the art world 
be understood as an evolution of a flat (nonhierarchical) struc-
ture. As Charlotte Bydler has shown in The Global Art World, 
inc. (2004), the art world should be seen as both a horizontal 
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network and a hierarchical categorisation of various institutions 
and centres. A limited number of professional actors operate in 
this world who are able to set the agenda as a result of their ac-
cess to key institutions across a range of core nations and are, 
therefore, also able to define what is possible within the discourse; 
these actors shape the idea of the globalisation of art on the basis 
of institutions, languages and a history of European origin.113 The 
rhetoric surrounding the phenomenon of globalisation is reminis-
cent of that which underpinned ideas about modernisation, with 
the centrifugal motion outward from an inner nucleus leading to 
both the universal and the global being defined on the basis of 
a norm, a canon and an interpretive horizon, all of which orig-
inate in a particular geographic and historical position. And al-
though Bydler is describing the situation at the beginning of the 
twenty-first century, and even though this structure has become 
extraordinarily more complex and the ways of regulating and de-
fining the discourse of the order ever more subtle, and thus harder 
to analyse, mechanisms that were in operation in the European 
art world from the end of the nineteenth century can clearly be 
recognised.
The expansion under discussion here has, in any case, meant that 
a wealth of different styles, media and aesthetic approaches have 
been established and presented within key institutions. And yet it 
is also clear that the art world of Western Europe and America, 
until the end of the 1950s at least, was, as we have seen, character-
ised by a rather one-sided—not to say doctrinaire—interpretation 
of the meaning of modernism in aesthetic, medial and historio-
graphic terms. At a more overarching level, what normalisation 
means in this context is the establishment of an interpretive privi-
lege, such that the position of modern art shifted from being chal-
lenged to being possible and, ultimately, to constituting the only 
apparent possibility—the historically normal.
A key institution in this regard is the museum of modern and 
contemporary art. This type of museum was not an innovation 
purely of the twentieth century but can be traced back to the estab-
lishment of the Musée du Luxembourg by the French state in 1818, 
which served as an annex to the Musée du Louvre. The relation-
ship between these museums, known as the Louvre-Luxembourg 
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system, meant that works were deposited in the collections of the 
contemporary museum until the centenary of the artist’s birth had 
been reached, when they were either transferred to the central 
collection of the Louvre or, in the case of those works that were 
no longer considered of major significance, were sent to museums 
and institutions in the provinces.114 The flexibility of this system 
made it initially appear ideal for several of the twentieth century’s 
museums of modern art. However, it is precisely because this sys-
tem was not implemented that it is possible to refer to the modern 
museums that were set up in the middle of the twentieth century 
as constituting a new type of museum. This new museum com-
bined to some extent the functions of the Musée du Luxembourg 
and the Salon in nineteenth-century Paris, serving as a normative 
and sanctioned arena for contemporary art while establishing a 
similarly normative and sanctioned historical collection.
The international prototypes for this kind of museum were the 
Museum of Modern Art in New York (1929/1939) and the Musée 
National d’Art Moderne in Paris (1939/1947). The way these two 
institutions operated was, however, rather different. While the lat-
ter represented the continuity of the modern museums with the 
official art world of the nineteenth century as a result of its con-
servative, hierarchical and centralising approach, the unrivalled 
collections and the progressive and historically informed exhibi-
tion programme of the former meant that it would become the 
paradigm for the modern art museum as a new type of institution. 
The causes behind the emergence of this new type of museum 
could, of course, vary, ranging from a pragmatic realisation of the 
lack of scope for modern art in major art historical collections 
or a reactionary aspiration to be able to separate the great tradi-
tion from the decadence of the contemporary to a more aggressive 
pursuit of a specific site at which to present and study the art 
of the present and its history. This shift and the process of es-
tablishment may be understood in general terms as reflecting the 
institutional change introduced by modernity, as part of which, 
older institutions continued operating but with somewhat altered 
functions and a different basis of legitimation. There could thus 
be continuity between premodern and modern institutions, with 
the particular transformation of their significance and function 
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serving as an index of their new roles and grounds of legitimation. 
The expansion of modern art museums around the world after 
the Second World War meant that this type of institution not only 
assumed the normative functions of the Academy, but also helped 
to shape the understanding of modern art and its history to a 
considerable extent.
****
The creation of the museum for modern art involved the estab-
lishment not only of a new type of museum, but also of a partic-
ular narrative structure in the post-war public sphere that served 
as a normalised matrix for the interpretation of contemporary art 
and its recent history. The historical selection was defined with 
such a degree of specificity that the word modern combined a 
period of time (the twentieth century) with a particular aesthetic 
trend (modernism).115 In the modern epochal museum, a specific 
and all-inclusive historical interpretive matrix was devised and 
entrenched that every other form of representation had to relate 
to and be measured against: antimodernism, regional variants and 
deviations, postmodernism. A pattern of interaction between nar-
rative and institution emerges here that served as a code for the 
historically normal.
To assert that the modern museum formed a narrative specific 
to itself might seem to be a massive exaggeration, because a range 
of different narratives and interpretations were demonstrably in 
evidence in the post-war period: the Tate Gallery was not tell-
ing exactly the same story as the Museum of Modern Art, the 
Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum was not the same as the Musée 
National d’Art Moderne, the Stedelijk Museum was not the same 
as the Hamburger Kunsthalle, Moderna Museet was not the same 
as the Louisiana Museum for Moderne Kunst, and so on. And if 
the various survey works covering the art history of the twentieth 
century published from the mid-1950s onwards are also taken 
into account, then an even greater range of variation becomes 
evident.
But it is possible to refer to the existence of a common pat-
tern behind these variations, which can appear so self-evident 
and internalised it may be difficult to pick out. Carol Duncan has 
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described the uniformity of the selections and narratives of the 
modern museums, in Europe as well as in the USA, as a function 
of their task of presenting generally accepted values and forms of 
knowledge to the public.116 She distinguishes a hierarchy among 
different museums in this respect with the Museum of Modern 
Art providing the paradigm, not only in terms of the composi-
tion and presentation of its collection, but also in terms of the 
standard narrative of modernism. This narrative is not, however, 
presented solely by museums of modern art around the world, 
but also in various texts, articles, books and survey literature. It 
also provides the foundation for an oral mediation of the history 
of modern art in the teaching carried out in art schools and at 
university. There can be no disputing the fact that the standard 
narrative of modernism now serves as the normalised matrix for 
the understanding of modern art.
As the fundamental problem in this regard is the understand-
ing of the normal as a historically specific construction, one way 
forward would be to compare the normalised account with other 
narratives produced about twentieth-century art. The universal 
history of art might be compared, for example, with its regional 
and national variants. Or a comparison might be drawn, as James 
Elkins has done, between the narratives and selections presented 
by survey literature published in Western Europe and the US with 
their counterparts in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.117 One 
significant example is the nine-volume Soviet work Vseobsjtjaja 
istorija iskusstv (The Universal History of Art), which was pub-
lished by the Institute for the Theory and History of the Visual 
Arts at the Art Academy in Moscow in 1956.118 Both in terms of 
narrative and selection, the earlier parts resemble what has be-
come the standard version in the major surveys published in the 
West during the twentieth century, but a deviation starts to emerge 
in the seventh volume in the treatment of nineteenth-century art—
what are considered to be the origins of the modern period, that 
is. Instead of one great line emerging from the development of 
French art, the narrative is structured around various national 
schools, with the emphasis placed on Russia and Eastern Europe. 
It may, of course, be objected that Elkins exaggerates the unusual 
nature of this type of structure, which actually has historical 
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precedents and which is interesting precisely because it demon-
strates a kind of narrative that preceded the now-established evo-
lutionary progression from romanticism/realism to modernism.119 
The seventh volume describes the developments in art during the 
nineteenth century in the capitalist countries, structured according 
to national schools and applying an inclusive global perspective in 
which all the continents are represented, while the eighth and final 
volume deals with the corresponding developments in the socialist 
countries, with a considerable emphasis on the Soviet Union.
The historical account and the selection provided in Vseobsjtjaja 
istorija iskusstv not only portray a different twentieth century and 
a different modern art to the one presented by Western European 
and American survey works, they also reveal, as Elkins empha-
sises, an interesting structural agreement:
The gaps are complementary: “our” texts, nominally unbiased, 
are sometimes perfect casts of Eastern models. . . . The Russian 
“universal history” shows with uncanny exactitude how America’s 
apparently nonjudgmental survey texts are not only deeply biased 
towards the West (we knew that) but are in parts virtually capi-
talist manifestoes, excluding each and every one of the movements 
that the Russian text includes.120
The two different narratives thus provide a specialised example of 
the discursive logic of the Cold War: an art-historical microcosm 
that is more or less directly related to the macrocosmic structures 
of the official ideologies. But Elkins misses a crucial aspect when 
describing these two opposed but complementary structures: 
the Soviet survey work actually devotes a whole volume of over 
900 pages to capitalist art. This is an inclusive approach almost 
 entirely absent from the Western European and American surveys, 
and one is forced to ask oneself why that should be the case. The 
answer obviously has nothing to do with a greater willingness 
on the part of the post-Stalinist regime to permit the publication 
of alternative opinions in the public sphere. It should be remem-
bered that this project was launched by the Soviet art academy at 
a time when all the bodies representing the art world had been 
centralised in a rigid hierarchical structure under the direct con-
trol of the Party, so it can hardly be a question of a mistake or of a 
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particular volume managing to slip through the net of the censor 
without the authorities reacting. Vseobsjtjaja istorija iskusstv rep-
resented the official view of the history of art in a way that was 
quite different from any corresponding work or collection in the 
West. So why then was the enemy included in this picture?
One possible answer could be drawn from what has been said 
previously in this study. As we have seen, the normalisation of 
modernism in the US and parts of Western Europe was dependant 
on the putatively nonpolitical function of art, which meant that 
the deideologisation of the avant-garde was essential if it was to 
be used for ideological ends; this was made possible by the appli-
cation of what I have called the model of indirect and symbolic 
interpretation. This allowed for an interpretation of the visual 
arts that was simultaneously cultural and countercultural, with 
the result that certain fundamental tropes—freedom, individual-
ity, authenticity, modernity, universality—could be used for the 
legitimation of radical art by both camps. The situation in the 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe was the exact opposite. One of 
the basic principles of Socialist Realism was that the visual arts 
were subordinate to the control of the party and they formed part 
of the fabric of the Socialist state. The function of art was clear: 
every representation could and had to be interpreted on the ba-
sis of an explicit political context (the doctrine of realistic form 
and socialist content). And because the dialectic of materialism 
formed the scientific foundation of this approach, a particular 
synthesis had to be formulated in relation to any given antithesis. 
This led to a narrative structure that is entirely different from 
that of the West, with triumphing over its antithesis (capitalism) 
providing the immanent driving force of history, although in so 
doing it necessarily demonstrates the existence of its antithesis in 
the historiography of art as well (modernism).
And yet the dialectic is more complicated than that. For if one 
surveys the selection of images in the volume dealing with the art 
of the capitalist countries, one finds reproduced both a familiar 
modernist canon and a different image that affords considerable 
scope for a more socially critical, realistic and, possibly Socialist, 
art. Although Jackson Pollock, Mark Tobey, Robert Motherwell 
and Franz Kline appear in the chapter on art and architecture 
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in the US, Abstract Expressionism does not exactly dominate the 
presentation; it gets seven lines in a chapter of just over thirty 
pages. What does dominate is the Social Realism of the interwar 
years and artists such as George Bellows, Kent Rockwell, Robert 
Minor, William Gropper, Andrew Wyeth, Alton Pickens and Ben 
Shan. The text starts by drawing a distinction between two trends 
in American society that are mutually opposed: the democratic 
humanism of progressive realism is set against the official, reac-
tionary, ‘late-bourgeois’ culture of decadence.121 This distinction 
provides the matrix on which the interpretation of every artistic 
and architectural creation is then based. As part of this scheme, 
Abstract Expressionism inevitably falls within the latter category 
as the style that embodies those artist-charlatans who shamelessly, 
and quite literally, are making a fast buck out of the sensation- 
seeking American public. Although artists such as Pollock and 
Kline are concerned with developing the appearance of existential 
and authentic expression in their work, this does not reflect any-
thing real in practice, apart from the decline of bourgeois culture.122
The rhetoric of this presentation makes two antithetical 
 positions—one of which is rejected—admirably clear, but it also 
identifies a trend of critical, popular and progressive culture 
within the stronghold of capitalism that may represent a potential 
for revolutionary change among the peoples of capitalist coun-
tries. The volume on capitalist art does not constitute an end in 
itself as part of the historical presentation but fulfils its particular 
function only when considered in relation to the concluding vol-
ume on Socialist art. The latter volume’s appendix of illustrations 
ends with a lithograph from Cuba portraying the people’s militia 
on the march; this individual portrayal could be interpreted in the 
light of the larger image mediated by the work as a whole of the 
triumphal march of Socialist Realism into the future.
So what do these parallel historical narratives tell us that we did 
not already know: that two different ideological systems produced 
apparently incompatible narratives at a particular time? What the 
comparison sheds light on in particular are their respective ideo-
logical and rhetorical starting points, the structures, tropes, tech-
niques and narrativesthat are presented in each account as the 
historically normal and have been concealed to a greater or lesser 
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extent. This applies especially to the putatively open, impartial 
and universal criteria of the Western form of historiography, in 
which the notion of modernism as modern art is a premise that 
has been taken for granted rather than an evaluation. Moreover, 
a form of historiography is involved in both cases that has had 
an enormous influence on assumptions about the present. This is 
particularly true of the modern museums—both the Eastern and 
Western varieties—which have become the key institution for the 
intersection of history’s diachronic line with the synchronous field 
of the contemporary period.
The place where these movements come together is not an in-
nocuous position, for this is the very point where the struggle for 
interpretive privilege is waged unceasingly both by history and the 
present. It is also at this point that the issue of which historical 
image is produced becomes decisive in determining what form of 
contemporary art is legitimate and possible. Here, interpretation 
is not so much a matter of a number of individual statements 
based on different personal preferences, but rather a pattern for 
what may be legitimately formulated as part of the discourse.
Alfred Barr’s Diagram
The narrative pattern of modernism could be likened to a ma-
trix for legitimate statements that extends both beyond and be-
low individual narratives and constitutes their tacit foundation. 
Although this kind of proposition is all well and good at a suf-
ficiently abstract level, the issue here is its implications in more 
concrete terms. Instead of setting out a wealth of different exam-
ples drawn from exhibitions, catalogues, survey works, special-
ist studies and monographs from Western Europe and the US, I 
propose to concentrate on a single one: the exhibition Cubism 
and Abstract Art held at the Museum of Modern Art in New 
York in 1936 and Alfred Barr’ schematic rendering of the devel-
opment of abstract art that was published on the front cover of 
the  catalogue.
The exhibition comprised over 400 works in various media 
that filled all four storeys of the museum’s then temporary prem-
ises on 53rd Street: painting, sculpture, photography, architecture, 
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furniture, posters, stage sets, typography and film. Most of the 
space was, however, given over to painting and sculpture, with 
the greater part of these works being made up of loans from 
European collections. Cubism and Abstract Art formed part of an 
ambitious attempt by Alfred Barr to chart and present the history 
of modern art up to the present day; it was followed somewhat 
later by a companion exhibition Fantastic Art, Dada, Surrealism 
(1936–37).123 These exhibitions not only provided two of the most 
comprehensive surveys of the various movements and history of 
modernism, but also came to be seen after the Second World War 
as a paradigmatic formulation of modern art.124
One of the factors contributing to their importance was they 
made no attempt to avoid the radical and potentially subversive 
aspects of modernism. They presented what was at that time a 
clearly defined picture of the trends considered significant, even 
though Barr expressly stated that the aim was to present a histor-
ical study in ‘a retrospective’ rather than ‘a controversial spirit’.125 
However, taken together, the exhibitions created a public and 
critical commotion that laid bare the existence of a yawning gulf 
between the avant-garde and the US public of the period, and it 
also contributed in no small measure to the proliferation of myths 
surrounding ‘misunderstood modernism’.126 Although it may not 
have been the first or the largest of its kind, what made Cubism 
and Abstract Art such a special exhibition was its character of an 
art-historical genealogy in which history was placed in an active 
relationship with the present. This difference also emerges from 
a comparison with Les Maîtres de l’Art Indépendant at the 1937 
Paris World Fair. Where the French exhibition focused on a num-
ber of significant individuals, in Cubism and Abstract Art, the in-
dividual was subordinated to the historical process. The concept 
was made abundantly clear by the cover of the catalogue, which 
was adorned with Alfred Barr’s controversial diagram of the de-
velopment of abstract art.
This image had a decisive influence on the way the history of 
modern art has been viewed in the post-war period and proved 
far more influential than the exhibition itself—or any other ex-
hibition,for that matter. Its significance lies not in its didactic 
aim of providing the public with an introduction to the course of 
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art history, but rather in the way it formulates a developmental 
logic of the history of modernism in more general terms. Sibyl 
Gordon Kantor’s meticulous biography of Alfred Barr reveals 
that he had two crucial qualifications for producing this diagram. 
He had been thoroughly schooled in art history at Harvard and 
Princeton, where, through his teacher and mentor Charles Rufus 
Morey, he became acquainted with what was at the time the most 
advanced research in formalism, in the work of Alois Riegl and 
Heinrich Wölfflin in particular.127 As part of his preparations for 
his dissertation, he set off on an extensive European study trip in 
1927–28 that took him to London, Amsterdam, Dessau, Berlin, 
Moscow, Paris and other places. There, Barr came in contact 
with some of the leading and most progressive representatives of 
European modernism, especially at the Bauhaus and its Russian 
counterpart VKhUTEMAS. This allowed him to acquire a rather 
unusually comprehensive grasp of the range and radicalism of 
modernism, not only in the visual arts and architecture, but also 
in other media. As a result, the idea of modernism as a coherent, 
supra-individual and transnational epochal style would be of cru-
cial importance for Barr.128 And it was this synthesis of first-hand 
information and historical analysis that served as the bedrock of 
the exhibition and which gave Barr’s notion of (modernism as) 
modern art such a wide-ranging and enduring import. For this 
flow-chart of the development of abstract art, with its various 
interconnections, interrelationships and influences, also provided 
a formulation of the main direction of modern art: an evolution 
towards an ever purer and increasingly visual (medium-specific, 
self-reflexive) idiom.
The starting-point for the diagram was specific and, at that 
point, controversial: the Post-impressionism of the late nineteenth 
century, with the emphasis on Cézanne, Gauguin, van Gogh and 
Seurat.129 Also displayed in the diagram are five rectangles of de-
velopmental influences outside the self-enclosed universe of the vi-
sual arts of the Western world that may be brought together under 
the headings of primitivism (Japanese prints, the art of the Middle 
East and ‘negro sculpture’) and modernity (the machine aesthetic 
and modern architecture).130 The rectangles are differentiated 
graphically from the structure of the diagram, and their contents 
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appear as isolated monads of underlying influences; whereas, the 
various stylistic movements are bounded by open semi-circles, 
which suggest that they constitute distinct but integrated compo-
nents of the system as an organic whole. Apart from the abstract 
effects of the rectangles, the development appears to be a perfectly 
isolated evolutionary sequence in which a veritable hodgepodge 
of movements and trends pours out of the sources of Syntheticism 
and Post-impressionism. Cubism occupies a central place, indi-
cated by the size of the font, and leads on to the trends, which 
form geometrical abstract art. To the left of the main Cubist chan-
nel, all the influences of the late nineteenth century run together 
into Fauvism, which in turn leads on to an alternative line to-
wards nongeometrical abstract art. Barr himself emphasised that 
the two strains making up contemporary abstract art (the biomor-
phic and the geometric) were refinements of the late  nineteenth 
century trends towards subjectivism (van Gogh, Gauguin) and 
objectivism (Cézanne, Seurat), respectively.131 This allows one to 
detect a further level of abstraction in the diagram, consisting of 
two ideal straight lines below the confusion of various individual 
movements and styles. As Michael Auping has insightfully pointed 
out, this systematic approach appears to be a mirror image of the 
two tendencies in human consciousness, localised in the left and 
right hemispheres, respectively, of the brain: emotional creativity 
and rational logic.132
The diagram can be difficult to analyse today because it seems 
so familiar. Few who have taken a foundation course in art history 
or read a handbook on twentieth-century art can have avoided 
having this diagram and its underlying tropes imprinted on their 
awareness: the main movements, the various influences and inter-
relationships, the autonomy and inherent essentialism of the de-
velopmental process, creative originality its ultimate driving force. 
And yet it was a historical accident that made Barr’s diagram so 
applicable and, therefore, so significant: its description of two dif-
ferent trends towards abstraction appears to be an almost pro-
phetic account of the post-war situation and the issues it faced.
A somewhat peculiar aspect of the selection of the diagram, 
which may not appear obvious at first, is that Barr chose to in-
clude so many movements in the process instead of refining it by 
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highlighting one or two significant strains (the route, for exam-
ple, from Cubism through Orphism, Purism, Supremacism and 
Constructivism to the then contemporary Concrete Art). What he 
formulated instead was the pursuit of abstraction as an underlying 
impulse—a Kunstwollen, as it were—in modern art that, like the 
preoccupation of the Florentine Renaissance with the doctrines 
of perspective and proportion, was manifested everywhere and 
had occurred time after time.133 This pursuit emerged as an es-
sential form of expression that lay behind modernism’s medley of 
movements, practices and idioms. At the same time, the thematic 
approach of the exhibition became a means of charting, charac-
terising and presenting modernism as a whole to the American 
public. In this respect, the diagram served as a blueprint, or a 
concealed matrix, not just for the development of abstract art, but 
also for the understanding of modern art as a whole.134
Barr himself could hardly be said to possess any exclusive 
copyright to this narrative or its fundamental criteria. The major 
significance of the diagram lies rather in the way it codifies and 
systematises theoretical propositions and identities that were pro-
duced by the historical avant-garde. It bears comparison with the 
curious text published in 1925 by El Lissitsky and Hans Arp un-
der the title Die Kunstismen 1924–1914. This was not a historical 
survey in the accepted sense but a selection of movements, artists, 
quotations and images that began in the contemporary period and 
led backwards, while a line was simultaneously being drawn in 
graphic terms from 1924 into the future where a question mark 
was waiting.135 The aim of bringing together the historical and 
the contemporary at a rhetorical question mark about the future 
course of modern art could be interpreted as providing a form 
of guidance for the general public, as a historical legitimation 
of contemporary radical art and as the creation of a genealogy 
within avant-garde discourse. The book also clearly demonstrates 
the level of historical awareness to be found in the avant-garde 
at this time and how the variety of -isms could be presented in a 
chronological sequence in order to distinguish a general develop-
ment that transcended individual styles. While Barr, for his part, 
does not deviate noticeably from this catalogue of -isms and, in-
deed, formulates what is in many respects the same image of the 
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situation of modern art, he does so not as an artist or critic but as 
an art historian.136 It is here, too, that a major difference lies, spe-
cifically in an institutional context: where El Lissitzky and Hans 
Arp were attempting to formulate a historical context within and 
for avant-garde discourse as a private initiative, Barr was speaking 
from his position as the head of a public art museum. His proposi-
tion was inscribed, in other words, as a legitimate representation 
in the context constituted by the official exhibitionary complex.
There is an additional similarity between Barr’s diagram and 
Die Kunstismen that is crucial: they both make generalisations 
that transcend the national and the culturally specific. Although 
the nationalities of the artists were indicated in the catalogue to 
Cubism and Abstract Art, this information had no bearing on the 
image of a universal development that the diagram presented. To 
this end, movements and artists with a more local impact were 
excluded, as were works that were created before or after those 
deemed of significance to the major evolutionary line.137 Barr was 
not, however, describing a determinist development; instead, ev-
ery artist was faced with a choice: whether he or she wanted to 
be part of the progressive, forward movement of the modern era 
or to stand outside it.138 Evident here are the two diverse and 
paradoxically interacting interpretive matrices referred to in rela-
tion to the historiography of documenta held in Kassel in 1955: 
the understanding of the development of modern art as both a 
supra-individual, essentialist process and a narrative about the 
autonomous efficacy and capacity for reflection of the individual 
in modern society. These two narrative structures might appear 
essentially opposed to one another, but it is in fact more a matter 
of the one determining the other. While the development of mod-
ern art could be understood as supra-individual, it was dependent 
on the choice of the individual, because as we all know, there are 
different kinds of choices, heroic as well as cowardly ones. In 
the political context of the post-war period, the individual artist 
could, as we have seen, be presented as a symbolic representative 
of the free man, the corollary being that the very existence of a 
real freedom of choice—and the creative action of the individ-
ual in this situation—was the factor that led art (and society) 
forward.
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To refer in this instance to a range of different narratives and 
tropes, or like Carol Duncan to distinguish a standard modernist 
narrative, would be to miss the point to some extent.139 For it 
is possible, in my view, to distinguish a more fundamental pat-
tern that links together the various normative attributes and the 
individual narratives; this pattern establishes the standard, so to 
speak, behind the standard narrative. This pattern involves a nar-
rative of the art world and history that is not primarily concerned 
with the experiences and statements of the individual, but it pro-
vides instead an underlying matrix that defines the parameters 
for the possible within every particular interpretation. While the 
pattern under discussion takes the form of a narrative, it functions 
rather as a metanarrative.140
****
The normalisation of the modernist metanarrative could be de-
scribed in terms of a number of stages, in which the typical (mod-
ernism as a vital movement in the discourse) becomes presented 
over time as the ideal type (modernism defines the discourse), only 
to be transformed a few years later into an archetypal assumption 
(modernism’s definition of the discourse as an underlying presup-
position). As an archetype, this notion remains below the surface; 
it need not be legitimated and explained in terms of its historical 
premises but has become instead a self-evident premise on which 
to base the understanding of the visual culture of modernity. And 
it is as an archetype that the notion of the modernity of modern-
ism is also introduced at this point as a self-evident premise in the 
interpretation of modern art: modernism is no longer just a crucial 
part of the visual culture of modernity, modernism is the modern.
This change brought with it both an expansion and restriction 
of the field and range of avant-garde visual culture. A key trope, 
formulated in various ways in the programmes of movements such 
as Bauhaus, De Stijl and VKhUTEMAS, was that the visual arts 
have to be abandoned as an autonomous value sphere in favour 
of an all-inclusive and socially integrated environmental design. 
In Painting as Model (1990), Yve-Alain Bois has interpreted these 
efforts in relation to the view of history taken by the modernist 
movements, and by De Stijl in particular:
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De Stijl was a typically modernist movement, whose theory was 
grounded on those two ideological pillars of modernism, histor-
icism and essentialism. On historicism, because on the one hand 
De Stijl conceived of its production as the logical culmination 
of the art of the past, and on the other because it prophesied in 
 quasi-Hegelian terms the inevitable dissolution of art into an 
all-encompassing sphere (“life” or “the environment”). On essen-
tialism, because the motor of this slow historical process was an 
ontological quest: each art was to “realize” its own “nature” by 
purging itself of everything that was not specific to it, by revealing 
its materials and codes, and in doing so by working toward the 
institution of a “universal plastic language”. None of this was par-
ticularly original, although De Stijl’s formulation of this modernist 
theory developed quite early on.141
These two pillars also serve as the basis of Barr’s programme—
both for the exhibition Cubism and Abstract Art and for MoMA 
as an institution—as evidenced in its inclusive approach, in which 
a wealth of different media were represented, and its formalist 
focus on, and understanding of, the development of the various 
media as linear and autonomous processes. Barr had learnt the 
lesson of Bauhaus in this regard: every medium has to be devel-
oped according to its particular characteristics, while all media 
start from the same basic course in the aesthetics of form. And yet 
this is also the very point at which the disparate clusters of forms 
and movements of the historical avant-garde are circumscribed, 
classified and legitimated as modern art—and by extension as 
modernism. The open-ended question mark of the fragmentary 
image is being transformed into the definitive full stop of the his-
toricising system.
Barr’s diagram should not, however, be seen as the absolute ori-
gin of the historiography of the post-war period. Instead, through 
its codification and systematisation of certain aspects of the the-
ory, practice and historiography of the historical avant-garde, it 
provides a condensed and explanatory image of how the history 
of modern art can be written. Its entrenchment in the identity of 
the avant-garde is of crucial importance in this regard, because 
it was the actors of the art world itself who wrote the history of 
modern art after the war. Moreover, the diagram does not simply 
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constitute a specific image or narrative but should be considered 
rather as a manifestation of a particular discursive order. In this 
regard, it needs to be read in relation to the purely physical pre-
sentation and staging of the modernist programme by the mod-
ern museums after the Second World War. This staging not only 
involved the placing of artefacts of different kinds in an alien 
context, but also the recoding and incorporation of artefacts as 
material and discursive objects within the specific sign system of 
the modern art museum: the white cube.
In The Power of Display (1998), Mary Anne Staniszewski has 
convincingly described how revolutionary Barr’s exhibition praxis 
actually was; this may be difficult to understand today because it 
has set the pattern for the normal to such a considerable extent. 
He abandoned the remaining vestiges of the Salon-hang with its 
tightly-packed collections of pictures and placed each work at eye 
level against a neutral background, with the works being hung in 
chronological sequences that emphasised their individuality and 
unicity, while also situating them in an overarching ahistorical and 
timeless unity.142 The point is not, however, as Staniszewski main-
tains, that this exhibition aesthetic constitutes a decontextualisa-
tion but rather that it introduced a recontextualisation through 
the creation of a new set of relationships in which the unique 
visual and aesthetic qualities of the work were emphasised while 
the object was simultaneously liberated from its historic, cultural 
and medial connotations. In ‘Inside the White Cube’ (1976), Brian 
O’Doherty describes how the modern exhibition space also con-
stitutes not only part of the modernist aesthetic, but also of its 
particular ways of reading and its historiography:
The history of modernism is intimately framed by that space; or 
rather the history of modern art can be correlated with changes in 
that space and in the way we see it. We have now reached a point 
where we see not the art but the space first. . . . An image comes 
to mind of a white, ideal space that, more than any single picture, 
may be the archetypical image of twentieth century art; it clarifies 
itself through a process of historical inevitability usually attached 
to the art it contains. . . . The work is isolated from everything 
that would detract from its own evaluation of itself. This gives the 
space a presence possessed by other spaces where conventions are 
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preserved through a closed system of values. Some of the sanctity 
of the church, the formality of the courtroom, the mystique of 
the experimental laboratory joins with chic design to produce a 
unique chamber of esthetics.143
The objection I would make to one aspect of Doherty’s account is 
that what is peculiar to the white cube is not that it appears ob-
vious to an observer but that it demonstrates a remarkable com-
bination of being entirely visible and completely invisible at the 
same time. However, the crucial point is his identification of this 
apparently neutral space as a primary discursive technology for 
the constitution of meaning and value. The white cube serves at 
one and the same time as the material and immaterial surface of 
the modernist institution: the space in which the possible trans-
formations of the art world occur and are legitimated and where 
the parameters for the interpretation of contemporary art are 
determined.144
In this sense, the white cube could be said to constitute the 
fundamental parergon of the modernist aesthetic: an aspect of the 
discursive order that is both invisible and fully observable and 
which, to the extent that it is detected at all, can be construed 
from the structure of the space and the forms of presentation. 
This bears comparison with Michel Foucault’s description of the 
way rooms in eighteenth century schools were structured as ‘the 
internal discourse of the institution’, the ideas, that is, about chil-
dren’s sexuality that lay behind the particular differentiation of 
spaces and functions.145 And yet the white cube and the modern 
museum, as the institutionalised spaces of modernism, amount to 
something other and something more than a mere differentiation 
of function. They provide, as Brian O’Doherty maintains, a frame 
for the interpretation of historical and contemporary art.
One obvious example is the way in which different media were 
incorporated in the exhibition on Cubism and Abstract Art; de-
spite the use of informative texts and documentary photographs, 
all the images, texts and objects were fully integrated within the 
aestheticising and evolutionist matrix of the diagram.146 The price 
for being able to include such a broad spectrum of different media 
in the collections of MoMA was that every object, irrespective 
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of its genre or original function, was selected and interpreted on 
the basis of the same template: aesthetic artefacts in the neutral 
white cube of the museum. As Douglas Crisp points out in On the 
Museum’s Ruins (1993), this did not just mean that revolutionis-
ing or revolutionary movements in the history of modernism were 
tamed, but that what were in medial terms cross-boundary proj-
ects, such as those of Soviet Constructivism and German Dadaism, 
whose various experiments with montage, live performances, new 
sculptural materials, product design and spatial installations were 
intended to transcend the conventions of the traditional con-
cept of art, were fitted into and classified in the separate medial 
compartments they had been attempting to demolish: painting, 
sculpture, photography, design and architecture.147 Here, the once 
so revolutionary idea of a visual culture that participates in the 
social and political transformation of modern life—transcending 
the medial and aesthetic boundaries of bourgeois society—is neu-
tralised and adapted to an autonomous abstract order, beyond the 
reach of the turbulence of the political and social world and its 
occasionally violent upheavals.
The relationship between modernism and modernity was not 
a means in this instance to situate the artefact in its historical 
context or to provide a stimulus to critical analysis of the institu-
tionalised order of the different media; it formed a tacit precondi-
tion for the authenticity of modern art. This could be considered 
perhaps the most radical and definitely the most significant in-
novation of the formalist aesthetic. During the first half of the 
twentieth century, formalism developed from one of the leading 
ideas of studio discussion and the discourses of art education into 
an essential, although never dominant, tendency in the discourses 
of the artistic manifesto and of art criticism,and, ultimately, from 
the 1930s onwards, into a key starting point for the presentation 
and interpretation of historical and contemporary modern art in 
the modern museum. The modernist metanarrative thus emerges 
from, and transforms, perceptions, identities, theories and forms 
of legitimation that became established in the discourse of the 
avant-garde but is, as a result of its institutional base, far more 
wide-ranging and authoritative than the individual representa-
tions of that discourse. For unlike the narrative structure set up 
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by the formation of an individual or professional identity, the 
metanarrative operates primarily in historiography, without it-
self becoming the object of historical study, with various individ-
ual statements being woven together while being simultaneously 
adapted to an overarching interpretive matrix.
Such underlying patterns can no doubt be discerned in all kinds 
of narratives and statements. The existence of metanarratives 
need not be understood as something suspect or conspiratorial. 
There is, however, one aspect of this underlying interpretive ma-
trix that is extremely problematic, and that is its invisibility. It is 
actively at work in the writing of history but presented as natural. 
In this sense, the modernist metanarrative calls to mind Roland 
Barthes’ definition of myth as a secondary semiological system (a 
metalanguage), which begins at the point an already extant lin-
guistic meaning comes to an end.148 The myth is, in other words, a 
distinct narrative form that, irrespective of substance and content, 
constitutes a certain way of reading and produces a particular 
kind of understanding:
Myth does not deny things, on the contrary, its function is to talk 
about them; simply, it purifies them, it makes them innocent, it 
gives them a natural and eternal justification, it gives them clarity 
which is not that of an explanation but that of a statement of 
fact. . . . In passing from history to nature, myth acts economi-
cally: it abolishes the complexity of human acts, it gives them the 
simplicity of essences, it does away with all dialectics, with any 
going back beyond what is immediately visible, it organizes the 
world which is without contradictions because it is without depth, 
a world wide open and wallowing in the evident, it establishes a 
blissful clarity: things appear to mean something by themselves.149
Myth thus creates an understanding based on a particular pre-
understanding, but nevertheless it transcends this by excluding 
part of the meaning and by transforming a historically specific 
import into a statement of a universal kind, presenting the his-
torically specific as the natural, that is. An obvious example is 
the white cube, which parades itself quite openly in public while 
nevertheless remaining hidden by its putatively neutral and innoc-
uous universality. Its existence has to be pointed out if the viewer 
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is to discover what has been right in front of him or her the whole 
time as an unquestioned and natural background to the exhibi-
tion. And its existence has to be problematised and historicised 
in order to understand that this neutrality is actually permeated 
by aesthetic, social and ideological norms: a metanarrative that 
defines the discursive order in which every single object acquires 
its legitimacy and meaning.
The metanarrative cannot, of course, be compared with myths 
in the general sense, even though a set of myths has been produced 
within its field (about artists, art works, creativity, presence, origi-
nality, alienation, the transgression of boundaries). But unlike the 
retrospective nature of myth, the metanarrative points forward 
and should therefore be understood as both an ideological and an 
epistemological narrative, a formulation of the world that encom-
passes a range of different ideas and representations but produces 
a specific order whose evaluations and selections are presented as 
self-evident, neutral and universal and which actively excludes or 
obscures competing forms of thought.150 In this regard, it func-
tions as an underlying framework that is taken for granted rather 
than as an explicitly articulated norm.
Like Fredric Jameson, one could interpret modernism as a pe-
riodising category whose metanarrative serves as a spectral and 
allegorical subtext that incorporates the individual work and de-
termines the parameters for its possible meanings.151 We are faced 
here with a reflexive relationship that is both the end of its own 
teleological explanation and yet remains open-ended towards the 
objects that can be included, with the selection serving as the sub-
text and the subtext representing a narrative about the telos of 
progress and history. A context is thus established in which the 
fragmentary and contradictory elements of history are integrated 
within a coherent and unified system. This discursive system is 
manifested both by the neutral exhibition space and the linear 
narrative, and it defines a specific course through modern art that 
leaves no room for question marks or alternative routes.
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Gropius wrote a book on grain silos,
Le Corbusier one on aeroplanes,
And Charlotte Periand brought a new object to the  
office every morning;
But today we collect ads.1
Alison Smithson and Peter Smithson, 
‘But Today We Collect Ads’ (1956)
[T]he work itself functions as a general sign and it is normal that 
it should represent an institutional category of the civilization of 
the Sign. The Text, on the contrary, practices the infinite deferment 
of the signified, is dilatory; its field is that of the signifier and the 
signifier must not be conceived of as ‘the first stage of meaning’, 
its material vestibule, but, in complete opposition to this, as its 
deferred action. Similarly, the infinity of the signifier refers not to 
some idea of the ineffable (the unnamed signified) but to that of a 
playing. . .’2
Roland Barthes, ‘From Work to Text’ (1971)
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Realities Around and Underneath the Sign
Approaches in Post-war Visual Cultures
A photograph of a television set in a fastidiously furnished 
room—the image is a 1958 advertising poster for Philips, show-
ing an interior whose furnishings and subdued colours evoke an 
unmistakable sense of the fifties.
The selection of paints and materials in shades of blue and grey 
contrasting with light-coloured wood and black metal seems both 
carefully coordinated and in tune with the times. The light shines 
at an angle from behind, as if thrown by a ceiling lamp. Like every 
other advertising image, the primary function is to sell a product. 
At the heart of the image is a television set. Its centrality is em-
phasised by the way the restricted depth of field places the focus 
on the set, while making the room and foreground appear more 
diffuse. The sharpness of the television picture, a rather crucial 
part of the sales pitch, tells us that this is a photomontage. A game 
of football is being played. The dramatic quality of the image on 
the screen (will it be a goal?) is clearly being contrasted with the 
cosiness and emptiness of the domestic setting (come in and sit 
yourself down). And unmistakable is perhaps the most astonish-
ing function of the new medium: you can watch the whole world 
from your living room—if you buy a television.
This image may not seem particularly radical in design terms 
when compared with many other examples of late 1950s adver-
tising, but that does not mean it lacks interest. It depicts what 
was, at the time, an extremely modern home with cutting edge 
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Figure 7. Advertising poster for Philips TV, 1958, Photo and copyright: The 
National Library of Sweden, License: CC BY-NC-ND.
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technology blending seamlessly into the everyday environment. 
No longer concealed in a bulky cupboard with shutters, a model 
that was still available, the television set—a trim, modern piece 
of furniture in wood and steel—demonstrates its function for all 
to see. The home is fairly anonymous, without any distinct social 
markers: it is the home of anyone and everyone who wants to 
keep in step with the contemporary world. It is not only the do-
mestic setting that is modern, but also the rhetoric of the advert.
The text fills a vital function in this image. It is written in the 
same font as the Philips logo. The message is worded as a per-
sonal address, stressing notions of home and freedom of choice, 
in addition to the trademark. The function of the text could be 
described as providing an anchorage of the image, to use Roland 
Barthes’ term: it defines the genre of the image and identifies its 
component parts; it indicates how it should be read and the cor-
rect level for interpretation. Considered as a whole, however, the 
rhetoric of the image amounts to something considerably more 
powerful. Instead of stating explicitly ‘Buy Philips TV’, the tacit 
message is woven into a complex totality of different visual and 
verbal codes, within which the indirect but personal form of ad-
dress plays a key role. What is being offered is not just the chance 
to buy a particular television set, but also the chance to acquire a 
modern lifestyle, the underlying message being that the product is 
an integral part of that acquisition. An interlinked chain of con-
notations permeates the image: modernity, topicality, technology, 
cleanness, security, hygiene, light, living standards. This chain of 
connotations is entirely consistent with the values that character-
ised the normative structure of post-war European society, with 
the addition that this particular value (Philips television) is not 
automatically provided but has to be bought in store. The rhetoric 
is based around the offer of an opportunity and a choice: this may 
not be what your home looks like, but it could be. The modernity 
of the rhetoric lies in that it not only wants to persuade viewers 
to buy a particular product, but also it also aims to get them to 
convince themselves of the necessity of purchasing it.
As a reflection of a characteristic 1950s home, the advert is 
somewhat deceptive: this is not what most people’s homes ac-
tually looked like. But one of the most important functions of 
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advertising is not to reproduce (passively) already-existing norms 
and ideas but (actively) to influence and change them to some 
extent, to generate positive values around a product.3 Modernity 
is being promoted here as a sales pitch, linking new technology 
with modern furnishings and, implicitly, with modern living stan-
dards. Although the advertisement creates a distorted picture of 
the domestic setting typical of the period, the gulf between his-
torical reality and the heightened setting also makes visible a key 
function of the message of the image: the reproduction of an ideal. 
Here, the modern is not being portrayed as a utopia of advanced 
technology but instead as a cosy reality, as a blend of modernity 
and normality.
A number of different perspectives on the modernity of the 
post-war period converge in this image. The most obvious is the 
increased importance of technology, although the issue here is not 
technological discoveries and innovations as such but their intro-
duction and effect within and upon broader strata of the popu-
lation. A stabilised and steadily growing economy was leading to 
higher living standards and creating ever-greater scope for private 
consumption; this allowed both older and more recent innova-
tions to be made available to larger and larger swathes of the 
population. As a result of the growth in demand, there was an 
expansion of supply and increasing competition, both of which 
were evident in almost every sector of the economy. Technology 
should be interpreted here in relation to a larger social, economic 
and political context, as clearly exemplified in the rapid diffusion 
of television through post-war society and the enormous impact 
it made.4 Seen from a different perspective, this also involved a 
change in the nature of the news and advertising media. Here, 
the advertising image reflects both developments in photography 
(colour images) and improved reproduction techniques and the 
breakthrough of the televisual medium and the increasing impor-
tance of advertising.
These developments did not distinguish the post-war period 
from the early history of modernism in any fundamental sense. 
From the beginning of industrialism, various forms of pictorial 
codes and representations aimed at a broad audience had emerged 
in which technological innovations combined with new social and 
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cultural patterns to change visual communication in a compre-
hensive manner. But the process occurred significantly more rap-
idly during the 1950s, and its impact on the individual appeared 
much greater as a result. This was a quantitative change that also 
entailed a qualitative one when considered as a whole. The vi-
sual landscape was transformed not only by new buildings, but 
also by illuminations, shop windows, advertising, logos, symbols 
and posters. Various forms of advertising acquired greater impor-
tance as a result, as did the design of goods and packaging. These 
changes not only introduced more advanced forms of commu-
nication between originator and recipient, but also they meant 
that the functional and exchange values of goods coalesced to a 
greater extent with their ‘sign value’.5 The expansion of the media 
altered the way images were used in both the public and private 
spheres, and this created in turn new patterns of consumption and 
communication.
The interconnections between technology, economics, ideol-
ogy and visual culture appear to be obvious here. Indeed, during 
the 1960s and 1970s, cultural critics and various academic disci-
plines increasingly focused their attention on the comprehensive 
nature of this change. One key example is the characterisation 
by Marshall McLuhan of the media as ‘extensions of Man’—the 
notion that the technological revolution within the media was of 
crucial significance for the way human beings perceive both them-
selves and the world around them, and this applied to television 
in particular: ‘What electric implosion or contraction has done 
inter-personally and inter-nationally, the TV image does intra- 
personally and intra-sensuously’.6 This example provides a potent 
demonstration of McLuhan’s thesis on the reciprocal relationship 
of technology and society: when a new technology emerges in a 
particular society, it also contributes to defining that society irre-
spective of whether the technology is print or television.
McLuhan’s inspired formulation of this relationship was also 
interpreted more critically, as for example by Hans Magnus 
Enzensberger, who described the interconnections between tech-
nology, economics, ideology and culture with the term ‘the con-
sciousness industry’.7 According to Enzensberger, the explosive 
development of this industry after the Second World War could be 
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seen as a new phase following from the exploitation of raw ma-
terials by industrialism, a phase in which the power structure of 
a society is determined by whoever controls both financial capital 
and the intellectual capital of the consciousness industry. In the 
mid-1970s, McLuhan’s analysis also provided the foundation to 
some extent for Jean Baudrillard’s description of how the world-
view of the urban individual after the Second World War was in-
creasingly constituted by a hyper-real play of signs, in which the 
boundary between immediate and mediated experience, between 
the real and the simulated, appeared to implode.8 Both McLuhan 
and Baudrillard saw technology not as an isolated force of pro-
duction (in the Marxist sense) but as a medium and, as such, one 
that was of crucial significance for the change in human con-
sciousness. Both also perceived how technology in their contem-
porary periods had introduced a radical turning point in the way 
human beings related to the world around them, such that its 
medium/mediation is the reality we can understand and partici-
pate in. A rhetoric is being formulated that stipulates not only that 
the world can be observed in your living room, but also that the 
world is what you observe in your living room.
****
A key aspect of the changes in visual culture after the Second 
World War was the constitution of a strict relationship between 
the art world and the world around it, in the sense that it focused 
to such a considerable extent on the work’s transcendence of the 
surrounding world through the agency of the originator and the 
creative process. When considered in terms of the requirement for 
medium specificity, this transcendence involved an ever-more ex-
plicit exclusion of large parts of the contemporary social, political 
and medial culture. The institutionalisation of modernism, there-
fore, also entailed the establishment of an aesthetic of disparity.
It may seem odd that this aesthetic acquired such a dominant 
position in the 1950s. It became established at a time of height-
ened visual modernity, when the codes and forms of the visual 
cultures had been subject to an expansion, without historical par-
allel, in advertising, television, film, logos, the daily and weekly 
press, comics, record covers, product design and posters. This was 
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the social context that Guy Debord described as ‘the society of 
spectacles’.9 Irrespective of whether one shares this rather misan-
thropic form of conspiracy thinking, it provides an apt description 
of the condensed visual and communicative codes that character-
ise the urban landscapes of modernity and of the post-war period 
in particular in Western Europe and the United States. And in the 
midst of this enormous visual transformation and expansion, at 
the heart of the burgeoning and variegated forest of signs, conven-
tions, codes and signals, advanced modern art was presented as a 
more or less isolated preserve—more clearly, perhaps, during the 
post-war period than at any previous time.
This aesthetic of disparity is not a new phenomenon as such but 
simply a consequence of the mechanics of the modern art world 
(a system with the capacity to produce value by making distinc-
tions) and of its basic form of legitimation (authenticity). What is 
evident during the 1950s, however, is that two types of distinction 
were emphasised as being of definitive importance in the contem-
porary art world: between Art and art and between art and the 
rest of the world. This aesthetic did not, of course, constitute an 
entirely uniform theory; its foundations lay in a cluster of theo-
ries, whose least common denominator was the axiom concerning 
the authenticity of the work of art (of the form/of the symbol) and 
its ontological boundary towards the outside world. And this ap-
plied irrespective of whether the work/form was shown in isola-
tion in a gallery, as public adornment in an urban space or as part 
of a larger environmental design. The potential relation between 
the world of art and other worlds was seen as a one-way commu-
nication from art to the outside world but never, in principle, in 
the other direction.10
Perhaps the most paradoxical aspect of the aesthetic of dispar-
ity, superficially at least, is its preoccupation with oil painting as 
the primary medium of modern art. It would be legitimate here 
to refer to the transformation of an ancient institution so that it 
could survive into the modern era. A number of crises in painting 
run through the whole history of modernity in parallel with a 
progressive accentuation of the key importance of the medium, 
particularly within the theory and historiography of modernism. 
Oil painting in traditional terms could no longer be defended as a 
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form of representation in the modern era: from Paul Delaroche’s 
declaration of the death of painting after Daguerre’s public pre-
sentation of photography in 1839, followed by a series of similar 
declarations (listing various causes of death) from within the var-
ious forms of the modernist avant-garde of the twentieth century 
and on to the postmodernist variant (based on different theoreti-
cal premises) of the same theme.11 A return to the comparison be-
tween the prognoses for contemporary art put forward by Walter 
Benjamin and Clement Greenberg at the end of the 1930s, which 
offered two diametrically opposed interpretations of the meaning 
of this crisis, provides us with a telling example. Note how the 
latter’s accentuation of the primacy of painting precisely because 
of its ambivalent, and therefore potentially critical, relationship 
with the technology of the modern era ensured its place as the 
privileged interpretation.
If the institutionalisation of modernism (and the premise of the 
significance of oil painting) is considered from a longer historical 
perspective, this process is neither an unusual or remarkable one; 
rather, it is a fairly self-evident function of the fact that a partic-
ular group acting within a discursive context will acquire the in-
terpretive privilege through its control of key representations and 
institutions. It is, in fact, this alteration of the political, cultural 
and institutional landscape that lays the foundation for the cre-
ation of a new discursive order to reproduce and normalize a spe-
cific image of modern art and to establish the boundaries for what 
is possible and legitimate within the discourse. An interesting di-
agnosis of the relationship between authentic art and popular cul-
ture within this order was provided by Theodor Adorno and Max 
Horkeimer in their ferocious settling of accounts with what they 
called ‘the culture industry’ in Dialektik der Aufklärung (1947):
Light art has accompanied serious art as its shadow. It is the social 
bad conscience of serious art. The truth which the latter could not 
apprehend because of its social premises gives the former an ap-
pearance of objective justification. The split between them is itself 
the truth: it expresses at least the negativity of the culture which 
is the sum of both spheres. The antithesis can be reconciled least 
of all by absorbing light art into serious or vice versa. That, how-
ever, is what the culture industry attempts. The eccentricity of the 
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circus, the peep show, or the brothel in relation to society is as 
embarrassing to it as that of Schönberg and Karl Kraus.12
Despite the fact that their diagnosis is a swingeing critique of 
the state of affairs in Western capitalist society, written in exile 
in Los Angeles in the final phase of the Second World War, their 
identification of a necessary boundary between the authentic and 
the popular provides a telling portrayal of the aesthetic of dis-
parity that was established after the war in the institutions of the 
art world. An apparently paradoxical pattern of centrifugal and 
centripetal forces at work in the post-war art world can be dis-
cerned here: an increasingly specialised, closed and metaphysical 
aesthetic was promoted to an ever-expanding mass audience in 
ever more sectors within the field of officially sanctioned culture, 
and as part of which, the avant-garde art world was increasingly 
becoming an integrated part of the cultural industry of modern 
society. Adorno and Horkheimer were no doubt correct in main-
taining that the split was the truth but in a rather different way 
than they intended: the split was presented as a normative order 
within a field; whereas, the two fields separated by the split were 
actually being incorporated within the system of norms of the 
established cultural sphere.
What the order described here actually calls to mind is the bi-
polar opposition of the Cold War: the creation of a boundary 
between two opposed camps that refused to acknowledge the 
existence of a third. In a maxim that would subsequently be-
come celebrated, the American artist Ad Reinhardt summed up 
the essence of this aesthetic of disparity: ‘The one thing to say 
about Art is that it is one thing. Art is art-as-art and everything 
else is everything else.’13 This deliberately tautological and rather 
thought-provoking definition presents the work of art as entirely 
concrete in the sense of being autonomous, as a sign whose on-
tology, value and meanings cannot be related to anything outside 
itself. The distinction is not dialectical in the sense that it leads on 
to a synthesis; instead, it establishes absolute boundaries for the 
space—the value sphere, the art world, the economy of signs—
within which the dialectic can be enacted. Ad Reinhardt’s radical 
dramatisation of the interface between art and the world around 
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it leads to a conceptual endpoint that he could only relate to by 
repeating the same subject matter and the same aesthetic and in-
tellectual gesture throughout the last years of his life: producing 
image after image whose rectangular surfaces had been meticu-
lously painted with a black cross on a black background.14
This rather extreme radicalisation of an idea involved pushing 
it towards a limit, however, where the parameters of its own logic 
were transgressed and it became inverted. In his reinterpretation 
of Reinhardt’s strategy, Joseph Kosuth produced equally meticu-
lously executed pictures of a black square on which various defi-
nitions drawn from dictionaries were depicted. In this way, a path 
was opened out through the image from the lowest circle of her-
metic distinction. The projection of text onto image also served to 
expose the closed aesthetic to critical and meta linguistic illumina-
tion, which reveals that the absolute criteria of distinction here 
are, in fact, arbitrary. Kosuth’s strategy also introduced a threat 
from within to the polarisation between Art and the surrounding 
world by grafting a third element—an  outsider—on to the ter-
ritory of Art that would, in the long term, pose a much greater 
threat to the absolute boundary than the enemy ever could.
This strategy was not unique but may be considered part of a 
pattern within—or, if you prefer, a function of—the aesthetic of 
disparity and its drive to refine the essence of every medium (on 
the basis of a particular and predetermined logic). This led to a 
situation in which each thesis at its most refined was predestined, 
in the words of John Perreault, to give birth to its own antithesis:
Paradoxically, the closer an artist gets to the mythological “es-
sence” of his particular medium the faster the medium becomes 
something else. Frank Stella’s shaped-canvases become a kind 
of flat sculpture for the wall. Cage’s “music” becomes theatre. 
Concretist poems become graphic art. Prose becomes poetry or 
music. Film becomes a kind of projected painting. Architecture as 
it tries more and more to be simply architecture becomes sculpture. 
And sculpture as it strives for “sculptureness” becomes architec-
ture or merely interior design. This paradoxical “media transpor-
tation” indicates perhaps that just as there is no ideal gameness 
that relates all Games, there is no ideal art or  essence of  painting or 
sculpture, no “nature”.15
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The strategy in question is of key importance because it demon-
strates a trend in post-war modernism that, as a result of its in-
trospective linguistic critique, reached paradoxically outwards 
to encompass areas that were taboo. And in the modernist dis-
course that would be aimed, above all, at the refinement of each 
and every concept; this absolute focus on the medium-specific, 
the self-reflexive and the primacy of the visual surface inevitably 
meant that its opposite was put in play. This apparently paradox-
ical motion—inward to the core and then on outward through 
the core—is a trope that many critics and historians have drawn 
attention to. In the work of Michael Fried, it served as the defin-
itive argument in what were, ultimately, his attempts to delegiti-
mate minimalism.16 The same motion has been used in the work 
of critics such as Rosalind Krauss and Hal Foster to explain the 
transition from modernism to postmodernism in terms of certain 
artists exceeding the bounds of the possible in the idioms and 
aesthetics of modernism as a result of their refinement of a par-
ticular logic.17 What we are referring to here is a general aspect 
of the logic that Thierry de Duve described in the transition from 
painting to the readymade in the 1910s, where the search for ab-
solute purity in the work of artists such as Malevitch, Kupka and 
Mondrian led inevitably to the zero point of painting—a transi-
tion that would, in the long term, provide the impetus for Marcel 
Duchamp’s transgression of the very boundaries of the idiom.18
My point is not, however, to identify one transgressive act as 
a critical juncture in the modern history of the visual arts, but 
to demonstrate how this particular movement can be interpreted 
as part of a historical continuity, as a function of the modernist 
language game that is almost inevitably inscribed in a dialectic, 
rather than linear, process and, furthermore, to show that this dia-
lectic extends beyond the absolute boundaries and schematic clas-
sifications on which the historiography of modernism is based.
The Reactivation of an Old Relationship
In his introduction to New York Painting and Sculpture: 
 1940–1970, the major retrospective exhibition held at the 
Metropolitan Museum of Modern Art in 1970, Henry Geldzahler 
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insisted that Pop Art was only a transitory episode in the art his-
tory of the post-war period, whose real importance—apart from 
a few significant oeuvres at the beginning of the 1960s—was that 
it repaid, so to speak, the debt owed by art to visual mass cul-
ture.19 The notion that there should ever have been a debt to re-
pay makes this a particularly interesting observation. It is a way 
of considering the matter that completely inverts the relationship 
for which Clement Greenberg and Theodor Adorno, each in their 
own way, had argued so persuasively and which few representa-
tives of leading art institutions would have even recognised only 
a few years before.
At much the same time, Richard Hamilton, who was one of 
the artists to make a serious attempt to introduce mass culture as 
visual material in his art at the end of the 1950s, described this 
peculiar state of affairs as follows:
The surprising thing is that it took until the mid-fifties for artists 
to realise that the visual world had been altered by the mass me-
dia and changed dramatically enough to make it worth looking 
at again in terms of painting. Magazines, movies, TV, newspapers 
and comics for that matter, assume great importance when we 
consider the percentage of positively directed visual time they oc-
cupy in our society.20
Although this description may be accurate, it needs to be modified 
to some extent. As we have seen, there is a long tradition under-
pinning the distinction between Art and other visual cultures that 
had been institutionalised in academic discourse. But we have also 
seen that the distinction between high and low was far from clear 
in the aesthetic practices of early modernism. On the contrary, 
as Thomas Crow has maintained, the problematic but intensive 
exchange between both these levels can be seen as a characteristic 
and constant feature of the aesthetics of the avant-garde, from 
Manet’s ‘Olympia’ onwards.21 The interaction between modern-
ism and modernity served in this regard to establish an ambivalent 
relationship between art and the world around it, with the idea 
of Art’s autonomy and distinctiveness in relation to the surround-
ing culture making possible the interpretation of its specific posi-
tion within that culture. But Hamilton is no doubt right that an 
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intensification of the exchange between popular and elite cultures 
did characterise parts of the visual arts of the late 1950s, albeit on 
the periphery of the art world. In some surveys this phenomenon 
is sometimes reduced to no more than an additional branch on 
the genealogical tree of the metanarrative, to a mere change of 
style (with Pop Art replacing Abstract Expressionism), but one 
that would nevertheless provide a major stumbling block to many 
of those writing about the development of modern art during the 
1950s as a linear progression towards abstraction as a universal 
idiom, an inner necessity or the logic of history.
One aspect of this change in perspective was a radical reformu-
lation of the function and boundaries of the serious visual arts, 
without the abolition of any fixing of those boundaries as a result. 
Another involved the establishment of a different relation to the 
historical models of the avant-garde. When considered as a whole, 
this meant that a shift in discursive—the interpretive privilege—
was taking place. A situation emerged in which the dialectic was 
no longer isolated within a specifically defined field but was also 
oriented outwards, and thus involved various outsiders from the 
world beyond the sanctified precincts of Art: popular culture, the 
mass media, product design, handicraft and other forms of ap-
plied art. This could, but need not, be interpreted as modernism 
being challenged and its boundaries breached. Instead of referring 
to a critical juncture, the new phenomenon might be considered a 
reactivation of some of the aesthetic and medial strategies of the 
avant-garde that had been excluded from the historical narrative 
of modernism following the Second World War, with this change 
of position occurring initially at least within the framework of the 
order of modernist discourse.
It is important that the introspective, structural and linguistic 
elements of this change are borne in mind as they tend to get 
lost in the projections by the cross-boundary art genres of every-
day objects, hybrid forms, popular cultural references and spec-
tacular stagings. The problem resembles to a considerable degree 
that which confronted Picasso when executing Guitar and Wine 
Glass: how to operate at the dividing line between an introverted 
(symbolic) linguistic critique and an expansive (futurist) cult of 
the contemporary without renouncing either side. This is an issue 
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Robert Rauschenberg touched on in a subsequently celebrated 
pronouncement published in connection with the exhibition 
Sixteen Americans held at MoMA in 1959:
Any incentive to paint is as good as any other. There is no poor 
subject.  . . . Painting relates to both art and life. Neither can be 
made. (I try to act in the gap between the two.) A pair of socks is 
no less suitable to make a painting with than wood, nails, turpen-
tine, oil and fabric. A canvas is never empty.22
This statement describes in a nutshell how the relationship be-
tween modernity and art has been dealt with, transformed and 
rediscovered time after time since Baudelaire’s day: the modern 
notion of beauty is focused at a point between the eternal and 
the transience of the everyday. The split that Theodor Adorno 
and Clement Greenberg took for granted as an absolute constant 
emerges as arbitrary in Rauschenberg’s words, or perhaps rather 
as a fruitful position from which the artist is obliged to relate to 
two incompatible areas, each of which, ultimately, can never be 
attained.
But even though this issue already had one hundred years of 
history behind it by the end of the 1950s, each individual artist’s 
interpretation of the problem would, of course, be determined 
by his or her particular situation. Where Baudelaire described 
Constantin Guy’s depictions of different individuals as representa-
tives of the social types of the modern era, where Picasso employed 
the fractured syntax of the music-hall theatre and newspaper ref-
erences as allusions to the existence of the surrounding world and 
as a means to experiment with figurative language, Rauschenberg 
made objects, images and texts from the everyday world— topical, 
public, controversial, banal, extravagant, discarded, private, ob-
solete, forgotten—into the material for new aesthetic experiences. 
These were entities that functioned simultaneously as slices of 
contemporary modernity and as archaeological excavations of 
conscious and unconscious segments of modern experience.
Although the problem that confronted Rauschenberg is 
 reminiscent of the one Picasso faced, the two problems are not 
identical.23 It is not the image of a linear tradition that is  relevant 
here, but the understanding of how a specific problem is established 
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and transformed by a great many pivotal moments in history. The 
historical dimension in particular serves as an important dividing 
line, with the very idea of the tradition of the new creating a sense 
of alienation and a reference point to which every artist and gener-
ation of artists after the Second World War has had to relate. And 
yet it is at this very point that one can see how extraordinarily 
challenging in historical terms—and rhetorically awkward—the 
introduction of new art forms has proved within the parame-
ters of avant-garde discourse, whose raison d’être is not only a 
countercultural position, but also the formulation of a direction 
towards/away from: into the future, away from history. What is 
evident is that this problematic issue was dealt with in a number 
of different ways and with varying degrees of success during the 
post-war period and that the extent to which it was successfully 
tackled proved to be a decisive factor in establishing a position in 
the field.
Two exhibitions exemplify this. Held in New York at the begin-
ning of the 1960s, both attracted attention at the time; although, 
they were accorded extremely different levels of significance. In 
the summer and autumn of 1960, New Form–New Media was 
shown in two versions at the Martha Jackson Gallery. It presented 
the work of a motley collection of some seventy artists from the 
United States and Europe and showed contemporary and histori-
cal examples alongside one another in two sections, with the aim 
of throwing into international and historical relief what was de-
scribed as a new American art form: assemblage, junk-art, hap-
penings, environments, ready-mades, collages.24 In the catalogue, 
Lawrence Alloway describes the existence of a historical link be-
tween Neo-Dadaism and the Dadaist and Futurist traditions that 
was reflected, all their differences notwithstanding, in an essential 
accord, namely their dependence on the urban environment and 
their close connection to popular culture.25 Allan Kaprow empha-
sised the untidiness, the unfinished surface, the impression of im-
mediacy and the indifference to traditional concepts of beauty as 
common denominators.26 Although the overall impression of the 
selection and content of the exhibition as presented in Alloway’s 
and Kaprow’s texts was of confronting the viewer with a new 
form of art that deviated in aesthetic terms from the then-current 
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norms pertaining to serious Art, this was nevertheless anaesthetic 
with obvious historical references.
The raw, amorphous and perhaps offensive idiom the exhibi-
tion displayed did not in itself constitute a generic difference from 
the set of technical, aesthetic and medial connections on which 
the interpretation of Abstract Expressionism and informal art was 
frequently based. It would hardly have posed a problem, in terms 
solely of theory and form, to show one of Willem de Kooning’s 
pictures of women from the mid-1950s as part of the exhibition. 
But an inclusion of this kind would have erased one of the exhibi-
tion’s most important rhetorical distinctions: between established 
and independent culture.
This rhetoric was largely concerned with social distinctions, rather 
than purely aesthetic ones; the primacy of the latter would have 
made the explicit historical connections the source of legitimacy for 
the contemporary works. But this use of history would have laid the 
exhibition open to the kind of criticism that rejected assemblage art 
as a mere plagiarism of long-since exhausted gestures (the negative 
implication of the term ‘neo-Dada’).27 Or, as Thomas Hess put it, the 
new forms of art amounted to no more than a collection of romantic 
souvenirs from the barricades (the street, history).28
Another major thematic exhibition of new trends in contempo-
rary art was shown two years later in November 1962: The New 
Realists at the Sidney Janis Gallery.29 It comprised an interna-
tional selection, including artists from France, Italy, Great Britain, 
Sweden and the United States. American artists predominated in 
numerical terms but were, for the most part, represented not by 
the relatively well-known (and in some cases already established) 
neo-Dadaists but by a younger generation of artists, such as Roy 
Lichtenstein, Claes Oldenburg, James Rosenquist, Steven Segal, 
Andy Warhol and Tom Wesselmann.30 This exhibition created a 
different context from the one held at Martha Jackson Gallery. In 
part, this was a matter of the location (the Sidney Janis Gallery was 
one of the most established galleries in New York and represented 
the elite of the Abstract Expressionists), in part it involved the vi-
sual style of American Pop Art (far removed from any possible ac-
cusation as to romantic souvenirs); above all, however, the change 
had to do with a difference in rhetoric: a new avant-gardiste front 
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line was defined here, whose historical context was constituted 
not by a vanished modernist past but by international and domes-
tic New Realism and neo-Dadaism.
In his foreword, Sidney Janis referred to a historical transfor-
mation, with New Realism supplanting Abstract Expressionism in 
the role of principal pacemaker in the contemporary art world.31 
John Ashbery described New Realism as a transgression of the 
causality of historical relationships; his point being that Dadaism, 
in its time, had reactivated a trend that had always existed in 
art and that New Realism was currently creating a situation in 
which the images and objects of everyday life could be employed 
without serving as metaphors.32 That interpretive construct 
 national→international→universal was evidently once more in 
play and utilised here in a context that set out a clear demarcation 
from both Abstract Expressionism and causal historical compari-
sons. In this respect, the selection drew attention to a new interna-
tionalism, with the United States most definitely in the vanguard 
as a result of the aggressively visual style of Pop Art.33
The signals sent out by the exhibition were summarised most 
trenchantly in the exclamation by the New York Times critic 
Brian O’Doherty that ‘“Pop” goes the new art!’ and by Harold 
Rosenberg’s phrase in The New Yorker that the exhibition had 
struck the art world of New York ‘like an earthquake.’34 After 
a meeting of the Abstract Expressionists who were associated 
with the Sidney Janis Gallery, Philip Guston, William Baziotes, 
Robert Motherwell, Adolph Gottlieb and Mark Rothko decided 
to leave the gallery with only Willem de Kooning choosing to stay. 
Their fury could, as Calvin Tomkins has pointed out, be readily 
understood: after decades of hard work to reach a position of 
legitimacy and a relatively stable income, everything they stood 
for—the serious, autonomous, spiritual, existential—appeared to 
have been turned upside-down in the course of a single evening at 
the opening of the show.35 The exhibition thus achieved what ev-
ery avant-garde must: to define clear boundaries while simultane-
ously identifying something new. But unlike most of the previous 
manifestations of the avant-garde in history, this was accorded a 
form of institutional legitimacy almost immediately: first through 
a symposium at the Museum of Modern Art in mid-December, 
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at which a number of leading critics and curators discussed the 
meaning and content of the new art, and subsequently as a result 
of a series of exhibitions of Pop Art held throughout the United 
States and Europe.36
The key aspect of The New Realists—and what distinguishes it 
from previous exhibitions—was that it made evident a new con-
text, both in rhetorical and real terms. Although this context could 
be inscribed in a historical continuity, history here was not a static 
backdrop of linguistic expressions and stylistic props but served, 
instead, as a legitimising subtext whose orientation pointed for-
ward toward an aesthetic context in the contemporary world. 
The relation between past and present appears, in fact, to be 
an extraordinarily—boomerang-like—dynamic that has proved 
important both for artistic production and the rhetorical legit-
imation of that production and, subsequently, for its historical 
interpretation. Once again, the historical pivot is in action here; 
where artists such as Picasso or Duchamp had established certain 
pictorial incentives in a particular period, these had now been dis-
located by artists such as Rauschenberg or Warhol, and this had, 
in turn, given rise to various artistic and theoretical reinterpreta-
tions of history. The postmodern semiotic readings of Cubism by 
Rosalind Krauss, Jeffrey Weiss and Yve-Alain Bois would, in fact, 
be all but inconceivable without this dislocation.
Even specialised surveys suffer under the yoke of the obligatory 
classifications, with particular categories, such as Pop Art, being 
described in terms of their birth, rise, maturity, descent and inher-
itance on the basis of an evolutionist and anthropomorphic nar-
rative.37 The key issue here, however, is not the abstraction from 
empirical data, which is, of course, essential to any historical in-
terpretation, but its implementation: a far-reaching, complex and 
contradictory process is reduced to a number of fixed categories 
that are defined in turn in relation to a nucleus of  oeuvres/works. 
A label, such as ‘Pop Art’, serves in this system as a term covering 
all the possible phenomena that have some kind of connection 
with a particular stylistic idiom, with proximity to that nucleus 
constituting a crucial criterion for the art-historical importance 
of the phenomena. In her 1966 survey Pop Art, Lucy Lippard 
listed only five artists as forming part of the core—The New York 
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Five—who were presented on a falling scale in terms of the de-
gree to which their work was in accord with the principles of Pop 
Art: Andy Warhol, Roy Lichtenstein, Tom Wesselmann, James 
Rosenquist and Claes Oldenburg.38 These then defined retro-
actively a specific order in which other artists could be included 
or from which they could be excluded, depending on the degree 
of stylistic similarity.39 Related artistic works in other countries 
were inevitably deported to the periphery—as precursors, vari-
ants, copies, deviations— irrespective of the extent to which they 
fit into the paradigm set out by the category’s coordinates.
The interpretation of individual oeuvres was similarly adapted 
to and determined by the internal logic of the categories. As, for 
example, at the beginning of the 1960s when Jasper Johns and 
Robert Rauschenberg ceased to be classified as Neo-Dada or as 
an odd variant of second generation Abstract Expressionism and 
were labelled instead as pre-Pop, with certain qualities and fea-
tures of their art becoming emphasised at the cost of others in 
order to make it better suited to the definition of Pop Art and its 
narrative.40 What we are dealing with here is a self-perpetuating 
category that reduces both the overarching context and the indi-
vidual oeuvre.
This does not, of course, mean that we should simply abandon 
the term Pop Art completely; it is of both historical and historio-
graphical relevance. An analysis of this concept can provide a 
powerful indication of the significance of the categories in the es-
tablishment of a particular perspective, the drawing up of a chart 
and the normalisation of a selection. Indeed, the term Pop Art 
demonstrates a particularly interesting history of changes to artis-
tic and historical reception and production: from its introduction 
(the end of the 1950s), its cultural transposition and establishment 
(1962–63), its rapid institutional sanction (1963–64) and histor-
icisation (1965–68) to its historical revision (late 1970s and on-
wards).41 A similar—and no doubt, interesting—historical account 
could also be written about the other stylistic and epochal terms 
of the 1950s and 1960s, but the problem remains: how are we to 
name the transformation within the order of modernist discourse 
that took place during this period? And how should we actually 
understand the role played by Pop Art in that transformation?
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This is a question that has elicited different responses over the 
last four decades. One example is found in Henry Geldzahler’s 
previously cited catalogue essay for New York Painting and 
Sculpture 1940-1970, held at the Metropolitan Museum of Art in 
New York in 1970:
It seems today that Pop Art was an episode, an interesting one 
that has left its mark on the decade, and will continue to affect 
the future, but not a major modern movement which continues to 
spawn new artists. In fact, just about everything new and original 
in Pop Art was stated by a few artists in the first years of its exis-
tence. Since then no artists of first importance have been recruited 
and no second generation has come along.42
A quite different assessment is provided by Rosalind Krauss in her 
lecture to a symposium on ‘Theories of Art after Minimalism and 
Pop’ at Dia Art Foundation 1987:
[W]e are deluding ourselves if we think that we are dealing with a 
period of art that succeeds or comes after pop. For as far as we are 
concerned there has been no “after pop”; its terms, no matter how 
third-hand, no matter how degraded or sad, have been rehearsed 
and re-rehearsed throughout almost everything that has happened 
within dominant aesthetic practice in the past two decades.43
How are we to understand the fact that two individuals, who both 
possess such a thorough knowledge of the contemporary art world, 
can arrive at such different viewpoints? One explanation may be 
the different dates at which these assessments were made; perhaps 
the significance of Pop Art was not as obvious in 1970 as in 1987. 
Another, and in my view more likely, explanation is that they are 
not talking about the same thing. One would, after all, quite simply 
have to agree with Geldzahler that Pop Art as a style had already 
seen its heyday by the mid-1960s. Neither does Krauss contradict 
this; on the contrary, there is an air of resignation in her words at 
all the different varieties and hybrids that have evolved and been 
promoted in the art world ever since. But what she actually seems 
to be referring to is not a stylistic concept but a discursive order: 
the fact that the change of the rules provoked by Pop Art was still 
(in 1987) a dominant issue in the order of the discourse.
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If the transformation we have referred to here was largely a 
matter of establishing a new relationship between art and the 
world around it, the question is not so much how this relation-
ship was expressed directly in the image, but how it influenced 
language, roles and definitions within the discourse of the visual 
arts. Just as modernism cannot be seen as a direct or essential 
artistic translation of modernity, Pop Art cannot simply be under-
stood by analogy to mass culture. In my view, what is interesting 
about both instances is what happens in their mediation: between 
the present and the past, between high and low, between visual 
language and adjacent linguistic systems—between the art world 
and other segments of society.
Trespassing on Common Culture
A remarkable exhibition opened at the Whitechapel Art Gallery in 
London on 9 August 1956 entitled This is Tomorrow. The exhi-
bition had been initially intended to serve as an exposé of British 
Constructivism; however, it subsequently encompassed trends 
that were more cross-boundary in media terms.44 It was made up 
of twelve pavilions in which different groups had created separate 
interiors, installations and hangs that alluded in various ways to 
the futuristic theme of the exhibition. This theme was further un-
derlined in the press release, which emphasised the diversity of 
the exhibition, ranging from orthodox abstract order to extrav-
agant games with the various signs, images and objects of mass 
culture.45 The fact that the exhibition was opened by a full-scale 
model of Robby the Robot (from the film Fantastic Planet) only 
served to enhance the spectacular nature of this compilation and 
provoked countless newspaper headlines and considerable public 
interest.46
The visitor was steered through a labyrinthine installation 
of twelve separate variations on the futuristic theme that, when 
taken together, presented a fragmentary and contradictory vi-
sion of the future. In a press release, Lawrence Alloway, who 
was in charge of publicity for the exhibition, described the aim 
of the show as demonstrating the various ways architects, paint-
ers, sculptors and other visual artists could collaborate to create 
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interrelated works.47 It also formed part of the ongoing debate in 
the  twentieth century on the relationship of the various forms of 
art to architecture and the environment, while also providing a 
rather radical (for its time) cross-boundary approach to the possi-
bility of a fusion of different media and professional skills.
The aims of the exhibition met with an interesting and fairly 
well-informed contemporary reception, although its mixed com-
position and rebellious attitude were variously dismissed as a re-
hash of the glory days of the Bauhaus and of Dadaism in the 
1920s. Pierre Rouve, for example, adjudged what he perceived 
to be the twofold front the exhibition was attempting to erect 
against both realism and modernism a failure in that it was too 
dependent on both Dadaist gestures and formalist models.48 In 
more recent decades, however, much of the formalist and Dadaist 
duality has been missing from the received image of the show 
inasmuch as only one of the pavilions has entered the history 
books: that of Richard Hamilton, John McHale and John Voelker. 
On display was a remarkable mixture of the high and the low—
collages of films and media, a full-length portrait of Marilyn 
Monroe, a jukebox, a four-metre-high image of Robby the Robot, 
perspective projections and reconstructions of Marcel Duchamp’s 
rotoreliefs—in a setting that called to mind a mixture of an eth-
nographic museum and an amusement park. As exemplified in 
this pavilion, the exhibition has gone down in history as the first 
manifestation of Pop Art.
But the really interesting thing about This is Tomorrow is that it 
provided an anthology of some of the various possible approaches 
to contemporary visual culture and to that of ‘tomorrow’ found 
in the mid-1950s, on the borderland between Art and environ-
ment, and very much outside the accepted art-historical catego-
ries. It also took an approach to the reception of visitors that 
was distinctly different from accepted practice, which had institu-
tionalised the white cube as the ultimate representative space of 
modern art. This was made explicit in the press release: ‘Visitors 
are not expected to merely look at pictures on the walls or sculp-
tures on stands. Visitors are invited to enter strange houses, cor-
ridors and mazes. This is modern art to entertain people, modern 
art as a game people will want to play.’49 Modern art—and the 
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presentation of modern art—were thus being characterised as an 
interactive game rather than in terms of the isolation of the indi-
vidual work for elevated, aesthetic contemplation.
If a single theme is to be posthumously identified as crucial to the 
exhibition, this would have to be the mediation of various linguis-
tic, social and technological systems as visual forms of expression. 
The exhibition was organised by individuals who were associated 
with a small and only loosely connected set within the Institute 
of Contemporary Arts (ICA) called the Independent Group. This 
group was formed in 1952 and consisted of individuals operating 
in many different fields: Richard Hamilton (industrial designer, vi-
sual artist), John McHale (graphic designer), Eduardo and Freda 
Paolozzi (visual artists), Nigel Henderson (photographer), Reynes 
Bantham and Lawrence Alloway (art critics), Richard Lannoy 
(gallery assistant), Alison and Peter Smithson (architects). The 
aim of its meetings, seminars and exhibitions was to examine the 
whole range of representations that characterised society, culture 
and ‘the consciousness industry’ in post-war Great Britain: mass 
media, comic albums, advertising, design, trademarks and logos, 
science fiction and pulp-fiction, systems of communication and 
technology, architecture and town planning, social interactions, 
the visual arts and art history.50 This enterprise involved a kind 
of ambivalent archaeology of the then-contemporary world, in 
which the surface of mass culture appeared to be at least as im-
portant as the social unconscious and in which an ironic detach-
ment was coupled with undisguised fascination. The aims of the 
group were, as Lynne Cooke has observed, not to produce art 
but to analyse and visualise different types of contexts and pro-
cesses.51 In this perspective, their efforts should, perhaps, best be 
understood as ancestral to the visual culture studies of recent de-
cades. This is Tomorrow then becomes part of a larger pattern 
rather than serving simply as a model for the Pop Art of the early 
1960s.
The positioning of the exhibition in art history, as an early pro-
totype of Pop Art, is frequently underlined (and illustrated) by 
Richard Hamilton’s collage Just What Is It That Makes Today’s 
Homes So Different, So Appealing? (1956). This collage served as 
one of the posters for the exhibition and was also reproduced in 
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the catalogue. When placed beside a work by one of the American 
pop artists from the beginning of the 1960s, the correspondences 
can be striking (at least if they are compared as though based 
on photographs of the same scale), and, indeed, this image has 
been canonised as ‘the first Pop Artwork’ in many contexts.52 The 
connection is emphasised in particular in Lawrence Alloway’s in-
troduction, as well as in the subsequent historicisation of the term 
Pop Art, in which some of the activities of the Independent Group 
were reformulated as an aesthetic programme.53 But a stylistic 
comparison of this kind conceals a number of fundamental dif-
ferences between Hamilton’s poster and later Pop Art. One might 
observe to begin with that this is a very small picture (26 x 25 cm), 
entirely lacking the visual impact of the often enormous canvases 
of American Pop Art. If it is related to anything in the art history 
of the twentieth century, it would be the German Dadaist pho-
to-montage of the 1920s, and yet even that comparison misses the 
mark. For, despite the absurd heaping together of references and 
visual signs, the aim of Hamilton’s collage is not, fundamentally, 
the creation of antiaesthetic or poetic values but the provision of 
information. He was not working from an idea about paradoxical 
metaphors or dynamic composition; instead, he saw the image as 
a visual form of exhibition index in which a number of words or 
phenomena had to be included: man, woman, humanity, food, 
newspapers, cinema, TV, telephone, comics (picture information), 
words (textual information), tape recording (aural information), 
cars, domestic appliances, space.54 These phenomena were put to-
gether with a dry humour such that the sheer pleasure of the play 
with perspectives and references could work in tandem with the 
aim of conveying as clearly as possible the theme of the exhibition 
as a whole.
The way the image heightens and concentrates the phenomena 
and visual codes it presents appears, however, to clash with the fu-
turistic theme of the exhibition. It bears comparison here with the 
advertising image for Philips TV of the same period. Hamilton’s 
collage not only contains quotations from contemporary adver-
tising, but also it is obviously based on a comprehensive analysis 
of the codes and rhetorical devices of contemporary commercial 
culture. Here, too, we are dealing with a form of presentation 
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that thematises and makes display of a distinct notion of moder-
nity, but, unlike in the Philips image, this value has not been pro-
vided with a veil of normality. The setting is actually distorted in 
a rather obvious way that alienates what is familiar without con-
cealing the identification of its own visual rhetoric. In this respect, 
the alienation of the familiar would seem to be one of the most 
important informative aims of the image. This was a deliberate 
strategy on the part of (the industrial designer) Hamilton, as he 
believed that the future could only be conceptualised by an ex-
pansion of the visual experience of the present.55 Seen in this light, 
rather than functioning as a stylistic model for a new art form, 
Hamilton’s collage emerges as an allegory of the contemporary 
culture of consumption and its ideals and as a visual index of the 
attitudes and intellectual frames of reference that characterised 
the Independent Group—at once curious, affirmative, ironical 
and critical. The polemic against the preoccupation of historical 
modernism with technical innovations, functional structures and 
the fetishisation of more attractive everyday goods is all too evi-
dent here: the future is to be found in what surrounds us, in what 
is used up and discarded, which has hitherto been all but ignored 
by the representatives of elite culture.
The point of identifying this connection is to make it possible 
to see the operations of the Independent Group as an aspect of 
a larger shift in interest that took place in the modern discourse 
of the visual arts. Although not the accepted focus of the group’s 
sphere of ideas, contemporary radical visual art did, of course, 
play a very important part. But, here, the basis for the reception 
of contemporary Art was not exclusivity but the perspective of 
mass culture. A few years after the exhibition, Lawrence Alloway 
put forward a definition of this perspective in ‘The Long Front of 
Culture’ (1959):
Acceptance of the mass media entails a shift in our notion of what 
culture is. Instead of reserving the word for the highest artefacts and 
the noblest thoughts of history’s top ten, it needs to be used more 
widely as the description of “what a society does”. Then, unique 
oil paintings and highly personal poems as well as mass- distributed 
films and group-aimed magazines can be placed within a contin-
uum rather than frozen in layers in a pyramid. . . . Acceptance of 
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the media on some such basis, as entries in a descriptive account 
of society’s communication, is related to modern arrangements of 
knowledge in non-hierarchic forms . . . The mass media are crucial 
in this general extension of interpretation outwards from the mu-
seum and library into the crowded world.56
The approach set out above is based on the social and communi-
cative functions of culture, with interpretation playing a dual role: 
the understanding of sophisticated art within the framework of 
mass culture and the establishment of a nonhierarchical aesthetic 
based on a continuity between mass culture and elite culture. This 
could also be said to apply in large part to This is Tomorrow, 
which was, moreover, put together within the framework of an 
established and serious institution (the ICA).57
Hal Foster has analysed this interface between cultural and lin-
guistic spheres in connection with Richard Hamilton’s visual art 
(its overlapping of commercial and modernist representational 
styles, and between verbal and visual codes) in terms of a new 
regulatory apparatus or a new symbolic order, transcending the 
horizons of industrial society and formalist aesthetics.58 It is this 
point that is of such particular interest: the reception (within the 
Independent Group) opened up, as it were, new sections of the 
archive (history/the present) that, in their turn, shifted the focus 
and laid new foundations for the production of art. This involved 
a way of using information from a set of different fields not 
simply as visual material in images but as a means of employ-
ing knowledge to reformulate the visual and conceptual codes 
of modern art. Although their projects and methods differed in 
other respects, this approach provided a common denominator 
for both Hamilton and Rauschenberg. Here is the point at which 
the surrounding world reenters art at the same time linguistic cri-
tique and the relation to history are reactivated. The point, in both 
cases, is nevertheless dependent on the grid in which it is set: the 
field called art.
This shift does not, as it turns out, actually contradict Ad 
Reinhardt’s precept ‘Art is art-as-art and everything else is every-
thing else.’ Lawrence Alloway’s definition of a continuity between 
elite culture and mass culture and all the different variants of this 
formulation over the last fifty years have not led to an implosion 
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of the value sphere of the visual arts. Irrespective of the extent 
to which this activity was legitimised by a form of rhetoric that 
undermined the difference between art and everything else, it was 
the transformation in question that was crucial: of the surround-
ing world in the social and linguistic space of the visual arts, of the 
social and linguistic space of the visual arts by the reestablishment 
of a connection to the world around them.
What this shift highlights is the problematic nature of one of the 
parts of Ad Reinhardt’s formula, namely ‘as-art’. For this part of 
the phrase would—entirely counter to Ad Reinhardt’s  intention—
emerge as being vulnerable to extremely diverse interpretations 
that have established a somewhat different order in the discursive 
practice of the modern visual arts.
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In his study Opera aperta (1962), Umberto Eco analyses a trend 
in post-war music, literature and the visual arts that has brought 
about a radical reformulation, in his view, of the perception of the 
work of art and its communicative function. What is new is an 
interest in open, variable and (deliberately) incomplete structures 
that leave some of the constituent factors of the work free to be 
supplemented either by the executor, by the viewer or by chance:
This difference can be formulated in elementary terms as follows: 
a classical composition, whether it be a Bach fugue, Verdi’s Aïda, 
or Stravinsky’s Rite of Spring, posits an assemblage of sound units 
which the composer arranged in a closed, well-defined manner be-
fore presenting it to the listener. He converted his idea into conven-
tional symbols which more or less oblige the eventual performer 
to reproduce the format devised by the composer himself, whereas 
the new musical works . . . reject the definitive, concluded message 
and multiply the formal possibilities of the distribution of their 
elements. They appeal to the initiative of the individual performer, 
and hence they offer themselves not as finite works which prescribe 
specific repetition along given structural coordinates but as “open” 
works, which are brought to their conclusion by the performer at 
the same time as he experiences them on an aesthetic plane.59
The traditional view of the work as a structurally closed/ completed 
organic whole was being challenged here. The open work, in Eco’s 
sense, involves the inscription of a multiplicity of alternatives 
within the structure of the work such that its openness is both 
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communicative and structural in nature. This also entails changes 
to the fundamental criteria that govern the interpretation of the 
work by the executor, encompassing both variations in the aes-
thetic character of the piece (tempo, dynamic, emphases) and its 
structural framework and form. Eco exemplifies this new category 
of works with compositions, such as Karl Heinz Stockhausen’s 
Klavierstück XI of 1956, which consists of nineteen groups of 
notes and the interpreter is free to determine the internal arrange-
ment according to which the sequence should be played. It is the 
dimension of choice, and the open structure in particular, that 
constitutes the new type of work and distinguishes it from previ-
ous traditions in which the work was considered to be an organic 
whole whose structure was fixed by the score.
Experiments with variability were not an entirely new inven-
tion in the 1950s and can actually be traced far back into the past. 
It was at this time, however, that the open form became of central 
importance to various composers in different parts of the world. 
Among those who went furthest in terms of variability and the dis-
mantling of the structure of the work as a whole was John Cage. 
One of his early principles was to break with both the harmonics 
of the Western tradition and twelve-tone serial music in order to 
experiment with different types of sound in rhythmic sequences 
where time was the structuring factor.60 Initially, it was the pre-
pared piano, which emphasises the percussive mechanics of the 
piano, that served as the typical instrument for these endeavours, 
whose most radical implication was, in principle, any sound at all 
could be used in a composition. Perhaps Cage’s clearest declara-
tion of intent is found in the celebrated piece 4'33 of 1952 (partly 
inspired by the silence in Robert Rauschenberg’s White Paintings), 
whose three movements consist of a single notation: tacet. As a 
result, all the ambient sounds in the venue became incorporated 
in the piece, without any hierarchies operating between them. In 
this instance, it was not only the soloist who participated in the 
variability of the piece, but also the audience and the space to a 
considerable extent.
However, it would be a mistake to refer to an absence of struc-
ture, because the framework of the composition was precisely 
specified: the duration (four minutes and thirty-three seconds), 
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the division into three movements (which it was up to the inter-
preter to mark in some way) and the space (the concert venue).
The structure—and aesthetic—Cage was attempting to demon-
strate was one that made possible an opening up of the score and 
the performed work, and that could involve any and all kinds of 
sounds, such that the world would pass through the work, so to 
speak, allowing the audience to become aware of their environ-
ment by employing a different form of attention and sensibility. 
Cage’s aesthetic with its radical emphasis on the importance of 
the accidental for the work differs in many ways from the con-
siderably stricter structure of a composer such as Stockhausen. 
And Cage’s exploration of the possibilities of time and silence also 
took the idea of the open work beyond Eco’s modified commu-
nicative sequence (originator→work→interpreter) to create a sit-
uation in which the work was no longer to be understood as an 
autonomous and uniform structure but as a communicative pro-
cess outside the direct control of the originator. For Cage, silence 
and chance meant that the composer had to abandon the idea of 
his own intentions in relation to the work in order to accentuate 
its particular quality of indeterminacy.61
Instead of understanding the work as a specified hierarchical 
structure with a fixed centre, Cage employed a metaphor from the 
natural world to demonstrate the possibility of an open structure 
that transcends all hierarchies: a person studying a leaf cannot 
determine a particular viewpoint from which the constitution or 
essence of the leaf can be defined.62 It is interesting to note how 
this organic metaphor is employed to contravene the notion of 
the work as an organic whole: the structure of the work is no 
longer seen as developing out of a predetermined centre; the work 
no longer appears to be a transcendence of the presence of the 
originator; the work no longer has any set boundaries but can 
(and must) change over time. There can be no doubt that here we 
have arrived at a point in twentieth century Western aesthetics 
where the premises of the regime of the authentic are being se-
riously challenged. The reason that this challenge should occur, 
become possible even, within the aesthetic/ideological context of 
the 1950s was because, in contrast to the utilitarian visions of 
the Soviet Constructivists, it did not entail abandoning Art as an 
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autonomous sphere (for it to be subordinated to society’s forces 
of production) but involved, instead, a change to the linguistic 
systems and discursive framework (the art world) of serious art.
Umberto Eco (who never mentions Cage by name) does not 
deal with these revolutionary aspects in his study but takes as his 
paradigmatic examples of the new open type of work contem-
porary European composers (Stockhuasen, Boulez, Pousseur) and 
a somewhat older European literary tradition (Joyce, Mallarmé, 
Brecht). In these instances, variability was not a matter of aban-
doning a view of the work as an organic whole but of focusing 
instead on works whose structural coordinates were, although 
variable, based on a predetermined set of permutations within an 
overall framework. This becomes all the more apparent when Eco 
broadens the discussion of the open work to include the visual 
arts as well. In the latter case, he refers exclusively to (European) 
art informel whose openness was considered to exist primarily on 
a communicative level:
This sort of painting is, therefore, still a form of communication, 
a passage from an intention to a reception. And even if the recep-
tion is left open – because the intention itself was open, aiming at 
a plural communication – it is nevertheless the end of an act of 
communication which, like every act of information, depends on 
the disposition and the organization of a certain form. Understood 
in this sense, the “informal” is a rejection of classical forms with 
univocal directions but not a rejection of that form which is the 
fundamental condition of communication. The example of the in-
formal, like any open work, does not proclaim the death of form; 
rather, it proposes a new, more flexible version of it – form as a 
field of possibilities.63
According to Eco, informal art is open because it encompasses a 
greater number of interpretive possibilities. In a work by Jackson 
Pollock or Jean Fautrier, the spontaneous and arbitrary execution 
means that the structure of the painting cannot be perceived as 
conveying meaning in itself but demands a dialectical relation-
ship with the viewer. This communicative and semantic openness 
served, as we have seen, as a crucial aspect of the understand-
ing and legitimation of contemporary avant-garde art after the 
Second World War, which was open in principle to a pattern of 
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interpretation that was both cultural and countercultural. Eco, for 
his part, observes that the interpretation of contemporary nonfig-
urative art must necessarily be ambivalent and that this seman-
tic ambivalence is transformed into a fundamental criterion for a 
new category of artworks (open works).
This was not an entirely original innovation on Eco’s part but 
should be seen as a codification of ideas that were circulating 
in the art world of the time. European informal art in particu-
lar was interpreted by some critics in considerably more radical 
terms than is apparent from the classification and downgrading 
of this kind of art in more recent times as market-oriented and as 
mannered high-modernism. A similar argument can be found in 
the lecture given by Marcel Duchamp at the Convention of the 
American Federation of Arts in Houston in 1958 entitled ‘The 
Creative Act’. There, he maintained that the act of artistic creation 
had two principal poles, those of the artist and the viewer, that 
were both of equal importance for a work to come into being. 
This meant that he did not consider the work as finished once the 
artist had signed it, but rather its existence, in terms of its aes-
thetic meaning, entailed an uncompleted historical process:
The creative act takes another aspect when the spectator expe-
riences the phenomenon of transmutation; through the change 
from inert matter into a work of art, an actual transubstantiation 
has taken place, and the role of the spectator is to determine the 
weight of the work on the aesthetic scale. All in all, the creative act 
is not performed by the artist alone; the spectator brings the work 
in contact with the external world by deciphering and interpreting 
its inner qualifications and thus adds his contribution to the cre-
ative act.64
Duchamp is thus placing production and reception on an equal 
footing in the presentation of the work of art as an aesthetic object. 
This text also reflects a somewhat Romantic idea of interpretation 
as transubstantiation: a ritual transformation of substances, such 
as the wine and the bread into the blood and body of Christ as 
part of Holy Communion. This idea recurs somewhat later in Ulf 
Linde’s analysis of Duchamp’s The Large Glass ‘La mariée mise à 
nu par ses célibataires, même’: by an odd coincidence (a draught), 
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the world of the bachelors (the viewers) can be connected with 
that of the bride (the artist’s) in an upward movement (a transub-
stantiation) straight through two horizontal glass structures (the 
bride’s clothes, the work of art). The work does not emerge as a 
work of art until the moment the viewer succeeds in establishing 
a connection, when he or she is capable ‘of permeating it with his 
or her own life without demanding higher truths’. 65
Today, some forty years later, these ideas of the polyvalence 
of meaning and the significance of reception seem not only fa-
miliar concepts, but also as forming two of the accepted pos-
tulates in the contemporary discussion of interpretive theory. It 
may, nevertheless, appear somewhat remarkable that Umberto 
Eco should employ art informel, and Abstract Expressionism in 
particular, as examples of what this new type of art might mean. 
For this was the very period in which completely different forms 
of art were being established that deliberately employed commu-
nicative openness as a starting point for cross-boundary medial 
experimentation. What may appear today as a confusing use of 
categories may, itself, be an interesting example of how possible 
contexts, transgressions and shifts can be formulated before these 
categories become fixed in the historical record.
****
A significant example of what continuity and historical cross- 
fertilisation could mean in practice—subsequent historical cate-
gorisations notwithstanding—can be found in Allan Kaprow’s 
article ‘The Legacy of Jackson Pollock’, published in Art News 
in 1958. He maintained that while Pollock may have created 
wonderful paintings, in so doing he also succeeded in eradicating 
painting by violating the boundaries of the genre: in the use of his 
technique (drip-painting instead of brushstroke), by exceeding the 
formal framework of painting (all-over-ness instead of the organic 
whole of the planar image) and by the enormous scale and spatial 
structure of the paintings that blurred the boundary between the 
space of the painting and that of the viewer. The real inheritance 
left by Jackson Pollock was not that he established a certain style 
or a specific aesthetic approach but that he identified (indirectly) a 
new route for the visual arts that could take them beyond painting:
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Pollock, as I see him, left us at the point where we must become 
preoccupied with and even dazzled by the space and objects of 
our every-day life, either our bodies clothes, rooms, or, if need to 
be, the vastness of Forty-Second Street. Not satisfied with the sug-
gestion through paint of our other senses, we shall utilize the spe-
cific substances of sight, sound, movements, people, odors, touch. 
Objects of every sort are materials for the new art . . . Pollock’s 
near destruction of this tradition [of painting] may well be a return 
to the point where art is more actively involved in ritual, magic 
and life than we have known it in our recent past.66
This provides an interesting insight into the way the problem of 
modern art was reformulated during the second half of the 1950s, 
when the categorisation of various movements and approaches 
had not yet been fixed. In his own artistic practice, Kaprow 
moved from a direct interpretation of Pollock’s working method 
(action-collage) to the use of the gallery space as a means of ex-
pression (environment). When he showed his spatial installations, 
he realised that each visitor both influenced and became part of 
the artwork, with the result that the experience of an installation 
involved something other and greater than simply a communica-
tion of visual impressions:
We simply enter it, are surrounded by it, become part of it, pas-
sively or actively according to our talents for ‘engagement’, in 
much the same way that we have moved out of the totality of the 
street or our home where we also played a part.67
This led Kaprow to engage more actively with the development of 
forms that could transcend the boundaries between artistic media 
as well as those between the viewer and the work (happenings).68 
A link to painting can still be found, albeit at a metaphorical level, 
in 18 happenings in 6 parts, which was staged at the Reuben 
Gallery in New York in 1959: in one scene, an artist is sitting on 
a red chair; he lights and blows out nineteen matches; he gets up 
slowly, without making any gestures, in order to move over to 
each of the four laminated walls in front of which containers of 
paint and brushes have been placed and ‘solemnly paint’.69 This 
could be seen as an at once ironic, symbolic and utterly concrete 
representation of the change in the status of painting, from being 
Open Aesthetics 279
the essential form of expression to becoming one sign among all 
the others in the cross-boundary and wide-open reference system 
of the visual arts.
Although, as Benjamin Buchloh has pointed out, Kaprow’s 
declaration of the death of the tradition of painting because of 
Pollock was based on a twofold misconception: on the one hand, 
it involved an overestimation (that would subsequently be re-
produced in countless historical surveys) of the significance of 
the stylistic and medial rupture, while on the other, his focus on 
the magical and ritual functions of art meant that he considered 
these categories transhistorical and universal (which would have 
implied a continuity with aspects of the aesthetics of Abstract 
Expressionism).70 In contrast with Buchloh, I consider the first 
misconception to be the more important. It manages to situate 
in historical terms both the context in which an open aesthetic 
emerged and the polysemous diversity that was the hallmark of 
the art scene of the 1960s. At much the same time that happen-
ings, Pop Art and Minimalism were being treated as serious trends 
within contemporary art, Pollock was being posthumously can-
onised, Barnett Newman and Ad Reinhardt were being taken seri-
ously as artists, Mark Rothko, Robert Motherwell and Willem de 
Kooning were continuing their successful careers and a new wave 
of radicalised abstract art (colour field, hard edge, post-painterly 
abstraction, op-art, shaped canvas) was being established, all of 
which meant that a critic, such as Clement Greenberg, could ac-
quire renewed topicality. This was not solely an American pheno-
menon; the same pattern was repeated in Western Europe. The 
rather modest introduction of Neo-Dadaism and Pop Art at doc-
umenta III in 1964 and their relaunch on a much larger scale at 
documenta IV in 1968 occurred against a background that ac-
corded equal prominence to contemporary nonfigurative paint-
ing.71 Instead of accepting Kaprow’s interpretation of Pollack 
uncritically, we could see it as forming part of the process of le-
gitimation of a radical alternative that existed on the fringes of 
New York’s established art world at the end of the 1950s and had 
profound effects on the European art scene by the mid-1960s.
In this respect, Kaprow’s own artistic process calls to mind that 
of many other American artists of the same period, for whom 
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John Cage’s lectures at the New School of Social Research in 
New York provided the nexus for various intermedial experi-
ments.72 Cage’s class was, however, only part of a network of 
artists, dancers, musicians, actors and writers who participated 
in one another’s performances, attended one another’s openings 
and, most importantly, exchanged ideas between the different ar-
tistic genres in  every conceivable direction.73 It was this medial 
cross- fertilisation in particular that provided a radical antithesis 
to the powerful medium-specific trend of the art world of the 
late 1950s. If Clement Greenberg’s type of exclusionary criteria 
could be said to characterise the established end of the American 
art world in the late 1950s, the process of redefining traditional 
forms of art became a fundamental criterion of the subcultural 
context, one of whose cornerstones was provided by Cage’s in-
clusive and open aesthetic.
This medial cross-fertilisation also altered the way in which his-
tory was read. Knowledge of the Dadaist tradition was, of course, 
significant in this regard, both as a catalyst and as an example 
of the existence of other sources and alternative strains within 
moder nism. It also helped to shape the situation in which a radi-
cal reevaluation of the particular significance of Marcel Duchamp 
for twentieth-century art took place.74 His oeuvre was interpreted 
in a manner that transcended the historical context (and, on oc-
casion, even his own wishes) and led to the emergence of a reacti-
vated and, to some extent at least, new image of Duchamp. John 
Cage has described at some point his way of seeing Duchamp’s 
The Large Glass; this does not involve a historical reconstruc-
tion or an intrusive close reading (as exemplified in the interpre-
tations by André Breton and Ulf Linde) but a form of observation 
whose lack of pretension reveals an entirely different horizon of 
interpretation:
Looking at the Large Glass, the thing that I like so much is that 
I can focus my attention wherever I wish. It helps me to blur the 
distinction between art and life and produces a kind of silence in 
the work itself. There is nothing in it that requires me to look in 
one place or another, in fact, requires me to look at all. I can look 
through it to the world beyond. . . . So he’s telling us something 
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that we perhaps haven’t yet learned, when we speak as we do so 
glibly of the blurring of the distinction between art and life. Or 
perhaps he’s bringing us back to Thoreau: yes and no are lies.75
Sometimes this attitude has been considered an eclectic, un-
critical or unoriginal recycling of historical sources, such as 
in the dismissal of the cross-boundary experimentation of the 
late 1950s with the pejorative label of Neo-Dada in the critical 
writing of Thomas Hess and others, or, as in the work of Peter 
Bürger, as the rejection of the workings of the neo-avantgarde as 
a market-oriented institutionalisation and aestheticisation of the 
institution-critical (and fundamentally anti-aesthetic) attitude of 
the historical avant-garde.76 In its polemical eagerness to present 
a situation as black and white, this kind of dismissal ignores the 
complexity of the process in which the redefinition of a discur-
sive order can both activate and be activated by a historiographic 
reformulation. It was not the change to historical knowledge it-
self that was crucial to the establishment of an open aesthetic 
but the real and active reinterpretation of this knowledge that 
took place in artistic and theoretical practice. Seen in this light, 
the historical avant-garde emerges as a far more complex, con-
tradictory and ambivalent source than the institutionalisation of 
the post-war period and the historiography of modernism would 
have it appear. If the late 1950s is to be considered a critical 
juncture in the history of modern art, which seems appropriate 
in many ways, the change involved is one that occurs as part of 
a continuity.
But even if the subcultural arts circles of New York at this time 
displayed a multiplicity and a concentration without parallel in 
the contemporary world, their cross-boundary ambitions were 
far from unique. Quite the opposite, as similar activities could be 
witnessed elsewhere in the United States, Europe and other parts 
of the world, with artists seeking in various ways and (initially) 
independently of one another to discover new forms while also 
searching for alternative historical sources and attempting to de-
fine different aesthetic problems. And it is in this particular regard 
that Umberto Eco’s argument becomes of serious interest in rela-
tion to the visual arts. Moreover, the distinctions he draws can be 
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made considerably more useful for our purposes if their scope is 
broadened from the definition of a new type of work (the open 
artwork) to the identification of a fundamental change in aesthetic 
approach (the open aesthetic). The point of this operation is to 
make possible a discussion of underlying attitudes, rather than a 
comparison based on form or stylistic similarity, so as to explicitly 
transcend an essentialist view of the work as a closed structure of 
meaning and encompass all artistic media, while also describing 
an international phenomenon irrespective of the formation of na-
tional schools, derivations of influences, normative examples and 
distinctions between the centre and the periphery.
The aim here is not to establish a new historical category 
for the inclusion and exclusion of ideas, works and names. It 
is, rather, to identify and clarify an underlying context: to in-
terpret and understand a number of disparate historical pheno-
mena, documents, images and other representations on the basis 
of what might be described as a specific discursive order. The 
open aesthetic does not entail a definitive historical rupture in 
this respect but rather a shift of the focus within the discourse of 
modernity. What this opens up is, in fact, the ‘as’ which precedes 
‘art’ in Ad Reinhardt’s phrase—a displacement of the conceivable 
boundaries within which artistic practice and interpretation are 
possible and legitimate. This open ‘as’ serves to characterise a 
change in attitude, which affects both the way the work is seen 
(as artwork), its meaning as a work of art and the relationship 
of the originator as well as the observer to the work. This is a 
shift that may be described in the words of Hal Foster as a tran-
sition from emphasising the work as quality to understanding it 
as interest.77 That is, it is a shift away from a focus on normative 
critique, presence and essence in order to move beyond estab-
lished (stylistic, aesthetic, medial) categories and to emphasise 
the communicative situation of the work. This does not mean 
that the extremely disparate contexts the open aesthetic describes 
lacked norms in the form of discursive rules for the possible and 
acceptable, but rather that those norms were not to be derived 
from a fixed, essentialist or teleological relation to the specific 
nature of the medium, the logic of history or the authentic style 
of the individual.
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The Play of Opposites
American theatre and dance historian Sally Banes’ book 
Greenwich Village 1963 (1993) is that unusual thing: a mono-
graph of a single year as observed from a single place. The reason 
she chose this particular geographic and temporal location was its 
crucial importance, in her view, to an entirely new direction in the 
cultural life of the United States:
In 1963 what we now call the Sixties began. For political histori-
ans that year is memorable for the nuclear test ban treaty, the his-
toric civil rights March on Washington, U.S. help in overthrowing 
the Diem government in Vietnam and the increase of American 
advisers there twentyfold, President John F. Kennedy’s visit to the 
Berlin Wall, the deepening Sino-Soviet split, and the assassination 
in Dallas, among other events. But in 1963 another kind of his-
tory and another kind of politics were being made, in Greenwich 
Village, New York City. This was a political history that had noth-
ing to do with the states, governments, or armies, or with public 
resistance. It had, instead, to do with art and its role in American 
life. For it was not only the policymakers in Washington who were 
shaping American postwar culture, but also, importantly, groups 
of individuals setting forth models of daily life for a generation – 
gently loosening the social and cultural fabric by merging private 
and public life, work and play, art and ordinary experience. . . . 
There was a feeling – so unlike the early 1990s – that all things 
were possible. . .and permitted.78
This might be thought a flagrant example of the kind of revolu-
tionary dramaturgy we referred to earlier, with a pivotal moment 
being fixed upon as the introduction to an era. But Banes’ book 
is more interesting than that. What she actually does is break up 
traditional types of linear and/or evolutionist narratives by al-
lowing a multiplicity of diverse periods, contradictory styles and 
ambivalent attitudes to intersect at a singular, albeit composite, 
focus. The focal point she describes could be considered the cul-
mination of a process over many years in the art and cultural 
worlds of New York in which forms of expression that had op-
erated as subcultural manifestations in relation to the established 
culture, remaining in hiding as it were, were gradually rising to 
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the surface and increasingly coming to define the discursive order 
of cultural life.
A counterpart in the art world to Banes’ list is the extraordi-
narily rapid impact of Pop Art on New York and the United States 
at the end of 1962 and during 1963. This much discussed period 
can be read to advantage through Banes’ study, particularly in 
order to restore to Pop Art a feature it later lost as a result, for 
the most part, of its institutional internalisation: its close con-
nection with a subcultural scene and with a diverse arrangement 
of social, political, sexual, aesthetic and medial groups. Pop Art 
may be considered a product of this cultural melting-pot, whose 
once so-obviously transgressive tendencies had both social and 
aesthetic aspects. Susan Sontag attempted to convey something 
along these lines in ‘Notes On Camp’ (1964), whose argument 
recreates the historical backdrop vital to an understanding of how 
alien Pop Art and its specific sensibility must once have appeared 
to its contemporaries before it was fixed, classified and made the 
object of theory as an idea.79
An interesting aspect of this institutional transformation of 
living culture is that it expresses a relationship of a more gen-
eral kind between two different interpretive positions: the way 
in which a phenomenon occurs within a particular temporal and 
discursive framework and then undergoes a transformation when 
that framework is exchanged, for example, when an object is 
shifted from serving a particular contextual function to becoming 
a museum exhibit. The issue may also be formulated directly with 
reference to the work of art, in which case it concerns the rela-
tion between the signifier and the signified: what happens, that 
is, to the surrounding world when it is transformed, manipulated 
and encapsulated within the borders of the work. Although this 
is an ancient and incredibly complex question within the history 
of art, it emerged in various ways as an issue of acute importance 
for many of the avant-garde movements of the twentieth century, 
when it was sometimes formulated in terms of an attempt to bridge 
the divide between art and life. This divide has taken on an almost 
metaphorical significance at times, with the prescription for bridg-
ing it set out in diametrically opposed ways: from a metaphysical 
conviction of the immediate communicative capacity of the image 
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(Kandinsky) to the idea of abandoning the individual work in fa-
vour of a universal form of plastic representation (Mondrian).80 
The issue may already have been overplayed by the beginning of 
the 1960s, but the solutions proposed by Cage, Rauschenberg or 
Warhol were radically different from those provided by any of the 
artists practising in Europe of the 1910s.
It is not only the change itself that is interesting, but also the 
problematic issues with which the open aesthetic confronts the 
interpreter. How, for example, should one interpret the sounds 
that happen to occur in a particular performance of John Cage’s 
4'33? Can such a question even be put in relation to this work? 
Are we not, in fact, confronted in this instance with an aesthetic 
that in its most radical extension makes any interpretive activity 
impossible?
The answer to these questions is fundamentally semiotic in 
nature and concerns whether it is even possible to distinguish a 
particular phenomenon as a sign, whether a sound, a movement 
or a material item or sediment when inscribed into a particular 
conventional space (the art world, the work of art) is transformed 
from substance into form, thus becoming a sign that can be inter-
preted. But even if the problem is rarely as complicated as in the 
case of 4'33, it is nevertheless one the viewer is forced to confront 
in relation to large parts of the work created by arts practitioners 
from the 1960s onwards. The interesting question here is not 
whether something is a work of art, but how meaning is generated 
within the framework of the open aesthetic and how meanings 
may be transformed by institutional relocations.
****
When Öyvind Fahlström’s Dr. Schweitzer’s Last Mission 
 (1964–66) was shown for the first time at the Venice Biennale of 
1966, it attracted a great deal of international attention. Fahlström 
was among the preliminary favourites for the major painting 
prize (Premio Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri), which was 
ultimately awarded to the Argentinian Julio Le Parc. The work 
had been produced for display at the institution that had estab-
lished itself in the post-war period as the foremost international 
shop-window of the art world and, hence, as the gatekeeper for 
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the established order of the discourse. It was bought that same 
year by the gallery owner Sidney Janis in New York, who sold it 
to Moderna Museet in Stockholm in 1970. It would be futile to 
attempt to distinguish between sensibility and concept when faced 
with a work that was so evidently produced within the frame-
work of the established institutions of the art world, because the 
sensibility of the open aesthetic had become the very concept the 
institutions of the art world were busy producing and reproduc-
ing at this time.
It is the very normality of the Venice Biennale of 1966 that is so 
interesting here in that it demonstrates that a significant change 
had taken place on the international art scene and that the open 
aesthetic had become a self-evident part of the institutionalised 
establishment. The exhibition lacked even a vestige of the her-
oism that characterised other aspects of the turbulent political 
and cultural history of the 1960s, such as the legendary Biennales 
held in 1964 and 1968.81 In a similar vein, Dr. Schweitzer’s Last 
Mission could be said to represent a type of structure, concept 
and aesthetic that was normal for the more radical end of the in-
stitutional and economic structure of the art world—the part that 
ended up in the history books. Although the position adopted by 
Fahlström’s works at this time makes them typical of the serious 
art of the 1960s, this does not mean they are mediocre or unin-
teresting, quite the contrary. Indeed, Dr. Schweitzer’s Last Mission 
provides a striking example of the aesthetic and linguistic inter-
face that encompassed large parts of the visual arts of the 1960s.
The work is made up of 68 parts in different materials that 
are hung in a three-dimensional space. The relationships between 
the visual elements are not fixed but determined by the person 
responsible for the exhibition, which means that the design of the 
work can (and should) vary between each display. The 68 painted 
elements of the work are hung in a clearly defined area that should 
indicate its spatial extent. The viewer was originally supposed to 
be able to move freely within this real space, but this is no lon-
ger permitted today. The structure of the work is not predeter-
mined, and the fixed (hard) shapes of the visual elements have 
pronounced contours, which makes them appear to be discrete 
signs in the syntax of a pictorial language.
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A peculiar relationship to several of the components that are 
of traditional importance in the history of art may be discerned 
here. First, Fahlström did not execute the workmanship himself 
but delegated it to the artist, and his then-wife, Barbro Östlihn—a 
circumstance that was openly declared initially but subsequently 
toned down.82 Second, the space of the work seems most peculiar. 
The various pictorial elements are set within a frame that con-
stitutes a fixed temporal situation; they are parts of a narrative 
(although a fragmentary one) and therefore also encompass an el-
ement of time. This means that they exist at once as a space, a nar-
rative and a relationship between part and whole. Dr. Schweitzer’s 
Last Mission is not fundamentally different from the paintings 
of previous eras in this regard. But the fact that the dividing line 
between the pictorial space and the space of the viewer is blurred 
makes the medial identity of the work less than clear. Can this 
be called painting at all? Yes, if it is the artist who says it is. In 
structural terms, however, this is a painting located in the bor-
derlands between painting, the multiple and the installation that 
simultaneously challenges and extends the specific boundaries of 
the medium.
In terms of its scale and subject matter, the work could be 
described as a modern variant of history painting—une grande 
machine (a great machine)—however, that evidently produces a 
very different history than the allegorical stagings of academic 
discourse. Fahlström’s particular status as artist and critic should 
be taken into consideration when attempting to understand this 
approach. From the beginning of the 1950s, he had been a driving 
force in Swedish cultural life in terms of introducing new types of 
visual art, literature, poetry, music and film. At the same time that 
Umberto Eco was publishing Opera aperta, Öyvind Fahlström 
was summarising a number of cross-medial features he believed 
he could discern in the radical art of the day: the participation of 
the observer in the execution of the work; the ever increasing im-
portance of chance; a nonnormative and value-relative approach 
to art; open and unfinished forms; a nonhierarchical approach to 
material, methods and genres; an anti-symbolic and antiexpres-
sionist view of objects as physical and visual facts.83 Although 
Fahlström could never match Eco in terms of analytic acuity, he 
288 Modernism as Institution
clearly possessed an unusual overview of the front line of contem-
porary culture, as well as an ability to transform his theoretical 
and empirical insights into images. Indeed, Dr. Schweitzer’s Last 
Mission appears almost to be a visual manifesto of the changes in 
the aesthetic position of contemporary painting. To borrow Craig 
Owen’s specifically postmodern definition of allegory—the super-
imposition of texts, the fragments, the movement outward from 
the work, the active role of the viewer—Dr. Schweitzer’s Last 
Mission could be said to constitute an allegorical reflection on the 
contemporary period and its art.84 One layer of meaning refers to 
a peculiar hodgepodge of allusions to espionage, surveillance, vi-
olence, the Cold War balance of power and other more quotidian 
aspects of high and mass culture, while another seems to speak of 
the possibilities of painting as an artistic medium.
The corollary of this twofold perspective is that the individual 
pictorial elements are, of course, important for the understanding 
of the work. The question is simply in what way they are import-
ant. Several years before, Fahlström had described in the essay 
‘Manipulating the World’ (1962) how he conceived of the way in 
which the pictorial elements would function in variable paintings:
These elements, while materially fixed, achieve their character-iden-
tity only when they are put together; their character changes with 
each new arrangement. The arrangement grows out of a combi-
nation of the rules (the chance factor) and my intentions, and is 
shown in a “score” or “scenario” (in the form of drawings, photo-
graphs or small paintings). The isolated elements are thus not 
paintings, but machinery to make paintings. Picture organ. The 
finished picture stands somewhere on the intersection of paintings, 
games (type Monopoly and war games) and puppet theatre.85
What is being established here is a structure that appears to make 
traditional hermeneutics implode: should you manage to extri-
cate yourself from the forest of individual pictorial elements and 
the almost endless permutations of references, meanings, cross- 
references and connotations, you discover that the structure as 
a whole has been changed by a new hang. And yet this artwork, 
like every other, can be interpreted. The ambivalence between the 
apparent and the concealed, the familiar and the unknown, is 
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actually a fundamental aesthetic principle in Fahlström’s work, 
particularly when fairly simple pictorial elements, which a con-
temporary viewer would presumably have been able to identify 
immediately, are contrasted with mysterious combinations of 
fragments and transformations of the familiar. The combination 
of a great diversity of discrete pictorial elements with the existence 
of an explanatory text—Minnesanteckningar (till ‘Dr.Schweitzers 
sista uppdrag’) [Memoranda (to ‘Dr Schweitzer’s Last Mission’)] 
of 1964—could be seen as actually inviting a close reading: to-
gether, they serve to encourage an iconographic interpretation. 
The arrangement makes for an almost embarrassing correspon-
dence with Marcel Duchamp’s The Large Glass and its relation-
ship to the Green Box.86
In Jean-François Chevrier’s view, the various pictorial elements 
in Fahlström’s work may be seen as conventional character types 
that possess the obvious meaning of hieroglyphs (in which a hand 
means a hand).87 While the comparison is interesting, the conclu-
sion drawn seems peculiar to say the least. In hieroglyphic script, 
each sign can convey a multiplicity of meanings both on its own 
and in relation to other signs. These meanings are, however, de-
termined by a conventional set of rules, which gives the script a 
linear syntax that can be translated into other written languages. 
Since premodern times, hieroglyphs have also been associated 
with occult knowledge and mysticism, and it is this aspect of tra-
dition that makes the comparison interesting: allowing the origi-
nal cultural significance of the character types to be transformed 
into different, alien and possibly hidden meanings. Instead of 
functioning as hieroglyphs (signs in a conventional written lan-
guage), the pictorial elements allude to the hieroglyphic (with its 
mystical connotations in Western cultural history). A work such 
as Dr. Schweitzer’s Last Mission is one that both opens and closes 
itself at the same time.
An illustrative example is provided by the pictorial element that 
serves as a key to understanding the title of the work. Here we 
have a portrait of Fahlström that can be put together with a pic-
ture representing a scene (inscribed in the silhouette of a woman) 
in which the weeping doctor and missionary, Albert Schweitzer, 
looks up at the night sky and a passing rocket (or missile). The 
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iconicity of the individual visual signs does not constitute a prob-
lem here; a little historical knowledge makes it possible to identify 
the various individuals and objects. But how is one to interpret 
the individual pictorial elements and their variable reciprocal re-
lationships in particular? It has been pointed out that here, as in 
several other parts of the work, it is possible to see how various 
elements have been put together as pairs of opposites that are 
based on similarity and/or paradoxes.88 An example is provided 
by the contour line between the two detachable pictorial elements. 
They form the silhouette of a woman who is kissing a man and, 
at the same time, a portrait of the artist. Together, they create a 
scenario full of mystery. The dividing line connotes both closeness 
and separation. How are we to understand the scene of a weeping 
Dr Schweitzer? Is he a witness to truth—a good man who was 
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1952—weeping over the arms 
race or the madness of the modern age? Or is he an outdated rem-
nant of the old colonial order bemoaning the changes taking place 
in the present? And what does he have to do with Fahlström, who 
is looking at us while being kissed by a woman who has been 
reduced to a silhouette? Should we understand the way the artist 
gazes at us in terms of an established convention by which an 
individual in a historical scene gazes out of the pictorial space in 
order to establish a connection with the viewer? In that case, the 
gaze would seem to be encouraging the viewer to reflect on some-
thing. The question then is what should we reflect on?
****
Naturally, more general themes could be attributed to the various 
images. The iconic significance of each individual pictorial ele-
ment cannot, however, be related to a fixed iconographic scheme.89 
The open structure actually communicates nothing more than its 
own situation, which is that of being a situation: the artist who 
leaves the work unfinished, the work that establishes a structure 
of meaning that highlights the establishment by the work of struc-
tures of meaning, the viewer who tries in vain to decipher a final 
and inherent meaning.
Fahlström wrote about this state of affairs in a 1961 article in 
which he characterised the concrete poetry of the day, which can 
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also be read as a draft of his own poetics: ‘The basic mistrust of 
symbolism (allegorical and surrealistic alike) leads to an affinity 
for everyday materials and subjects, worn banalities lacking in 
overtones. . .’90 A fundamental tenet of Fahlström’s poetics is to 
avoid providing any kind of key. Applied to the visual arts (to 
Dr. Schweitzer’s Last Mission), this provides an explanation of 
a possible way of reading that goes beyond those established by 
art-critical and art-historical praxis during the twentieth century: 
at once iconography and formalism and an existential, sympa-
thetic interpretation (Einfühlung). At this point, any notion of 
the work as an organic whole, of the idiom as a complete and 
nonreducible structure, of the subject as a linear narrative and 
its signs as representations of a coherent world-image, seems to 
disintegrate. Fahlström’s use of images, texts and objects calls that 
of Rauschenberg to mind inasmuch as they both simultaneously 
separate and link together material with the aim of displacing ac-
customed conventions so as to create a polysemous field of asso-
ciation. The very argument used by Branden Joseph to describe 
the strictly iconographic interpretation of Rauschenberg’s work 
as meaningless also appears to apply to Fahlström’s work. While 
it would not be impossible to establish an iconographic scheme, 
a scheme of that kind could be established at any point and have 
any direction.91 Here it is the absence of a key that emerges as a 
crucial insight into how to understand this poetics and the ways 
of reading it (a leaf possesses no absolute and privileged view-
point from which it can be defined and understood).92
The iconographic interpretation of Fahlström’s work may, in 
fact, be seen to fulfil a twofold function: it draws attention to 
particular meaning-saturated fields of association as a result of 
its strongly logocentric tendency to fix a specific meaning, while 
simultaneously demonstrating the openness of that meaning by 
failing to connect together the individual signs into a uniform pro-
gramme. For the viewer who refuses to take up the challenge of a 
close reading posed by the work, the arbitrariness of its meaning 
and its subversive potential remain concealed under the noncom-
mittal surface of the visual spectacle. This pursuit of a poetics 
based on a way of reading that transcends both form and content 
could be compared with changes in other artistic media of the 
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same period. An example Fahlström himself often referred to was 
so-called Concrete Poetry.93
Öyvind Fahlström described the new function of poetry in his 
manifesto Hätilaragulprfåtskilaben. Manifest förkonkretpoesi 
(1954):
Poetry is not only for analysis; it is also structure. Not just struc-
ture with the emphasis on expression of ideas, but also concrete 
structure. Let’s say good-bye to all systematic or spontaneous de-
piction of private psychological, contemporary cultural or univer-
sal problems. Words are symbols, of course, but that’s no reason 
why poetry shouldn’t be experienced and written on the basis of 
language as concrete matter.94
Here, language is no longer seen as a conventional system of 
references (to the objects, ideas, feelings and perceptions of the 
surrounding world) but as linguistic material to play with: un-
expected new word formations in order to evoke new associa-
tions, systematic reductions of words and sentences in order to 
expose new structural connections, distortions of words and syn-
tax, experiments with the sonic qualities of words and with vi-
sual and typographically embellished interweavings of words and 
sentences in complex ideograms (sound-image-poems). In a work 
such as Dr. Schweitzer’s Last Mission, Fahlström can be seen to 
be actively employing a poetics derived from the concrete poetry 
and abstract sign painting (signifigurations) of the 1950s, a poet-
ics that he had transformed in the variable paintings of the 1960s 
with their explicit iconic references to the surrounding world.95 
Even though the aesthetic devices and referentiality of the sign 
had changed, the code remained the same, so to speak.
The concrete aspect of this poetics is reminiscent of the efforts 
of many other artists, poets, composers and writers at this time. 
An example can be found in John Cage’s description of Robert 
Rauschenberg’s combine-paintings, with particular reference to 
the use/reuse of objects and motifs:
This is not a composition. It is a place where things are, as a table 
or as a town seen from the air: any one of them could be removed 
and another come into its place through circumstances analogous 
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to birth and death, travel, housecleaning, or cluttering. . . . There 
is no more subject in a combine than there is in a page from a 
newspaper. Each thing that is there is a subject. It is a situation in-
volving multiplicity. . . . Of course there are objects. . . . And object 
is fact, not symbol.96
Everything on the canvas, from the concrete objects to the paint, 
appears to be physical and material facts, recorded and selected in 
order to be used in a specific context (a work of art). A very differ-
ent approach to painting and the image is being described here that 
is strongly reminiscent of Leo Steinberg’s concept of the flatbed 
picture plane: a place that no longer takes its orientation from that 
of the upright human body but is organised instead as a horizontal 
surface filled with objects, signs and images, whose reference is not 
to (natural, optical) perception but to a (cultural, interpretive) co-
ordination and confrontation of information with signification.97 
The paradigmatic model would be the groaning desk rather than 
the open transparent window or the vertical opaque surface of the 
nonfigurative image. Irrespective of whether the canvas then hangs 
on a wall or lies on the floor (or is transformed into an installation 
or a happening), this way of organising and reading the work ap-
pears to be radically different from that of older traditions, a way 
of reading that is neither illusory nor symbolic.
A similar nonsymbolic and nonpsychological aesthetic is also 
found among the practitioners of the nouveau roman, such as 
Alain Robbe-Grillet, who wrote in the foreword to Dans le laby-
rinth (1959)
Yet the reality in question is a strictly material one; that is, it is 
subject to no allegorical interpretation. The reader is therefore re-
quested to see in it only the objects, actions, words, and events 
which are described, without attempting to give them either more 
or less meaning than in his own life, or his own death.98
The long descriptions of passages of time, objects and interiors that 
Robbe-Grillet presents have no symbolic or metaphorical function 
but serve instead as an inventory of the sensory perceptions the 
narrator receives from a particular place and time. Roland Barthes 
has also described this aesthetic in the following terms:
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The novel becomes a direct experience of man’s surroundings, 
without this man’s being able to fall back on psychology, a meta-
physic, or psychoanalysis in order to approach the objective milieu 
he discovers. The novel here is no longer of a chthonic, infernal 
order, it is terrestrial: it teaches us to look at the world no longer 
with the eyes of a confessor, a physician, or of God – all significant 
hypostases of the classical novelist – but with the eyes of a man 
walking in his city with no other horizon but the spectacle before 
him, no other power than of his own eyes.99
The horizon of the narrative is the observation of a passage of 
time by an individual human being at ground level that offers no 
possibility of an overarching understanding of its logic or causal 
connections. There is an explicit aversion in the nouveau roman 
towards any kind of transcendent humanism, towards all finished 
metaphysical or psychological constructions. The world and its 
objects are not presented through sentimental or anecdotal fic-
tion, by means of mysticism or riddles; they are neither absurd 
nor meaningful. The structure of the narrative in the work of 
an author such as Robbe-Grillet resembles a construction that 
simulates the experience of the various aimless moments of the 
everyday, without reference to any privileged and hierarchical 
viewpoint but in which the viewer is given an active, co-creative 
role, rather than passively receiving a finished presentation of the 
world.100
It is, however, not necessarily the depiction of everyday life—in 
the sense of observable, true-to-life references to the surrounding 
world—that is important here but, rather, the view taken of the 
concrete function and value of language/matter. Neither does this 
involve some naive form of realism but a metarealism that high-
lights the descriptive or interpretive activity itself (on the part of 
the artist and the viewer), instead of providing a simple inclusion 
and or description of the individual objects, images and signs lo-
cated in the work.
Examples of similar aesthetic motives can be found in a range 
of artistic genres at this time. A nonfigurative artist such as Frank 
Stella may be considered a counterpart to Rauschenberg. In the 
mid-1960s, Stella characterised his own art and aesthetics as fol-
lows: ‘My painting is based on the fact that only what can be 
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seen there is there. It really is an object. . . . [Y]ou can see the 
whole idea without any confusion. . . What you see is what you 
see.’101 A statement of this kind may appear on first reading to be 
a noncommittal and all but mystifying tautology in imitation of 
Ad Reinhardt. But the attitude it reveals is one that is prepared to 
take the focus of modernism (and Abstract Expressionism in par-
ticular) on the visual beyond the boundary of the material: paint 
and idiom are no longer seen as conveying anything (a content) 
apart from their own physical existence; the composition (the bal-
ancing of shapes) has been discarded in favour of a presentation 
of a symmetrical pattern, and the originality of the brushstroke 
has been abandoned in favour of a neutral application of indus-
trial pigment to an untreated canvas. The pigment and the can-
vas emerge as concrete and real objects in the concrete and real 
physical space of the viewer. This is, in other words, an aesthetic 
that transgresses an earlier modernist nonfigurative tradition (in 
terms of both its metaphysical implications and its belief in the 
work as an organic whole) while pointing forward to some of the 
movements of the 1960s (the visual facticity of Pop Art and the 
material objecticality of Minimalism). Absent as well is any trend 
towards representative vision.
The point of referring to all these highly diverse examples is 
not to indicate the existence of an implicit programme or a least 
common denominator for all the different art forms of the 1960s. 
Rather, it is to demonstrate the considerable extent to which what 
we have referred to as the open aesthetic involves the multivalent 
transformation of visual signs in movement through the context 
called art: the dual aspect of the goat as physical object and lin-
guistic sign in Rauschenberg’s Monogram; the visuality and mate-
riality of paint and canvas in Stella’s paintings of the early 1960s. 
We are confronted here, perhaps more clearly than anywhere else, 
with a realisation that the interpretation of the visual arts also 
has to transcend appearance and stylistic criteria. In the case of 
Dr. Schweitzer’s Last Mission, realism has as much to do with 
form (the variable and spatial structure of the work) as content 
(the references to the surrounding world). For this is painting 
that has, as Pontus Hultén put it, ‘abandoned the wall’ and been 
transformed into ‘theatre, games, psychodrama’.102 Or to put it 
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another way: painting whose realism serves as the concrete ex-
istence of the work and of its interaction with the viewer in a 
real space-time. The absence of a key here is not a metaphor for 
freedom in general or an escape manoeuvre from responsibility 
but a crucial means of understanding the content and function of 
the piece. Having served as a fixed and inherent meaning, content 
now emerges as an indication of one fragmentary context among 
many others to which the text can be related. The meaning of the 
work is altered as a result, from encompassing the content of the 
sign to pointing out its function.
The interpretation of Dr. Schweitzer’s Last Mission is not aimed 
at deciphering what the work means but at an attempt to under-
stand how it means. In my view, this is the truly radical content 
of Fahlström’s piece; this is what it encourages us to contemplate. 
The particular dialectic between the presence of boundaries and 
the transgression of boundaries can be considered one of the fun-
damental subjects of Dr. Schweitzer’s Last Mission. The existence 
of a certain traditional order is a precondition for playing with 
the rules and boundaries of the medium. Similarly, the openness of 
meaning also appears to be a game that presupposes the existence 
of a traditional view that holds that meaning is fixed as essen-
tial and intrinsic in every work of art. Several years previously, 
Fahlström had formulated an ideal (based on contemporary con-
crete poetry and aleatory music) that radicalised the remnants of 
traditional composition still to be found in the visual arts:
The open form: one prefers an imperfection of form, a more or 
less consciously incomplete, unsurveyable and unforeseeable form, 
fluid and present, as opposed to the anecdotal/thematic/aphoristic 
form, which piles up past moments like steps to perceived goals, 
peripetia and climaxes. A form that does not mark a beginning or 
an end and that can be entered and exited at any time and place.103
The open structure is intimately connected with the communica-
tive and meaning-generative aspects of the work, with the relation 
to the viewer being one of the work’s constituent factors. Seen in 
this light, Dr. Schweitzer’s Last Mission emerges as a dramatisa-
tion of the changing view of the ontology and meaning-function 
of the work of art at this time, as a staging of the artwork as 
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a meaning-producing machine, in which the traditionally static 
structures of form and pictorial space are transformed at a met-
aphorical level into an open space of meaning—into an arena of 
possibilities and possible readings—in which the viewer is able 
to move, both figuratively and literally, searching for connections 
and associations, choosing the direction of travel and selecting 
focal points, but never fixing either a stable relationship between 
the parts and the whole or an accepted core of meaning.
However, the structure that Fahlström establishes is far too strict 
and far too compelling simply to be characterised by an expression 
as vague as ‘an arena of possibilities’. At issue is rather a game of 
opposites. It is no accident that he refers to games and games theory 
on many different occasions. A game implies the existence of a set 
of rules and the necessity of interaction, which indeed appear to be 
two key themes in his work. And yet even this particular combina-
tion may also seem much too static to describe the radically variable 
elements in Fahlström’s work. The crucial aspect of the reference to 
rules here is not the fixing of a set of rules as such but the dialectic 
between the establishment of those rules and their dissolution. An 
example is provided by one of his earlier paintings, Performing K.K. 
no. 2 (Sunday Edition) of 1963–64. In this work, he took George 
Harriman’s comic character ‘KrazyKat’ as his starting point and 
transformed the already absurd storyline into a subversive and al-
most hallucinogenic narrative structure. Fahlström appears to have 
transferred the structure of his earlier nonfigurative sign paintings 
to one of the most regulated genres of the visual arts in modern 
society: the comic. A crash, a dislocation, occurs here between two 
different logical systems, with the image operating in the field of 
tension between a particular fundamental structure (a conventional 
understanding of the linear structure of the narrative) and the disso-
lution of the structure (in execution and interpretation).
In a 1966 article, Fahlström described how the relationship be-
tween the freedom provided by the variation and manipulation of 
the components exists in direct proportion to the rigidity of the 
rules and the invariability of the components.104 At issue here is 
an aesthetic that is far removed from free association, amorphous 
form-experiments and spontaneity. In this context, the word 
‘game’ means a combination of rules and interaction.
298 Modernism as Institution
This combination was formulated by Fahlström in a way that 
suggests that the work/sign could have both an aesthetic and a 
political dimension. In a situation in which every structure, every 
convention and every rule appear to be arbitrary, they can—to 
the extent the possibility is conceived of—be changed or manip-
ulated. This is not, however, a matter of creating art for political 
purposes or as a form of agitation but about setting up instead a 
potentially subversive linguistic approach that has been arrived at 
through the various experiments of modernism. As in previously 
cited examples, it is the direction that is crucial here: the move-
ment through linguistic analysis, through the examples of history, 
in order to arrive at life through the image.
A mediation of this kind also serves to illuminate the hierarchi-
cal structure existing between the value sphere of the visual arts 
and other cultural domains. Benjamin Buchloh has described this 
unequal relationship as a double negation that is institutionally 
inscribed in the concept of the art:
Every time the avant-garde appropriates elements from the discourse 
of low, folk, or mass culture, it publicly denounces its own elitist iso-
lation and the obsolescence of its inherited production procedures. 
Ultimately, each such instance of “bridging the gap between art and 
life”, as Robert Rauschenberg famously put it, only reaffirms the 
stability of the division because it remains within the context of high 
art. Each act of cultural appropriation, therefore, constructs a sim-
ulacrum of double negation, denying the validity of individual and 
original production, yet denying equally the relevance of the specific 
context and function of the work’s own practice.105
Buchloh’s analysis is entirely correct in describing a movement 
that values the destination of the individual element rather than 
its origin, such that the grafting onto the artwork of the surround-
ing world leads inexorably to a transformation. This is a function, 
as it were, of the kind of semiotic formation of meaning that the 
art world makes possible, in which every fragment of the outside 
world constitutes undifferentiated substance until it undergoes 
transformation in the work of art and becomes form.
But the occasionally radical use of visual material within the 
open aesthetic cannot be described as unambiguously as Buchloh 
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would have it in terms of visual and semantic colonisation. The 
transformation constitutes a zone of its own on the boundary be-
tween the art world and the wider one, with the fragments left dan-
gling between them. The angora goat in Rauschenberg’s Monogram 
is transformed into a visual sign in this work, while also retaining 
something of its origins (the angora goat and the stuffed angora 
goat, respectively). The selection of visual elements is of major sig-
nificance because the transformation works in both directions. This 
becomes particularly clear in a work such as Monogram because 
the goat occupies such a prominent visual place; indeed, within 
the art world’s system of norms its goatness was once perceived as 
an extraordinarily aggressive sign. Here, as in the previous history 
of modernism, the circulation of signs involves a multiplication of 
voices and a multiplication of meaningful contexts.
The movement we are referring to here both opens up and 
closes down the possible production of meaning and value in 
the world of art and in the wider world. It may be entirely cor-
rect, as Buchloh writes, that this process takes place within the 
framework of Art as its institutional and authoritative focal point. 
Nevertheless, a distinction must be drawn between the movement 
taking place in the present (and actively challenging the validity 
of the distinction) and the historicisation of that movement, in 
which the provocative gesture is archived and codified together 
with other similar gestures and where the potential connection be-
tween serious art and popular culture is transformed into a purely 
art-historical context. In complete contrast with what Buchloh 
writes, Rauschenberg denies the very possibility of bridging the 
gulf between art and life. And it is for this very reason that he 
realises the necessity for operating in this breach.
This seems to be one of the clearest formulations of the artist’s 
linguistic and existential dilemma in the modern era of differenti-
ation and fragmentation, in which the boundary to a once natural 
unity has been forever breached with no possibility of return. It 
is a formulation that seems to confirm that Art is art as art (and 
that everything else is everything else) while also expressing dis-
belief that the artist will ever be able to (re)gain access to that 
unity. Authentic art—like authentic life—appears to be a beautiful 
but fragile illusion to which we are continually drawn back but 
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which vanishes as soon as someone reaches out a hand to grasp it. 
Rauschenberg’s phrase conveys not a trace of nostalgia but rather 
the reverse: an active desire to explore this particular divide. While 
he quite clearly commits a form of violence against the origin and 
meaning of the individual objects and pictorial fragments, so, too, 
do every interpretation and every quotation. As I see it, the ethical 
dilemma is not to be found in the forms of appropriation that con-
stitute artistic practice but rather in the tendency of the historiog-
raphy of the post-war period to read this practice in terms of much 
more rigid narratives and structures of meaning. To point out once 
again the gulf between art and life, and to reemphasise its value, 
would be to revitalise the subversive and transgressive values that 
the avant-garde once produced, irrespective of whether we are re-
ferring to European art of the 1910s or American art of the 1960s.
As in Octavio Paz’s definition of modernity, art never appears 
as itself in this context but always as another. And to the extent 
that the idea of this gulf has been realised and institutionalised as 
a discursive order, art, like modernity, is condemned to pluralism. 
This is the radical interpretation, as it were, of Rauschenberg’s 
definition and of modernism as the aesthetic of openness.
The open aesthetic does not, in practice, entail a break with the 
self-reflexive and self-critical aesthetic of modernism. The realism 
of a work by Cage, Rauschenberg, Stella, Fahlström or Robbe-
Grillet only exists in the sense that the surrounding world has re-
entered the centre of the work through a filter of linguistic forms 
and historical reflections; this involves language, medium, memory, 
convention and history just as much as the world outside the work. 
But unlike the theories of early modernism, the open aesthetic pro-
vides an approach that distrusts the romantic view of the symbol, 
of organic unity and essential expression, whether these apply to 
the ontological status of the sign or to the communicative func-
tion of the work. The metalevel actualised here and in many other 
places in the visual arts of the 1960s could, in fact, be considered to 
have been a precondition of the comprehensive aesthetic disloca-
tion within the discourse of the visual arts. The phenomenon could 
be likened to the growing historiographic interest that always 
seems to surround shifts in the discursive order of the historical 
and aesthetic disciplines: in order to go beyond the boundary of the 
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possible and legitimate, that boundary (its historical and theoreti-
cal determinants) has to be made visible and analysed.
The transgression of these parameters may be considered in 
light of the much more radical shift from work to frame that 
Craig Owens has described as a key aspect of the transition from 
modernism to postmodernism:
Rather, postmodernism approaches the empty space left by the 
author’s disappearance from a different perspective, one which 
brings to light a number of questions that modernism, with its ex-
clusive focus on the work of art and its “creator”, either ignored or 
repressed: Where do exchanges between readers and viewers take 
place? Who is free to define, manipulate and, ultimately, to bene-
fit from the codes and conventions of cultural production? These 
questions shift attention away from the work and its producer and 
onto its frame – the first by focusing on the location in which the 
work of art is encountered; the second, by insisting on the social 
nature of artistic production and reception.106
Fahlström’s work and his aesthetic may be seen as a histori-
cal symptom of such a major shift; however, this misses a cru-
cial point: these transgressions entail a dislocation within and 
throughout the order of modernist discourse. At issue here are an 
artistic practice and an aesthetic attitude that clearly diverge from 
certain fundamental values in the theoretical canon of the mod-
ernist narrative and that (to some extent) violate the boundaries 
of what was previously referred to as the regime of authenticity. 
Under consideration here are various expressions and represen-
tations of an attitude that could be described as a post-romantic 
modernism. This is what the emphasis of the open aesthetic on 
the communicative function of language and the shift from work 
to frame during the 1950s and 1960s meant—a shift that subse-
quently led to a number of theoretical and discursive changes that 
might very well be characterised as a postmodern condition).
Endgame
Instead of considering medial critique (modernism) and institu-
tional critique (avant-garde, postmodernism) as different in kind, 
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as some theoreticians have done, both practices could be rec-
ognised as two sides of the same coin: a linguistic critique that is 
fundamentally to do with communication and relates in various 
ways (antithetically and synthetically) to an institutionalised so-
cial context. This was the insight that compelled an art critic such 
as Arthur Danto to begin theorising on the meaning of the art 
world and of aesthetic identification after viewing and attempt-
ing to understand Andy Warhol’s Brillo-boxes in 1964. The basic 
problem in this regard is no different from that of the reception of 
Picasso’s work in 1912 or Pollock’s in 1948, apart from the fact 
that Warhol (to some extent) and Fahlström (to a considerable 
extent) formulated the problem of language/discourse at a highly 
conscious level. In Fahlström’s case, the course taken by the dia-
lectic of the work moves through a thorough exploration of the 
grammar of the visual language in order to expand far beyond any 
notion of a closed framework. And yet it seems all the more es-
sential to make that framework—its boundaries—visible in order 
to understand and analyse the meaning of the space that makes 
this movement possible or, in other words, the discursive space 
that Dr. Schweitzer’s Last Mission seems to identify by means of 
its complex structure and that also provides this work with its 
particular sign function as art.
If we return at this point to the comparison previously drawn 
between Clement Greenberg and Walter Benjamin, a reversal has 
evidently taken place. The (avant-garde) aesthetic of disparity that 
Greenberg championed from the end of the 1930s became the pos-
sible narrative for modern art in the political, social and economic 
context of the post-war period, in contrast with Benjamin’s thesis 
on the profound change to the work of art in the age of mechan-
ical reproduction. However, the discursive order that made one 
statement possible but not the other has shifted since that time. 
Detached from its original political connotations, Benjamin’s text 
has been recoded as a possible interpretation of the pluralism and 
cross-boundary artistic practices of recent decades. Particularly, 
his idea that the aura of the work of art (the very idea of the 
aura of the work of art) had been abandoned because the mass 
(re-)production provided by film and photography has become 
widespread within and without the art world. It would not be 
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farfetched to maintain that today the photographic code has re-
placed painting as the predominant sign system of the art world. 
But does this mean that we now find ourselves beyond the reach 
of the regime of authenticity—that it is no longer possible to make 
a distinction between Art and art?
It is quite clear at a theoretical level that this particular dis-
tinction has come in for massive criticism and, ultimately, been 
delegitimated, both in the practices of the visual arts and those of 
art criticism and philosophy. However, it would be naive to regard 
pluralism as a value-nihilist state purely on the basis of a changed 
theoretical position. Despite the fact that the distinctions and po-
sitions of the art world have undergone various radical changes 
during recent decades, and despite the fact that the structure of 
the system itself has become extraordinarily more complex, its 
practitioners still find themselves within a particular institutional 
and economic framework that converts, distributes and accumu-
lates various types of values—aesthetic, symbolic, ideological and 
economic. The circulation of capital and values within this do-
main depends as much today as ever before on the power and 
capacity to make distinctions.
The complicated machinery that Pierre Bourdieu describes in 
Les règles de l’art and elsewhere has not broken down in any 
sense, but the pattern of movement and the distinctions operating 
in this field are shaped and formulated in a somewhat different 
way today. Within the framework of this machinery, the idea of 
the authentic in both the descriptive and normative senses of the 
word still appears to be a central value. A more radical alteration 
of this state of affairs would presumably require not only a num-
ber of critical philosophical and artistic deconstructions, but also 
a completely different institutional and economic system.
And it is here that we return to the point where we began: 
wonderment at the alienated effect evoked by Thomas Struth’s 
photographs. This effect is, in large part, based on the peculiar 
activity the image dramatises as photograph and as work of art: 
that people and societies, now more so than ever before, place 
such a high value on the idea of Art and the transformations that 
take place within the world of art that they are prepared to in-
vest enormous quantities of money and time to make this activity 
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possible. This activity is one that also involves a most peculiar 
encounter between different types of quantifications. A building 
that cost hundreds of millions to erect and maintain is visited an-
nually by hundreds of thousands of people who look at images 
and objects whose collective value reaches into the billions. In this 
building, the images are hung individually so that each visitor can 
encounter a unique work (a work the artist considered himself 
at one time to be one with) in order to contemplate its singular 
meaning and the personal address it makes. Unfettered mass dis-
tribution and isolated unicity are the simultaneous hallmarks of 
the situation. The space stipulates a real encounter with a physical 
object, whose transformation into Art and Meaning occurs in an 
entirely different symbolic or ritual sphere—to the extent, that is, 
that anyone still believes it is possible for transformation to take 
place (literally and figuratively) at all.
This situation brings to mind the space Michel Foucault de-
scribed with the term heterotopia: a kind of place that exists in the 
midst of society but which is regulated on the basis of different per-
ceptions than those governing the rest of society; it is completely 
real and yet unreal at the same time.107 The cemetery is one such 
space, as are the theatre, the park, the library, the cinema—and 
the museum. The heterotopic place brings together different spaces 
and attitudes that are mutually incompatible; it embraces different 
perceptions of time, implying a system of openings and closures 
that both isolate the functions of the space and relate them to the 
surrounding world. Foucault likens this type of place to a mirror 
in which I am observing an image of myself in a placeless place:
From the standpoint of the mirror I discover my absence from the 
place where I am since I see myself over there. Starting from this 
gaze that is, as it where, directed toward me, from the ground of 
this virtual space that is the other side of the glass, I come back 
toward myself: I begin again to direct my eyes toward myself and 
to reconstitute myself there where I am. The mirror functions as a 
heterotopia in this respect: it makes this place that I occupy at the 
moment when I look at myself in the glass at once absolutely real, 
connected with all the space that surrounds it, and absolutely un-
real, since in order to be perceived it has to pass this virtual point 
which is over there.108
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Thomas Struth’s photographs convey something of this strange 
feeling of finding oneself dangling in the discontinuity between 
different moments of time and different levels of reality. The dis-
tancing effect of the photograph makes it possible for us to ob-
serve observation, but that effect is also at work in the fact that a 
work of art is making visible the constitution and existence of art 
in modern society. What Thomas Struth is doing is demonstrat-
ing the romantic foundations of the white cube: that moment in 
which the sublime content of the work is meant to be conveyed 
to the viewer directly and immediately. And he portrays this mo-
ment in a manner that recalls the rhetorical apparatus a Romantic 
such as Caspar David Friedrich initiated in his work by showing a 
number of individuals who turn their backs on us, the viewers, in 
order to observe the sublime for themselves.
This may be understood not only as an ironic game with con-
ventions and traditions, but alo as an allegory of how the linguis-
tic and epistemological gulf that characterised the visual arts of 
the modern era also characterises our own age. The presentation 
of Jackson Pollock’s painting in the neutral space of the museum 
presupposes an individual experience of the aura and sublime ef-
fect of the authentic work. And yet Struth’s images could also be 
said to perform a deconstruction of this unarticulated context by 
portraying it in a piece that is both a clinical form of documenta-
tion and an aestheticising artwork—a work that serves as a sign 
of the impossibility of an origin of the sign or of the fixing of its 
meaning, a sign that demonstrates how the search for the meaning 
of the sign always leads on to another sign and never to anything 
originally signified. In this context, Thomas Struth’s image can be 
seen as a sign that stages a radical deconstruction of the possible 
authenticity of the sign/the work of art.
While this interpretation may be legitimate, it would appear to 
be a particularly pessimistic proposition about the communicative 
function and value of the visual arts (and, by extension, of human 
language). Although what seems truly remarkable in light of such 
radical scepticism is the actual existence of any communicative 
function and value. What Thomas Struth’s picture is bringing to 
the fore is, in fact, that problematic section of Ad Reinhardt’s for-
mula ‘Art is art as art and everything else is everything else’: the 
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phrase that designates something ‘as art’. Poststructuralist scep-
ticism could be described in this regard as a form of secularisa-
tion and emancipation. Art, like every other value and every other 
meaning, cannot be understood as something simply god-given 
but rather as a social construction, at once utterly real and uncon-
ditionally unreal. The hopeful aspect of this situation is that an 
understanding of this part is being established that transcends the 
authoritative sanction of the unified modernist narrative, whose 
formula has been dissolved and fragmentised in such a way that 
the definition of modern art has reacquired that once so open 
question mark.
This is also a key implication of a differentiation of the canon: 
to make it possible to revisit an oeuvre, such as that of Jackson 
Pollock’s, from outside the singular narrative of modernism and, 
perhaps, even to believe in it once again. Although this would 
involve a diametrically opposed form of belief to the truths me-
diated by the theory and historiography of modernism—a belief 
characterised not by historical necessity or blind faith in the au-
thenticity of the work but by a deep ambivalence between absence 
and meaning.
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Anyone who studies the history of modern art—in art museums, in 
the classroom, in art historical handbooks or specialist surveys—will 
soon be aware of a certain recurrent pattern governing the selection 
of objects and forming a certain type of narrative where the history 
of modern art is presented as a variety of different -isms that dissolve 
into each other in the coherent sequence that constitutes the history 
of modern art as modernism. 
But why is this pattern so similar in all different places and contexts? 
Is it possible to distinguish between the history of modern art and 
the history of modernism? And if so, when, where and how did 
modernism become synonymous with art of the modern era? 
With a dual perspective—regarding art as well as the discursive 
perception of art—Modernism as an Institution attempts to answer 
these questions by studying the frameworks for the institutional 
establishment, as well as the historiography, of modern art. 
